February 2019

February 2019 - International Criminal Court (ICC) Update

BY ISABELLA BANKS, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE PILPG-NL

IN THE PAST MONTH, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) RELEASED UPDATES ON THE CONDITIONAL RELEASE OF MR. GBAGBO AND MR. BLÉ GOUDÉ, THE ICC PROSECUTOR’S PARTICIPATION ON THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE, AND THE LAUNCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL GENDER CHAMPION NETWORK’S NEW HUB IN THE HAGUE.

ICC Appeals Chamber to Impose Conditions on Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé Upon Their Release Following Their Acquittal

On February 1, 2019, the ICC Appeals Chamber announced its unanimous decision to impose conditions on the release of Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé to a state (or states) willing to accept them and enforce these conditions. According to the ICC Press Release, the purpose of the imposed conditions is to “protect the integrity of the process.” The Appeals Chamber instructed ICC Registrar Peter Lewis to identify and enter into agreements with said state (or states) and make the necessary interim arrangements.

 This announcement came in the wake of the Trial Chamber I’s controversial decision in mid-January to grant the defense’s “no case to answer” motion to acquit Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé from all charges. Trial Chamber I initially found that there were no exceptional circumstances preventing the release of Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé from ICC detention following their acquittal.  The ICC Prosecutor appealed this decision, warning that the two men presented flight risks and that “their unconditional release might impact victims’ safety.”

 The acquittal – which came after a three-year trial relating to post-electoral violence in Cote d’Ivoire between 2010 and 2011 – prompted a wide range of reactions from ICC commentators. Some called it a serious “blow” for the Court that “rattles ICC foundations” while others argued that “the fairness of any criminal justice system must be judged by acquittals and not by convictions.” Regardless of whether or not this most recent acquittal reflects inadequacies of the Office of the Prosecutor, few dispute that the decision and the sensational publicity around it hurt the Court’s credibility. Dutch speakers can watch PILPG NL Director Marieke de Hoon’s comments on the decision on NPO Radio 1 here.

Statement of the ICC Prosecutor Following the Conditional Release of Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé 

Following the Feburary 1 decision of the Appeals Chamber, ICC Prosecutor stated that it was amenable to release with a set of conditions, the purpose of which was to ensure that Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé would be available before Court should the trial proceedings against them continue.

The ICC Prosecutor further noted that it would await a written decision by the Judges of Trial Chamber I detailing the legal reasons for the January 15 acquittal before deciding whether or not to exercise its right to appeal.

ICC Hosts Launch of International Gender Champions Network’s “Den Haag Hub”

On February 5, 2019, the ICC hosted the launch of the International Gender Champions  (IGC) Network’s new hub – an event organized by the Embassies of Canada and Switzerland to the Netherlands. The International Gender Champions is a leadership network that “brings together female and male decision-makers to break down gender barriers” and consists of over 200 active Champions worldwide. The purpose of the launch event was to discuss how Gender Champions and other advocates could put their commitment to gender equality into action in The Hague. The hub itself is intended to promote gender equality across organizations in The Hague and facilitate coordination with the IGC’s other chapters in Geneva, New York, Vienna, and Nairobi.

Last year, ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, and ICC Registrar Peter Lewis each joined the ICG leadership network and vowed to take concrete measures to strengthen gender equality within their respective organs at the Court. All three spoke at the February 5 launch event. As part of a panel discussion, Prosecutor Bensouda stated, “Equality for women is progress for all. Achieving gender parity is a collective responsibility.”  

ICC Prosecutor Participates in the Munich Security Conference

From February 15-17, 2019, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda attended Germany’s 55th Munich Security Conference. The purpose of the annual event is to “build trust and contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts by sustaining a continuous, curated, and informal dialogue within the international security community.” Prosecutor Bensouda’s attendance was intended to bring attention to accountability for atrocity crimes and build support for her Office.

In her statements at the conference, the ICC Prosecutor called for greater support for “institutions created to ensure a rules-based global order and accountability” and highlighted her Office’s preliminary investigation work, which have helped catalyze national proceedings in select states. Prosecutor Bensouda also participated in a solutions-oriented side event organized by the Aurora Humanitarian Initiative, a non-profit organization founded on behalf of survivors of the Armenian Genocide. 

