The Tragedy of Goli Otok: A Call for Justice

By Ambassador (ret.) Zorica Maric Djordjevic & Prof. Milena Sterio

Goli Otok translates to "Barren Island" in English. It is the name of a political prison camp located on an island in the Adriatic Sea, Croatia, part of the former Yugoslavia, functioning from 1948 until the end of 1988.

Goli Otok, the notorious Yugoslav prison camp, remains one of the darkest chapters in the history of the former Yugoslavia. Established in 1948 as a brutal labor camp for political prisoners, it became synonymous with repression, psychological and physical torture, and forced ideological re-education. Numerous citizens of the former Yugoslavia, and in particular many intellectuals and political figures, were imprisoned there for “crimes” such as opposing the Communist Party's policies or being labeled a Stalin supporter and “enemy of the people.” Sentences, handed down by the Communist Party without a trial, ranged from months to several years of forced labor and imprisonment on Goli Otok. The imprisonment of political dissidents on Goli Otok left a lasting impact on their families, particularly their children, who grew up under the shadow of societal prejudice, silent struggle, and the enduring weight of injustice—burdens that persisted particularly until the fall of communism in 1989.

 This repressive political project did not spare women, who were imprisoned both on Goli Otok and the nearby island of St. Grgur, where they endured brutal treatment, forced labor, and ideological persecution. Their suffering remains an often-overlooked aspect of this dark chapter, yet it is an essential part of the broader historical reckoning that must take place.

While most former Yugoslav republics have acknowledged this dark chapter, rehabilitated the victims, and provided compensation, Montenegro remains an exception. The communist narrative, once used to justify these grave human rights violations, still dominates discussions about Goli Otok, obstructing true rehabilitation and justice. This is no coincidence—those who shaped and upheld this narrative were the very ones who wrote Montenegrin history, ensuring that the truth remained buried, and that accountability was never fully addressed.

Yet, rehabilitation and compensation are not mere legal formalities—they are essential steps toward historical accountability, human dignity, and genuine democratic reconciliation. This is not just a matter of acknowledging the past; it is a matter of justice. It is about ensuring that the voices of those who suffered are heard and remembered, and that future generations learn from these tragedies. Despite the shortcomings that Montenegrins continue to criticize in their homeland, the personal freedoms achieved today are significant. With them, Montenegrins have the opportunity to confront their difficult past, demand justice, and uphold historical responsibility. 

First, rehabilitation and compensation are important toward restoring dignity. Most former prisoners and their families lived under the stigma of imprisonment. Official recognition and rehabilitation would confirm their innocence and restore their dignity. Second, rehabilitation and compensation are important to impose legal and moral responsibility on the government of Montenegro. Governments that inherited the legal and political structures of Yugoslavia, including Montenegro, have an obligation to acknowledge and atone for the unjust arrests of their citizens. Legal rehabilitation should include overturning unjust sentences, issuing official apologies, and recognizing historical truth in state documents. Third, rehabilitation and compensation acknowledge and compensate for unjust suffering. The survivors (the few who remain) and their families lost years of their lives, livelihoods, and health. Compensation—whether through financial reparations, social benefits, or symbolic acts such as memorial funds—would provide tangible recognition of the injustice they suffered. Finally, rehabilitation and compensations establish historical responsibility. In fact, proper acknowledgment of the victims of Goli Otok would serve as a warning against future political repression. By officially addressing these crimes, societies such as Montenegro can strengthen democratic principles and prevent history from repeating.

It is essential that the government of Montenegro address its difficult past related to Goli Otok by formally acknowledging what happened and by providing rehabilitation and compensation to thevictims/families of Goli Otok prisoners. It is through such formal actions that Montenegro could provide redress for the past while educating future generations about the dangers of punishing political dissent, ensuring that history does not repeat itself. Doing so, Montenegro will fully join the rest of Europe in honoring millions of victims who suffered under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

A New Chance for Europe?

Author: Dr. Igor Lukšić, Former Prime Minister of Montenegro, PILPG Senior Peace Fellow

​​Always On the Run
As the consequences of the war in Ukraine continue to be revealed, Europe finds itself grappling with a cluster of crises. Soaring electricity, gas and oil prices, as a consequence of economic sanctions on Russia, was the most evident early consequence of the war. Elsewhere the impact of the weaponization of food and fertilizers has been tremendous. This energy crisis compounds with already rising inflation, a lingering consequence of pandemic efforts to inject money into domestic economies and keep sinking economies afloat. As the war drags on, state security and foreign policy, especially that of the European states, continues to be tested. This insecurity has reignited an ongoing debate about the future of the European Union (EU), a debate that predates the Russian-Ukrainian war but is heavily linked to the long-established preference of Ukraine to have close ties to the EU. As a result of this debate, there have been various calls for reforms in order for the European Union to become more resilient, more competitive, and more globally relevant.

