Targeting the Innocent: Russia’s Continued Attacks on Ukrainian Civilians

Targeting the Innocent: Russia’s Continued Attacks on Ukrainian Civilians

By: Dr. Gregory P. Noone and Kateryna Kyrychenko, PILPG, and Todd Scott, Gargi Talukder, Lindsay Rindskopf, Bailey Higgs, Weixin Yang, and Rene Kathawala, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP

Introduction

Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia continues to deliberately target civilians, causing widespread devastation and uncertainty through repeated attacks and indiscriminate bombings.  Various human rights agencies, as well as the United Nations, have reported these targeted attacks, tracking the continually rising death toll in Ukraine’s civilian population.  Early 2025 brought reports of short-range drone attacks; a weapon that should in theory allow more precision and avoid civilian casualties, but has in practice put “civilians at grave risk.”  This blog post discusses the consistent findings of Russia’s “indiscriminate and disproportionate” attacks on civilians in Ukraine, and the international humanitarian law that prohibits them. 

Russia’s “Indiscriminate and Disproportionate Attacks” on Civilians in Ukraine

International human rights agencies and news organizations have widely reported Russia’s “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks” in Ukraine.  In a March 2023 report, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (the “Commission”) presented evidence that, in addition to a variety of other attacks on civilians, “Russian armed forces have carried out attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas with an apparent disregard for civilian harm and suffering.”  The Commission found that Russian forces used weapons, including unguided bombs, long-range anti-ship missiles, cluster munitions, and multiple launch rocket systems, against both military and civilian targets “without distinction.”  

The year following Russia’s full-scale invasion spurred consistent reports of these “indiscriminate” attacks committed with “disregard” to the targets (the list below is non-exhaustive and covers attacks only from the first two years of the invasion; it continues to grow as further incidents are documented daily):

• 28 February-30 April 2022: Twenty-eight “indiscriminate strikes” in Kharkiv.

• 3 March 2022: Attacks in residential areas of Chernihiv, killing at least 20 people and injuring others.

• 9 March 2022: Attack on Mariupol Primary and Sanitation Aid Center No. 3.

• 9 March 2022: Attack on apartment building in Izium, killing at least 44 people.

• 16 March 2022: Attack on Mariupol’s Drama Theater which killed as many as 600 civilians.

• 8 April 2022: Attack on Kramatorsk train station, killing 59 people and injuring 92.

• 27 June 2022: Attack on Kremenchuk shopping mall, killing 21 and injuring dozens of people.

• 1 July 2022: Attack on residential areas near Odessa, killing at least 21 people.

• 9 July 2022: Attack on an apartment building in Chasiv Yar, killing at least 15 people.

• 14 January 2023: Attack on an apartment building in Dnipro, killing 45 people, including six children.

• 28 April 2023: Attack on the apartment block, killing at least 21 people, including three children.

• October 2023: Attack on café and store in Hroza, killing at least 51 people.

• December 2023: Aerial attack killing at least 30 civilians and injuring at least 160.

These attacks are still occuring three years later, and the death toll continues to rise as Russia increases its aerial attacks against civilians.  In 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (“OHCHR”) issued a report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, identifying “[i]ncreased use of air-dropped bombs with a larger range” as a “significant reason for the rise in civilian casualties” in 2024.  The report found that 96% of civilian casualties in 2024 “were caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.”  

Hundreds of civilians have already been killed or injured in Ukraine during the first months of 2025, including through the use of short-range drones and missile and munitions attacks targeting residential buildings, a boarding school, and medical facilities.  In early 2025, it was not the use of unpredictable weapons, like unguided bombs and cluster munitions, that resulted in the most casualties; it was the use of short-range drones equipped with cameras, which should “allow[] an operator to assess with a higher degree of certainty whether a potential target is a military objective or a civilian person or object.”  While the use of short-range drones should, in theory, decrease the risk of civilian casualties, the head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported data “show[ing] a clear and disturbing pattern of short-range drones being used in ways that put civilians at grave risk.”  There is evidence suggesting that Russia may be purposely using drones to target civilians in order to terrorize them, and potentially use civilians for target practice in order to perfect the drone operators’ skills.  Civilian casualties were higher in January and February 2025 than in the same months last year. 

International Humanitarian Law Aims to Protect Civilians from Attack

International Humanitarian Law (IHL - also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict or LOAC) prohibits attacks (like bombardments or aerial strikes) on civilians and buildings likely to house civilians during armed conflicts.

Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols: The Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties that establish international legal standards for belligerent conduct during armed conflict, to which Russia has been a party since 1949.  They protect both people who do not participate in the fighting (such as civilians or medics/aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (such as captured or wounded troops).  In particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians in times of war, including those in occupied territories, from murder, torture, or brutality (Articles 13 and 32), and from indiscriminate destruction of property (Articles 33 and 34). 

Additional Protocol I, while not ratified by Russia, provides further illustration of the kind of protection that international law affords to civilians.  Specifically, it expands protections for the victims of international armed conflicts, including prohibiting the use of weapons that “cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” (Article 35); the destruction of foods, water, and other materials needed for survival (Article 54); and indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations (Article 51(4)).  “Indiscriminate attacks” are defined to include “those which are not directed at a specific military objective” and “those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective” (Article 51(4)(a)-(b)).  These protections include the IHL fundamental principle of proportionality which states “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Article 51(5)(b)).

Additional Protocol I further provides that a party conducting military operations should take “constant care…to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,” including by “refrain[ing] from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof…” (Article 57).