Throughout the conference, Prosecutor Bensouda met with senior officials from a number of states, regional and international organizations, and civil society. Controversially among them was Rwandan President Paul Kagame, a known critic of the ICC. A photo of the pair shaking hands sparked a vigorous debate about the dissemination of photos of meetings between the ICC Prosecutor and world leaders on Mark Kersten’s blog, Justice in Conflict.

International Criminal Liability in the Age of Social Media: Facebook's Role in Myanmar

By: Isabella Banks, Research Associate, PILPG-NL

The New York Times reported disturbing details of a systematic campaign led by Myanmar’s military elite to use Facebook’s broad reach to incite violence against the Rohingya. Through fake accounts and celebrity pages, the military disseminated anti-Rohingya propaganda, fake news, and inflammatory photos to millions of followers. As many as 700 people were involved in spreading this content to users across the country.

Criminal liability in international law is unique from that of most national legal systems in that it extends to those physically distant from the crime. International law’s expanded notions of criminal liability and commission are what have made it possible for justice institutions – first the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) in 1945 and now the International Criminal Court (ICC) – to hold high-level perpetrators who order, plan, coordinate, or facilitate mass atrocities from afar accountable for their actions.

A question that international legal authorities have largely left unanswered is how this expanded notion of criminal liability might be applied in the age of global online networks and in particular, social media. There is mounting evidence that in addition to helping us stay connected and “bring the world closer together,” social media platforms are being used to proliferate ideas that result in real-world violence. 

A recent study conducted in Germany found that anti-refugee hate speech on Facebook predicted violent crimes against refugees in municipalities with above average usage of the platform. The researchers took advantage of sporadic internet outages to test the causality of the relationship, and confirmed that when “internet access went down in an area with high Facebook use, attacks on refugees dropped significantly.” Other research suggests that this may be because posts that trigger strong, negative emotions are favored by the platform’s newsfeed algorithm, which aims to maximize user engagement.

Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm is particularly vulnerable to misuse and manipulation in transitional countries like Myanmar, where democratic institutions are weak, social trust is low, and Facebook is the only website that many people access. Over the past year, Facebook has been criticized repeatedly for exacerbating the ongoing genocide against the country’s Rohingya ethnic minority by failing to contain the spread of hate speech and disinformation on its platform.

The New York Times reported disturbing details of a systematic campaign led by Myanmar’s military elite to use Facebook’s broad reach to incite violence against the Rohingya. Through fake accounts and celebrity pages, the military disseminated anti-Rohingya propaganda, fake news, and inflammatory photos to millions of followers. As many as 700 people were involved in spreading this content to users across the country.

The military’s Facebook campaign was launched five years ago – approximately the same time that human rights violations against the Rohingya are reported to have worsened. A recent report published by the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) documenting atrocity crimes committed in Myanmar’s Rhakine State found that while many patterns of abuse stretch back for decades, “the period of the most consistent persecution and escalating violence against the Rohingya began in 2012 and steadily intensified through the major attacks that began in August 2017.”

By the time Facebook announced its decision to remove 20 accounts linked to military and spiritual leaders that had “enabled serious human rights abuses” in August 2018, a Reuters investigation had documented over 100,000 anti-Rohingya Facebook posts and 700,000 Rohingya had fled across the border to Bangladesh. 

Inside Myanmar, Facebook’s announcement was met with widespread outrage and largely overshadowed the news of a United Nations report highlighting the massacre of at least 10,000 Rohingya, which had been released the day before. One government spokesman went so far as to say, “We have called Facebook to ask why they have done this…we worry that this action will have an impact on national reconciliation.” 

For others, Facebook’s response came too late. As early as 2013, Myanmar experts began meeting with Facebook to warn them that activity on the platform was fueling attacks on the Rohingya. In a presentation at the company’s headquarters, one Myanmar-based entrepreneur likened Facebook’s role in Myanmar to that of extremist anti-Tutsi radio broadcasts that propelled the Rwandan genocide. 

In March 2018, the chairman of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar stated that social media had “substantively contributed to the level of acrimony and dissension and conflict” in Myanmar. The following month, civil society groups published an open letter criticizing Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s characterization of Facebook’s hate speech “detection systems” as effective in the aftermath of an incident that resulted in three violent attacks. The letter highlighted Facebook’s overreliance on third parties to flag dangerous content and its failure to implement a mechanism for emergency escalation. 