In this piece, however, I would like to focus on the future of the European Union as it relates to the relationship between its neighbors. The policy of enlargement, frequently dubbed as the EU’s most successful policy, has become stagnant. There are a number of countries, referred to as candidate countries, many of which in the Western Balkans, that aspire to become full-fledged member states but have yet to be accepted. The EU, however, has not expanded in almost 10 years since Croatia joined as a member state in 2013. The EU must embark on new methods of integration with urgency and must prioritize discussions surrounding EU enlargement policy. Though the EU’s strength and security has been challenged within recent years, steps have already been taken to strengthen Europe’s development and security, such as French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative for a new European political community, a political community with hopes of facilitating more efficient coordination and integration between European states.

In my view the Ukrainian war is the most obvious symptom of the various challenges that the EU faces in the political domain, but other challenges such as structural socio-economic issues, and the overwhelming crisis of climate change, require refreshed approaches by the EU. From, for example, speeding up the green transition, to doing more when it comes to the political consolidation of the EU with Western Balkans countries; these refreshed approaches will take courage, vision, and strong leadership.  

A New Vision 

Regional cooperation in the Balkans was given a new boost with the WB6 framework which I had the pleasure of initiating in the form of a non-paper in 2013 and later shaped with colleagues from the region and the European Commission in 2013 and 2014. The WB6 framework’s goal was to solidify regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the areas of rule of law, infrastructure development, and trade facilitation, with the aim of improving each individual country's preparations for their eventual EU accession. The framework contributed to existing wider coordination platforms such as the Process of Cooperation in South East Europe. The WB6 framework also became the integral component of the Berlin Process in 2014, a process which aimed to improve cooperation between the EU and Western Balkans potential candidate states. Some strides have been made due to the WB6 Initiative and Berlin Process but momentum towards EU membership of these states have largely faltered, despite new agreements signed in late 2022. The enthusiasm and optimism that existed ten years ago feels all but evaporated.

Therefore, I firmly believe it is time for change, particularly as it relates to EU membership. It is my recommendation that the EU restructures its membership policy and includes a new category of associate members. The EU should grant associate member status to qualified applicant states by January 2027 and should specify the necessary regulatory tasks that need to be completed by the applicant states well before. Such a membership formula would, for example, enable Western Balkans countries to participate fully in the work of the European Parliament and add around 50 Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s). These new associate member states would be able to take part in most steps of the legislative process as full-fledged members, but for the time being would not be able to nominate commissioners or block European Council decisions. The ability for associate members to take part in the legislative process but not in the final decision making would give additional time to the EU to implement the necessary internal reforms without slowing down the enlargement process.

The associate member states would have to adhere entirely to the security and foreign policy of the EU, helping pacify some of the existing political tensions. The new associate members would not be able to join the Schengen system until all the requirements are met, but would be required to install free movement of people, goods, services and capital like elsewhere in the European common market (which is the current case for countries like Romania and Bulgaria). This would reduce even the most acute, although politically relevant problems in the region, to a mere squabble.

By becoming associate members and gaining full access to the EU development funds, the Western Balkans countries could finally break their own obstacles to economic development too. The region is inhabited by approximately 17.5 million people, similar to the population of Romania of around 19 million people. According to the current EU policy, the candidate countries of the region (including Turkey) are entitled to about $12-14 billion euros of the pre-accession support instrument. According to the World Bank’s data book, the 2001 GDP per capita in Romania, a EU member state since 2007, was roughly the same as in Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia, although considerably higher than in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina due to previous conflict in these countries. In 2001, the GDP per capita in Romania was $1,800 USD and the GDP per capita average for the WB5 was $1,600 USD. However, in 2021, the Romanian GDP per capita was $15,000 whereas the WB6 average was about $7,500, a drastic loss of economic power for the Western Balkans countries, especially if one takes into account that the large gap exists between Romania and countries that two decades ago were at nearly the same level. In 2023, the Western Balkans countries are small and the regional market remains weak.

