Author: Dr. Igor Lukšić, Former Prime Minister of Montenegro, PILPG Senior Peace Fellow
Always On the Run
As the consequences of the war in Ukraine continue to be revealed, Europe finds itself grappling with a cluster of crises. Soaring electricity, gas and oil prices, as a consequence of economic sanctions on Russia, was the most evident early consequence of the war. Elsewhere the impact of the weaponization of food and fertilizers has been tremendous. This energy crisis compounds with already rising inflation, a lingering consequence of pandemic efforts to inject money into domestic economies and keep sinking economies afloat. As the war drags on, state security and foreign policy, especially that of the European states, continues to be tested. This insecurity has reignited an ongoing debate about the future of the European Union (EU), a debate that predates the Russian-Ukrainian war but is heavily linked to the long-established preference of Ukraine to have close ties to the EU. As a result of this debate, there have been various calls for reforms in order for the European Union to become more resilient, more competitive, and more globally relevant.
In this piece, however, I would like to focus on the future of the European Union as it relates to the relationship between its neighbors. The policy of enlargement, frequently dubbed as the EU’s most successful policy, has become stagnant. There are a number of countries, referred to as candidate countries, many of which in the Western Balkans, that aspire to become full-fledged member states but have yet to be accepted. The EU, however, has not expanded in almost 10 years since Croatia joined as a member state in 2013. The EU must embark on new methods of integration with urgency and must prioritize discussions surrounding EU enlargement policy. Though the EU’s strength and security has been challenged within recent years, steps have already been taken to strengthen Europe’s development and security, such as French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative for a new European political community, a political community with hopes of facilitating more efficient coordination and integration between European states.
In my view the Ukrainian war is the most obvious symptom of the various challenges that the EU faces in the political domain, but other challenges such as structural socio-economic issues, and the overwhelming crisis of climate change, require refreshed approaches by the EU. From, for example, speeding up the green transition, to doing more when it comes to the political consolidation of the EU with Western Balkans countries; these refreshed approaches will take courage, vision, and strong leadership.
A New Vision
Regional cooperation in the Balkans was given a new boost with the WB6 framework which I had the pleasure of initiating in the form of a non-paper in 2013 and later shaped with colleagues from the region and the European Commission in 2013 and 2014. The WB6 framework’s goal was to solidify regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the areas of rule of law, infrastructure development, and trade facilitation, with the aim of improving each individual country's preparations for their eventual EU accession. The framework contributed to existing wider coordination platforms such as the Process of Cooperation in South East Europe. The WB6 framework also became the integral component of the Berlin Process in 2014, a process which aimed to improve cooperation between the EU and Western Balkans potential candidate states. Some strides have been made due to the WB6 Initiative and Berlin Process but momentum towards EU membership of these states have largely faltered, despite new agreements signed in late 2022. The enthusiasm and optimism that existed ten years ago feels all but evaporated.
Therefore, I firmly believe it is time for change, particularly as it relates to EU membership. It is my recommendation that the EU restructures its membership policy and includes a new category of associate members. The EU should grant associate member status to qualified applicant states by January 2027 and should specify the necessary regulatory tasks that need to be completed by the applicant states well before. Such a membership formula would, for example, enable Western Balkans countries to participate fully in the work of the European Parliament and add around 50 Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s). These new associate member states would be able to take part in most steps of the legislative process as full-fledged members, but for the time being would not be able to nominate commissioners or block European Council decisions. The ability for associate members to take part in the legislative process but not in the final decision making would give additional time to the EU to implement the necessary internal reforms without slowing down the enlargement process.
The associate member states would have to adhere entirely to the security and foreign policy of the EU, helping pacify some of the existing political tensions. The new associate members would not be able to join the Schengen system until all the requirements are met, but would be required to install free movement of people, goods, services and capital like elsewhere in the European common market (which is the current case for countries like Romania and Bulgaria). This would reduce even the most acute, although politically relevant problems in the region, to a mere squabble.
By becoming associate members and gaining full access to the EU development funds, the Western Balkans countries could finally break their own obstacles to economic development too. The region is inhabited by approximately 17.5 million people, similar to the population of Romania of around 19 million people. According to the current EU policy, the candidate countries of the region (including Turkey) are entitled to about $12-14 billion euros of the pre-accession support instrument. According to the World Bank’s data book, the 2001 GDP per capita in Romania, a EU member state since 2007, was roughly the same as in Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia, although considerably higher than in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina due to previous conflict in these countries. In 2001, the GDP per capita in Romania was $1,800 USD and the GDP per capita average for the WB5 was $1,600 USD. However, in 2021, the Romanian GDP per capita was $15,000 whereas the WB6 average was about $7,500, a drastic loss of economic power for the Western Balkans countries, especially if one takes into account that the large gap exists between Romania and countries that two decades ago were at nearly the same level. In 2023, the Western Balkans countries are small and the regional market remains weak.
On the other hand, Romania has been an EU member state for 15 years, enjoying numerous benefits such as a net $4 billion euros in economic assistance in 2021. Romania could receive $30 billion euros of net inflows from the EU 2021-2027 budget framework and previously received about $40 billion euros of net inflows from the 2014-2020 budget framework. It is thus reasonable to expect that the Western Balkans countries, if associate members, would benefit similar amounts in economic assistance given the wider gap with the average EU GDP per capita. What a boost it could be! Meanwhile, the EU would need to ensure that during this time critical reforms are executed in line with the rule of law mechanism in order to pursue lasting economic development, security, and integration for Europe and its states.
Such a formula could also be used for other countries that are unable to continue the EU enlargement process because of disputed territories.
Don’t forget about climate change!
A new and courageous approach to the consolidation of the EU would not only promote economic and political security, but would also be important in ensuring climate change resilience in the Western Balkans. The more resilient the Western Balkans is to climate change, the more resilient the EU can be.
Historically, technological change has been more or less a spontaneous matter. It was a gradual process in which economic and technological developments overlapped without a pre-determined or clear course. However, the decarbonization agenda, or the UN Sustainable Development Goals of 2030, has imposed a cap on greenhouse gas emissions, meaning that for the first time ever a common direction of economic, social and technological change has been imposed globally. Although legitimate from the planet’s inhabitability point of view, we do not know the unintended consequences of such a course and whether the international community will be able to successfully maneuver the colliding economic, social, and technological change.
For all the reasons mentioned above, and others not elaborated here, this new approach is a needed long-term investment. Tough times require out of the box approaches and solutions, and expanding the EU membership policy to include associate states is one such needed approach.