The ICC’s recent decision to open a preliminary investigation concerning the mass deportation of the Rohingya to Bangladesh represents a potential opportunity to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Myanmar. This raises important questions: How and to what extent should top Facebook officials be held responsible for their avoidance and mismanagement of an emerging crisis? Do the company’s stated concerns about infringing upon the free speech of its users justify its inaction? On what legal basis might the military leaders who exploited Facebook to incite violence against the Rohingya be prosecuted?

In a 2003 case before the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor vs. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, three founders of extremist media outlets were convicted of direct and public incitement to commit genocide for orchestrating a propaganda campaign intended to desensitize the Hutu population and encourage them to kill Tutsis. In 2007, the Appeals Chamber reversed several aspects of the Trial Chamber's judgement on the grounds that: 1) it was inappropriate to apply international human rights law on hate speech to genocide crimes; and 2) direct and public incitement to commit genocide was not a continuous crime. In so doing, the Appeals Chamber drew a clear distinction between hate speech and international crimes, and made it difficult to hold individuals who publicly foment hatred over a long period of time accountable for violence that may result from their actions. 

The outcome of the ICTR’s so-called “Media case” suggests that the prosecution of the military leaders responsible for the anti-Rohingya Facebook campaign will constitute a significant legal challenge in itself. Still, the question of Facebook’s responsibility towards the countries it operates in – particularly those in transition – remains.

Zuckerberg himself has acknowledged: “In a lot of ways, Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.” Given that international law exists in large part to ensure that governments fulfill their “responsibility to protect” their own people, it seems likely that international legal authorities will need to further adapt criminal liability to account for the outsized influence of social media companies.

Security Council Meeting on the Situation in Darfur – Report Presentation by Fatou Bensouda

By Sophie Bones, PILPG Law Fellow & Victoria Ernst, PILPG Research Associate

Bensouda’s Remarks – paraphrased 

Effecting warrants of arrest is a big challenge and more collaboration is needed between Member States and the ICC. States Parties receiving as guests suspects the court wishes to arrest cannot become the usual practice. Over the years, reports have highlighted consistent failure of the Security Council to react on the movement of Bashir between states, and States Parties have failed to comply with the court’s request despite a clear treaty obligation to do so. A lack of legal clarity has been used to justify this, however the ICC’s position is that there is no legal lacuna or ambiguity concerning States Parties’ obligation to arrest persons with warrants issued against them. Such failures are flagrant violation of the Rome Statute, they equally undermine the Security Council’s reputation, and are an affront to Security Council resolutions. South Africa failed to arrest Bashir, and the pre-trial chamber found it had failed to comply with the arrest warrant – a direct contravention of the Rome Statute. This failure prevented the court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute. This decision (not appealed) establishes that there is no legal or factual justification for South Africa’s failure to arrest and surrender Bashir to the court. In such circumstances, there can be no justification to not arrest based on their official status where a warrant has been issued. Despite the chamber’s finding of non-compliance, it did not refer South Africa to the ASP or the Security Council. This was for multiple reasons namely that South Africa was the first State Party to utilize art. 97 of the Rome Statute; the chamber took note of robust domestic proceedings in South Africa on the issue. 

A spotlight is cast on the repeated inaction of the Security Council. This is a matter of grave concern, in particular for Bashir’s victims. This costly inaction has potential to undermine the fight against impunity and lowers the bar of accountability that many have fought to raise. Due to this inaction, states are safe in the knowledge that the Security Council will not respond to breaches. This has a detrimental impact on victims who rely on the court. The EU’s call to Member States of the UN to abide by, and implement resolutions made by the Security Council under Chapter VII was welcomed. However, cooperation has been a significant challenge. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) does have gratitude for the support received from other States Parties which has been crucial for obtaining information and evidence. Sudan continues to adopt an antagonistic posture to the ICC and refuses to cooperate, however the ICC is ready and willing to cooperate with them. It is necessary to remember that Bashir and other suspects are alleged to have committed serious crimes under the Rome Statute. As such, the office will continue to independently and impartially investigate these crimes, and notes that all suspects are innocent until proven guilty by the OTP. The OTP calls on the Council to remind parties to comply with International Humanitarian Law. The work of the ICC is essential for fighting impunity for world’s most serious and destabilizing crimes. The Court should be actively supported by the Security Council and community as a whole. The OTP is still receiving reports of killings and displacement of peoples. Moreover, there have also been reports of sexual violence, in particular against young girls. On this note, the OTP reminds the Council that it needs financial support to continue its investigations. Accountability for crimes under the Rome Statute is a necessary complement to sustainable peace in Darfur. Finally, the OTP calls on Member States to come to action on warrants for arrest issued by the court 