On the other hand, Romania has been an EU member state for 15 years, enjoying numerous benefits such as a net $4 billion euros in economic assistance in 2021. Romania could receive $30 billion euros of net inflows from the EU 2021-2027 budget framework and previously received about $40 billion euros of net inflows from the 2014-2020 budget framework. It is thus reasonable to expect that the Western Balkans countries, if associate members, would benefit similar amounts in economic assistance given the wider gap with the average EU GDP per capita. What a boost it could be! Meanwhile, the EU would need to ensure that during this time critical reforms are executed in line with the rule of law mechanism in order to pursue lasting economic development, security, and integration for Europe and its states.

Such a formula could also be used for other countries that are unable to continue the EU enlargement process because of disputed territories.

Don’t forget about climate change!

 A new and courageous approach to the consolidation of the EU would not only promote economic and political security, but would also be important in ensuring climate change resilience in the Western Balkans. The more resilient the Western Balkans is to climate change, the more resilient the EU can be.

Historically, technological change has been more or less a spontaneous matter. It was a gradual process in which economic and technological developments overlapped without a pre-determined or clear course. However, the decarbonization agenda, or the UN Sustainable Development Goals of 2030, has imposed a cap on greenhouse gas emissions, meaning that for the first time ever a common direction of economic, social and technological change has been imposed globally. Although legitimate from the planet’s inhabitability point of view, we do not know the unintended consequences of such a course and whether the international community will be able to successfully maneuver the colliding economic, social, and technological change. 

For all the reasons mentioned above, and others not elaborated here, this new approach is a needed long-term investment. Tough times require out of the box approaches and solutions, and expanding the EU membership policy to include associate states is one such needed approach.

The Truth Commission for Ayotzinapa

By: Ana Luz Manzano Ortiz, PILPG-NL Junior Research Associate

Abel, Aberlardo, Adán, Alexander, Antonio, Benjamín, Bernardo, Carlos Iván, Carlos Lorenzo, César, Christian Alfonso, Christian Tomás, Cutberto, Dorian, Emiliano, Everardo, Felipe, Giovanni, Israel Caballero, Israel Jacinto, Jesús, Jhosivani, Jonás, Jorge Álvarez, Jorge Aníbal, Jorge Antonio, Jorge Luis, José Ángel Campos, José Ángel Navarrete, José Eduardo, José Luis, Julio César, Leonel, Luis Ángel Abarca, Luis Ángel Francisco, Madgaleno, Marcial, Marco, Martín, Mauricio, Miguel Ángel Hernández, Miguel Ángel Mendoza and Saúl were the names of the 43 students of the Escuela Normal de Ayotzinapa (“Rural Teacher School of Ayotzinapa”) who disappeared on the night of the October 26, 2014 in Iguala, Guerrero, Mexico. 

More than eight years later, the investigation keeps developing due to the efforts of the students’ families who have brought numerous national and international actors into the scene. As a result of their efforts, Mexican President López Obrador created a truth commission in December 2018 to support the investigation of the Ayotzinapa case, the first of its kind in Mexico. The present blog will analyze the role of this newly created truth commission, based on the newest report of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) appointed by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.

Truth Commissions in Transitional Justice

Truth is one of the key elements of transitional justice, which establishes that individuals and societies have the right to know what has happened during a conflict. Truth-seeking initiatives investigate past human rights abuses to determine what happened, why it happened, and to what effect in order to prevent future abuses. For this reason, all around the world, truth commissions have become an essential part of transitional justice. Truth-seeking initiatives can take many forms, including freedom of information legislation, investigations into the missing, and non-judicial truth commissions.

Truth commissions have a long history in Latin America, with important examples from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru. National governments  have created truth commissions within processes of peace agreements and transitional procedures with the task of investigating violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes, or during internal armed conflicts. 

Mexico’s long history of forced disappearances by security forces began with  the Guerra Sucia (the “Dirty War”) of the 1980’s, and continues with the ongoing “War against drugs” that began in 2006. However the current President of Mexico has established the first truth commission to investigate one specific event: the case of the 43 students of Ayotzinapa. This could potentially be the beginning of a journey for seeking the truth in Mexico.

The investigation and the order to create a truth commission

Between the night of October 26 and the morning of October 27, 2014, a series of violent events took place in Iguala, Guerrero, resulting in the disappearance of 43 students. The students from a rural teacher school, commonly called normalistas, were preparing to bring education to the rural areas of Mexico. The normalistas of Ayotzinapa were traveling in buses to Mexico City, where they would take part in the commemoration of the massacre of the students of Tlatelolco in 1968. 