Sudan’s Remarks – paraphrased 

Their first comment was regarding the existence of small arms and light weapons in conflict zones. These weapons, the Sudanese representative claimed, contribute to insecurity and instability in the region, and therefore their presence in Darfur poses a challenge to the government. However, he argued that the Government of Sudan will not be part of the weapons collection, and UNAMID is to be responsible for this task. Sudan is not a party to the ICC, whose prosecutor and office, he says, have been blinded by political motives and cannot see the clear position of international law (referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). The Sudanese representative further argued that Security Council Resolution 1593 specifically refers to the fact that ICC jurisdiction does not apply to non-parties. This focus on Sudan, he says, is the result of inconsistencies inherent in the Rome Statute, notably the wide and unlimited powers granted to the Prosecutor, going on to mention “shocking reports about corruption of the court and the prosecutor”. 

He states that this Sudan report is the same as previous reports, which have gone beyond all international norms by attacking sovereign states and heads of state. He goes on to complain that the report does not highlight the real perpetrators of the violence – the armed groups. He argues that the ICC is hampering the peace process, and the Prosecutor is a tool for one single predetermined purpose- the intent to use the ICC as a political tool to achieve a specific political objective to extend the hostilities in Darfur. They argue that this intent is solidified by the Security Council Resolution 2363 which seeks to extend the mandate of UNAMID without care that further presence of UNAMID and ongoing ICC interest will continue the war. They believe that the ICC is an obstacle that needs to be removed in order to achieve peace in Sudan so it can turn to development and peace. He also argues that the Prosecutor has used fabricated information on Darfur regarding the numbers of people displaced and the atrocities committed all of which are outside the duties of the Prosecutor, and calls for an investigation into the sources used. He concludes by saying “we pay no attention to the contradiction, utterings, and phrases of a court that was born dead”, and “Sudan will pursue the course of lasting peace in Darfur, by doing so we will protect our people from falling victim to conflict, victims who are being exploited by the Prosecutor and her office”. 

Responses to the Prosecutor’s briefing from other Security Council Member States fell into two camps: those that supported the ICC and the apprehension of Bashir, and those that believed the continued investigation violated international law norms. Sentiments among states in each camp were largely consistent. The United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Senegal, Italy, the United States, Ukraine, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Japan supported the cases in Sudan. Sudan, China, Egypt, Russia, and Ethiopia did not. 

Among the representatives that voiced support for the ICC, the main issues concerned IDPs, continued sexual violence, and continued impunity. Representatives from the UK, France, Sweden, Italy, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Japan called on the Security Council to enforce the decisions of the ICC and take action against non-compliance, especially by State Parties to the Rome Statute. The UK representative stressed the importance of DDR, but said that the government’s ongoing disarmament campaign was undermining the security situation. She also addressed the continued volatility of the situation and the need for a ceasefire to refocus on the peace process. The French representative called for increased access for UNAMID so it could fulfill its mandate. She also reiterated a previous proposal to allow states that do not cooperate with ICC arrest warrants to come before the Council and have a dialogue. The Senegalese and Bolivian representatives called for support of the OTP as well as support of the AU’s high-level implementation group in achieving peace in the region. The Bolivian representative called on non-Parties to the Rome Statute to ratify and added that constructive dialogue was impossible while non-Party states advocated for the rule of law while ignoring their own international obligations. The Italian representative highlighted that the Council’s conversation about Darfur was not progressing and that continued talk without action was not advancing peace or security. He called for more open dialogue and creative solutions. 

The representatives that were not supportive of the ICC’s continued presence in Sudan reiterated sentiments that pursuing prosecution of Bashir violated customary norms relating to head of state immunity and national sovereignty. Representatives recognized achievements made by the Sudanese government in cooperating with UNAMID and others providing humanitarian assistance. Representatives advocated for an African driven peace process, which was being hampered by continued international intervention. Representatives also highlighted their position that states not Party to the Rome Statute have no obligations under it and cannot be held to violate its provisions or to abide by its orders. The Ethiopian representative went as far as to say that the case against al Bashir was weak and was “frankly becoming an embarrassment” to the Court. He said that continuing the case would only serve to damage the Court’s credibility. The Russian Federation representative said that the Prosecutor’s report was misleading and ignored real progress being made by the government of Sudan in pursing peace. He also defended Russia’s inaction in apprehending Bashir and said that Russia did not intend to report to anyone on its bilateral contact with Sudan.

Sudan made it clear today that it has no interest in cooperating with the court, and their complaints are indicative of the regional opinion on immunity for heads of state, and the court’s focus on African States. Sudan views the ICC’s involvement in the region as antagonistic to the peace process, while the OTP stood strong in its opinion that Bashir needs to answer for his alleged crimes in order to fight against impunity and bring a lasing resolution to the conflict. It appears, then, that the parties are at an impasse. Any future progress remains to be seen.

The Legal Aspects of the MH17 Disaster: What Next?

By: Emma Bakkum, Research Associate, PILPG-NL

Almost three years have passed since Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over Eastern Ukraine, leaving no survivors of the 298 passengers. The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) has since published that the plane was shot down by a buk missile situated in Eastern Ukraine. However, no State or individual has been held responsible to date. Victims’ relatives, the Dutch State, and others continue to consider legal options. In light of this, dr. Marieke de Hoon set out the problems and consequences of different legal procedures during a public lecture at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Because a single evening is not enough to discuss all legal aspects surrounding MH17, she focused on two legal avenues available: the prosecution of individuals before a criminal court of law and the responsibilities of States under international law.

Criminal Law

The most often discussed legal avenue is criminal law, under which individual perpetrators can be held accountable for the crimes they committed. Not only those directly responsible but also those who ordered, conspired to or aided and abetted the shooting down of MH17 can be held responsible. These individuals can be prosecuted both at the national level in domestic courts or at the international level, at the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a specially established tribunal. Criminal law, however, requires a high burden of proof. Not only needs to be proven that an individual has committed a criminal act but also that the individual did so with the required knowledge and intent, making it difficult to prosecute individuals. Under the circumstances of the MH17 situation, investigations are strenuous. Jeroen Akkermans, who was one of the first investigative journalists present at the crash site, underlined the problems with gathering evidence.

While the victims’ relatives appeared to have lost faith in the Dutch government for initiating criminal proceedings, they questioned what they could do personally. Professor Arno Akkermans pointed to the high costs and difficult procedures linked to individual legal proceedings and advised the victims’ relatives to continue to rely on the government and the pubic prosecution to undertake action.

International Responsibilities of States

Not only individuals but also States violating certain international obligations could be held responsible at the international level. There appear to be strong arguments to claim that Ukraine and Russia have violated their international obligations to communicate information, to investigate allegations, and to prosecute or extradite. These claims could be initiated by States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or by States or individuals before the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR). However, the options for these procedures are limited and they can be very lengthy and legally complex.

Political Unwillingness Calls for Both Legal and Political Approaches

Although legal procedures could achieve further truth finding and are a step towards responsibility, they all come with their own complexities and are moreover lengthy processes without much prospect of compensation. Most critically however, are the difficulties that arise from the (political) unwillingness of States to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution. Considering this, negotiations are important, which, as De Hoon pointed out, may lead to creative solutions as they did in the Lockerbie case.

Perhaps, the audience suggested, in order to turn the tides within the coming years, a political approach instead of legal approach should be advocated for. But is politics alone an option when legal options are not successful? “Law is a form of politics” and lawyers can clarify the responsibility of States, De Hoon answered. Pieter Omtzigt highlighted the importance of politics to establish any kind of justice trough law: “negotiate with States, use public diplomacy, and take a certain position against Ukraine or Russia”. The Netherlands might have an especially strong position to do this when it is part of the United Nations Security Council in 2018. It might then be able to push for adherence to UNSC Resolution 2166 which calls upon all States to fully cooperate with the MH17 investigation.

Truth Finding

The political side of international interaction surrounding MH17 inevitably slows legal action. However, it is not a choice between either political action or legal action. Law and politics are intertwined (law is a form of politics, making politics more effective with the language of law). The question should rather be: how can we strengthen both legal and political options with each other? In the end, finding the truth is the common ground, the basis of the endeavor surrounding responsibility for shooting down MH17.