The Federal Police stopped the normalistas on a highway in Iguala, Guerrero, and shortly after, the police opened fire against them. The reason why the encounter turned violent is still unclear, but a strong hypothesis by the GIEI is that a drug cartel called Guerreros Unidos had used some of the buses to transport narcotics. Police executed six people, among them three normalistas and three other people present at the scene, and injured more than 40 during the attack. In addition, the whereabouts of the 43 missing normalistas is still unknown.

The disappearance of the normalistas sparked public outrage, and the investigation gained attention from media all over the world. The General Prosecutor of Mexico released the infamous “historical truth,” which were the results of his investigation of the event. According to this version, Guerreros Unidos executed the normalistas and burned their bodies in a municipal dump. However, this version was quickly proven to be a fabrication by the investigation of the GIEI.

The GIEI arrived in Mexico after the relatives of the normalistas presented a request of interim measures to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The relatives of the normalistas have used several other legal mechanisms, including a constitutional claim against the “historical truth,” the investigation of the Federal Prosecutor. In a historical verdict, the Tribunal Federal Colegiado (Federal Collegiate Tribunal) in charge of this claim ordered that the Mexican President, as one of the authorities responsible for the flawed investigation of the General Prosecutor, create a Truth Commission to establish the true account of the events.

The role of the truth commission in the new report of the GIEI

A Presidential Decree of December 4, 2018 created the Comisión para la Verdad del Caso Ayotzinapa (Truth Commission for the Truth of the Ayotzinapa Case). This Commission has the role of facilitating dialogue between the authorities involved in the investigation, creating a mechanism of economic incentives for the collaboration of individuals who may have information on the events,  strengthening international technical cooperation with organizations like the GIEI, and strengthening the reparation assistance to the victims of the case.

Representatives of the victims have challenged the creation of the Truth Commission, as they claim that it has no powers to take direct part in the investigations, but only to help the parties involved, namely the GIEI, the victims, and the prosecutors. Despite this, in the latest report by the GIEI, the group recognized that the Commision played an important role in advancing the investigation, as it helped the GIEI access information it did not have in previous years. One of its major findings, according to the report of GIEI, were around 60 videos that confirm that the initial detainees who were part of the “historical truth” investigation, had been tortured. For this, the GIEI has asked the Mexican state to strengthen the Commission, as a fundamental part of the fight for truth and justice for the normalistas.

In conclusion, the role of the Commission has proven to be key in the development of the investigation. With the finding of the evidence of torture during the investigation, as well as the funding and identification of human remains of two of the normalistas, the GIEI has now established that most of the “historical truth” never took place. The search for truth by the Commission is not only fundamental for the victims of Ayotzinapa, but for all of the Mexican society who were led by false information in the past. In a country where impunity has hurt its population for so long, to find the truth is only necessary.

Riding the wave of the recognition of the rights of Nature in Europe: The case of "El Mar Menor"

By: Guillermo Ferrer Hernáez, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

Human activity is altering the planet's natural ecosystems, which could lead to their disappearance and that of the living beings that inhabit them. Efforts to avoid this disastrous situation are leading to the implementation of novel global actions for the defense of ecosystems, such as the recognition of the rights of natural elements and ecosystems. 

On April 5, 2022, the Spanish Congress of Deputies approved the processing of a law promoted by the Iniciativa Legislativa Popular (ILP) Mar Menor with the support of a petition with 640,000 signatures collected throughout the state, granting legal personality to Mar Menor, a saltwater lagoon. If the plenary of the Spanish Congress of Deputies approves this bill in the following months, it would be the first legal recognition of the personhood of an ecosystem in Europe. This blog will analyze the case of Mar Menor as a possible first recognition of a natural entity as a legal person in Europe and will assess the possible impact of this recognition.

The state of the Mar Menor

The Mar Menor is the largest saltwater lagoon in Europe, located on the coast of the Region of Murcia, Spain. This natural treasure is seriously threatened by an excess of nutrients in its waters, a process known as eutrophication. Fertilized water from the surrounding crops and desalination plants, loaded with nitrates, reaches the Mar Menor, where it feeds and nourishes phytoplankton. When this type of algae in the Mar Menor proliferates, it blocks the light to the plants that grow on the seabed, preventing photosynthesis and causing them to die. In turn, the death of these plants means a lack of oxygen in the waters of this sea affecting the fauna that inhabits the Mar Menor, causing ecological disasters like the one in October 2019 in which tons of dead fish were removed.