What is the Alternative?

The wishes or needs of victims’ relatives are difficult to be fulfilled with lengthy and complex legal procedures. “But what is the alternative? Doing nothing?” “We must continue to talk and discuss about MH17 and an evening like this is therefore very important to keep it on the agenda”, one of the victims’ relatives explained. Persistent attention could eventually lead to something. For this reason perhaps, some of the victims’ relatives recently expressed that they consider joining a case at the European Court for Human Rights against Ukraine for violating its obligation to close its airspace. They reiterated that the bottom line is that they cannot do nothing and sit back.

The JIT has arrived at its final and most difficult phase: identifying the actual perpetrators of the shooting down of MH17. The conversation on legal avenues to pursue can and will be continued when the JIT has identified those individual perpetrators. This public lecture has contributed to the understanding and considerations for all parties involved of the different legal avenues in response to the MH17 disaster.

For more, see Navigating the Legal Horizon: Lawyering the MH17 Disaster by Marieke de Hoon.

International crimes in Dutch Courts: Dutch Businessman Convicted for Complicity in War Crimes and Illegal Weapons Trade

By: Rosalie Dieleman & Emma Bakkum, Research Associates, PILPG-NL

On 21 April 2017, the court of appeal of Den Bosch convicted 74 years’ old Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven for illegal trade in weapons and complicity in war crimes in Liberia and Guinea between 2000 and 2003. He is sentenced to 19 years of imprisonment. Kouwenhoven, in his position as Director of Operation of the Oriental Timber Company (OTC) and of the Royal Timber Company (RTC) had a close relationship with former Liberian president Charles Taylor. An investigation into his activities was launched in February 2004. Kouwenhoven was accused of complicity in war crimes and weapons trade in violation of the UN embargo in place at the time.

On 21 April 2017, the court of appeal in Den Bosch sentenced Kouwenhoven to 19 years of imprisonment for complicity in war crimes in Liberia and Guinea between 2000 and 2003 as well as illegal arms trade. The court of appeal considered the facts proven, as consistent and reliable evidence was established as a result of additional investigation and witness hearings. Furthermore, with regards to sentencing, the court of appeal noted that it took into account that the crimes committed concern “very serious violations of the principles of humanitarian law” and that the suspect played “an important supporting role” in these violations. With the sentencing decision, the court intends to signal the court’s judgement of the gravity of the crimes to the victims and their families, as well as the international legal community. The sentencing aim of general prevention is given special attention by the court, noting that “businessmen like the suspect, who trade internationally and do not shy away to do so in cooperation with regimes like that of Charles Taylor, should be warned that they can get involved in (international) crimes (against humanity)”.

Kouwenhoven is the second Dutch businessman to be convicted for complicity in war crimes, following the conviction of Frans van Anraat in 2007. Van Anraat was convicted by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands for complicity in war crimes by delivering chemicals used for the production of mustard gas to the government of Sadam Hussein in Iraq.

Kouwenhoven has, to date, denied involvement in the crimes and is deliberating whether to file an appeal to the judgment. Kouwenhoven’s lawyer, Inez Weski, already expressed her intent to start a procedure at the European Court of Human Rights. She argues that, due to Kouwenhoven’s detoriating health, detention would be a violation of the duty of care of the Netherlands as laid down in the European Convention for Human Rights.

The judgment of the court of appeals in April 2017 followed a lengthy procedure before the Dutch courts. In 2006, the district court of The Hague convicted Kouwenhoven for illegal arms trade. He was, however, acquitted for complicity in war crimes due to lack of evidence. Both the prosecution and defense appealed. In 2008, the court of appeal in The Hague acquitted Kouwenhoven of all counts, due to the unreliability of several witness statements resulting in a lack of evidence. In 2010, however, the Supreme Court quashed this judgment and determined that the public prosecution’s office had unjustly not been given the opportunity to hear two anonymous witnesses. The Supreme Court referred the case back to the court of appeal in Den Bosch, where the case was reopened on 6 February 2017.

This judgment was the second judgment in April 2017 in an international crimes case in the Netherlands, on 4 April 2017, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands came to a final judgment in the criminal proceedings against five Dutch nationals involved in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).