This ecological crisis highlights the current legal protection system's failure, which has not prevented the continued discharge of polluted waters. For this reason, Spanish citizens have decided to mobilize to protect and preserve this natural ecosystem. 

The bill recognizes the legal entity of this ecosystem

Faced with the inaction of the Spanish authorities, a group of lawyers, scientists, and activists, with the support of the Legal Clinic of the University of Murcia, started a movement under the name of ILP Mar Menor to protect the lagoon by drafting a bill.  The association behind the bill has highlighted the need to preserve the lagoon's ecological value and guarantee intergenerational solidarity in line with international conventions such as the Paris Agreement.

This new bill includes the possibility of granting legal personality to the Mar Menor lagoon ecosystem, which would mean that it would be considered a subject of law.  This new juridical status would grant the lagoon with subjective rights, limiting its private use and enabling any citizen to enforce these rights in court.  In addition, the Mar Menor would thus become the only natural entity in Europe that functions as a subject of law. This could be a precedent for the recognition of other endangered natural entities’ rights within Spain and Europe. Nevertheless, authorities would still need to recognize the legal personality of these endangered natural entities individually or collectively in their national systems. In the Spanish case, the Spanish Parliament would still need to recognize the possibility of extending the legal personality to other endangered entities in national law.

According to the bill, the legal representation and guardianship of the lagoon would be exercised through an authority that would include representatives of public administrations; members of universities, research, and scientific centers; and residents of local municipalities. Public administrations have an obligation to conserve, preserve, and restore this ecosystem. If the administration does not fulfill this duty, this new legal authority could demand criminal and administrative action before Spanish tribunals. In addition, any citizen would be able to demand reparations from those responsible for the damages produced in the lagoon before the Spanish courts. In this regard, this blog will take the example of the Latin American states to see how natural ecosystems can be protected through citizen initiatives.

Examples from Latin American states

The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, which came into force in October 2008, revolutionized the concept of Nature as a subject of law in the Latin American region. The constitutional recognition of the legal personality of Nature, also known as Pachamama, includes the possibility for any person, community, or people to demand from the public authority the fulfillment of the rights of Nature.

This same idea has inspired many Latin American states, such as Chile, which have recently included the same provisions in their constitutions. These initiatives go further than other attempts to protect the rights of Nature, such as the Escazú Agreement, and set an example for other states around the world, such as Spain, to follow.

Latin American NGOs and citizens have made use of the recognition of the subjectivity of these ecosystems and their consequent rights to sue the authorities for not preserving the wellbeing of these ecosystems. However, in many cases, such as in Ecuador, the recognition of the Rights of Nature has not been able to stop the abusive exploitation of these ecosystems with the value of subjects of rights. The recognition of the subjectivity of these ecosystems establishes a starting point for their protection, but without effective enforcement mechanisms, the ultimate objective cannot be achieved.

Conclusion 

Time is running against the sustainability and welfare of the Mar Menor. If the Spanish Congress approves the bill presented by ILP, Spain will build a new path toward protecting the rights of Nature in Europe, following the example of other Latin American states. This is the first step toward protecting these ecosystems.

International criminal justice for irregular migrants? The case of Libya regarding atrocities committed at detention camps

By: Ana Luz Manzano Ortiz, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

Abuses committed or tolerated by authorities against foreigners with an unauthorized stay, also referred to as “irregular migrants,” are common. Cases like these have mostly been litigated by civil organizations under human rights law. However, there are situations where international criminal law can also serve as a tool to seek justice. An example of this is Libya, where NGOs have denounced militias’ practices of targeting irregular migrants through torture, kidnappings, forced recruitment, and killings. 

In order to seek accountability for this situation, NGOs have asked the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the situation in Libya. On January 17, 2022, a group of NGOs, composed of Adala for All, StraLi, and UpRights, presented a communication under Article 15 of the Rome Statute to the ICC, asking the Office of the Prosecutor to investigate potential crimes in Libya. This contribution examines the turn from international human rights law (IHRL) to international criminal law (ICL) in light of this particular situation in Libya.

The situation in Libya 

Libya has become one of the predominantly cited examples of abuse committed with impunity as a result of pushback policies, aimed at deterring migrants from reaching Europe through unauthorized sea routes. Due to its geographical location, Libya is a transit state through which each year an estimated 180,000 people from multiple states, mainly Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, travel on their way to Europe. In order to keep these individuals from reaching the European Union (EU), the EU Agency known as “Frontex,” as well as the Italian and the Maltese governments, provide funds, training, and boats to the Libyan Coast Guard. However, the armed conflict that has taken place in Libya for a decade has complicated and worsened the situation, as militias have become involved in these border control operations.

According to the latest report of the UN Support Mission in Libya, “more than 12,000 detainees are held in 27 prisons and places of detention across Libya.” However, thousands of additional detainees do not appear in official statistics and are held illegally and often in inhumane conditions in facilities controlled by armed groups, or “secret” facilities, unable to challenge the legal basis for their continued detention. It has been well-documented that serious abuses occur in these detention centers, such as ill-treatment, torture, sexual violence, forced labor, forced disappearance, and murder, all in the context of indefinite detention in inhuman conditions. According to Alessandro Pizzuti, co-founder of UpRights, in Libya the parties to the conflict target migrants because they perceive them as a crucial resource for carrying out their political and military objectives. 

Human rights violations or international crimes?

IHRL and ICL are part of public international law, and their scope covers the relationship between individuals and the state. Both of them deal with abuses committed by state officials, either through their acquiescence, their omission to comply with their obligations or through their direct actions. Their enforcement is primarily the responsibility of national authorities. ICL’s scope is, in fact, broader and also imposes obligations on non-state actors. The application of IHRL and ICL is not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, these specialized branches of law converge and are interdependent on each other. However, IHRL relates to the responsibility of the state, while ICL is concerned with individual criminal responsibility. Therefore, there are different mechanisms through which they can be enforced whenever domestic remedies have failed to be effective.

Under IHRL, several international judicial bodies have been created around the world: the European Court of Human Rights, the African Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are the main examples of these. The United Nations has also developed ten quasi-judicial treaty bodies that observe the enforcement of their corresponding human rights treaties, such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture, the Human Rights Committee, and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, among others. These are the main regional and international mechanisms through which individuals can seek redress when they believe there has been a violation of their human rights.

Under ICL, the main judicial body is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is an independent tribunal governed by the Rome Statute with jurisdiction over war crimes (WC), crimes against humanity (CAH), and genocide committed or tolerated by state and non-state actors from states party to the Rome Statute, or committed on the territory of a state party. Other ad hoc courts have previously been created to investigate specific situations in a state, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Trying to access redress under ICL has important consequences, both practical and symbolic. On the practical side, it can be much more difficult to access justice at the ICC, in contrast to other international human rights judicial bodies. In the history of the ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor has opened twelve official investigations and is currently conducting an additional nine preliminary examinations, and only 46 individuals have been indicted. On the other hand, in 2021 alone the European Court of Human Rights released 1,105 judgments. Additionally, the heightened burden of proof in ICL means that cases tend to focus on specific incidents, perpetrators, and victims, whereas IHRL cases can be much broader in scope. Even if a case is brought, victims under ICL may be excluded just because there is less evidence concerning the specific incident in which they were victimized, which may not be the case in a court of human rights. However, on the symbolic side, justice is reached in different terms under IHRL and ICL. Whereas human rights judicial bodies reach judgments that condemn states in abstract terms, ICL has the potential to point to the individual responsibilities of the persons who commit the crimes. 

Until now, the abuses committed in Libya against irregular migrants have been addressed under IHRL. In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy of the European Court of Human Rights, the situation in detention centers was recognized to amount to ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR, enough to condemn Italy for returning people at sea to Libya. This has been a positive development for migrant and refugee rights in Europe; however, under the framework of IHRL, only the state of Italy was condemned for the push-back operation, and not the individual officers who participated in the operation nor the authorities in charge of the detention centers where abuses were being committed. The victims of this case did not get to see the people who mistreated them on trial, nor do they have any assurance that they faced any consequence for their actions.

The group of NGOs that presented the communication to the ICC argue that the case of the situation in the Libyan detention centers amounts not only to a mass violation of human rights but also to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Under this logic, the situation now also falls under ICL. If the situation in Libya is to be investigated by the ICC, individual responsibilities could arise for the authorities implicated in the operations of migrant detention centers. 

Conclusion

The consequences of shifting from international human rights law to international criminal law to seek accountability for the ongoing situation in Libyan detention centers could be many, but one stands out: having the ICC criminally investigate the people responsible for the crimes being committed at the gates of Europe.