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC): The Rome Statute, which established the ICC, defines war crimes, including intentionally directing attacks against civilian populations or civilian objects, as prosecutable offenses.  

The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  “War crimes” are defined in Article 8 to include: (1) “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population”; (2) “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian objects”; (3) “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects”; (4) “[a]ttacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives”; and (5) “[e]mploying weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”.  Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines “crime[s] against humanity,” including murder, “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”  Article 6 defines “genocide” as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group.”

Russia signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but did not ratify it, and it withdrew from the Rome Statute altogether in 2016.  However, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are all part of customary international law and considered jus cogens, meaning that they are peremptory norms that cannot be violated regardless of whether or not a state is a party to a particular treaty.

Hague Conventions: These conventions, particularly the Hague Convention IV of 1907, set out the laws and customs of war, including the protection of civilian populations and property during conflicts.  The Hague Convention states that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” (Article 22) and explicitly prohibits “employ[ing] arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering” (Article 23).  The Hague Convention also prohibits attacks on certain areas likely to house civilians (Article 25, prohibiting attack on towns, villages, and dwellings) and requires taking “all necessary steps” “to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes” (Article 27).

Russia’s Attacks on Civilians Violate International Humanitarian Law

Russia’s attacks on civilians violate international humanitarian law protections for civilians in times of war.  For example, Russia has engaged in repeated “indiscriminate attacks” against civilians in violation of the Geneva Convention.  The armed conflict in Ukraine falls under Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits “indiscriminate attacks” against civilians.  The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded in its March 2023 report that “a majority” of Russia’s attacks, including the use of weapons like unguided bombs used against civilians, were indiscriminate.  The Commission made similar conclusions in its March 2024 report, determining that multiple attacks, including a March 13, 2022, attack on a hospital and the March 9, 2022, air attack on a maternity hospital, were indiscriminate attacks.  The Commission has concluded that Russia’s “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks” against civilians are violations of international humanitarian law.  

Russia has also failed to take the necessary precautions under Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2) to prevent attacks on civilians.  The Commission determined that “Russian armed forces failed to take feasible precautions to verify whether civilians were present” in multiple attacks, including those in residential areas.  

Russia has repeatedly attacked hospitals, schools, and churches, which are all locations that receive special protections under international humanitarian law.  See, e.g. Article 27 of the Hague Convention.

Russia has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and potentially genocide.   While Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, other state parties have referred the situation in Ukraine to the ICC, and in March 2022, the ICC Prosecutor announced an open investigation into “any past or present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person from 21 November 2013 onwards.”  In its March 2024 report, the Commission determined that “[c]ertain attacks amounted to the war crime of excessive incidental death, injury or damages.”  The Commission was unable to determine whether the bombardment of Mariupol constituted a crime against humanity under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, but recommended further investigation. 

Conclusion

Since its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there is incontrovertible evidence that Russia has committed numerous war crimes by, among other crimes, repeatedly and “indiscriminately” attacking civilians, failing to take sufficient precautions to prevent casualties in violation of international humanitarian law.  As Russia adopts new methods of attack, such as the use of short-range drones — which, in theory, should allow for greater precision in distinguishing military from civilian objects — concerns remain about their actual use and impact on civilians. This underscores the ongoing need for vigilant monitoring, thorough investigation, and robust accountability mechanisms. 

# Russian Aggression Has Consequences: The Erosion of the Ottawa Convention and Global Security

# Russian Aggression Has Consequences: The Erosion of the Ottawa Convention and Global Security

By: Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Kateryna Kyrychenko, and Sindija Beta

Introduction

With Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, the entire international security and legal infrastructure is being disrupted forcing nations to rethink long-standing disarmament commitments. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have announced their intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. In fact, the Latvian Parliament has already approved the law providing for the state’s withdrawal. 

The Ottawa Convention, a landmark treaty adopted in the 1990s, is an international arms control agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. These landmines are weapons that are usually hidden in the ground and are triggered by weight, such as a person stepping on it. Antipersonnel landmines leave a lasting legacy of suffering even after the armed conflict is over as civilians – frequently children – can fall victim to an abandoned unexploded landmine even generations later. Due to their indiscriminate nature, impacting combatants and civilians alike, their prohibition has been viewed as a major success of international humanitarian law. 

The signing of the Ottawa Convention was also a major success for civil society as civil society was among those spearheading its development. Uniquely, the Convention stands out as one of the few international treaties primarily driven by non-state actors, demonstrating the powerful role civil society can play in shaping global disarmament norms. The first decades after its signing witnessed a significant reduction in the production and use of antipersonnel landmines. 

Despite its widespread adoption, security concerns prevented some nations from being able to abandon their use of landmines. The U.S. notably refrained from joining due to its strategic concerns in the Korean Peninsula, where landmines are seen as a deterrent against North Korean aggression.

Nearly 30 years later, the treaty, which some even considered “the most successful treaty in the field of conventional disarmament”, is now being loudly questioned. With Russia’s escalating hostility toward its neighbors, the Baltic states and Poland find themselves in a security environment eerily reminiscent of the Korean Peninsula leading these nations to reevaluate their commitments.

Russian Aggression and Its Consequences

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have made it clear to neighboring countries that they cannot rely solely on international agreements for protection. The war has demonstrated Russia’s willingness to ignore international norms, violate borders, and use military force to achieve its objectives. Poland and the Baltic states, which share borders or close proximity with Russia, have been increasingly alarmed by its expansionist behavior and military provocations.

For these countries, the invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the importance of national defense and territorial security. The prospect of a Russian incursion, hybrid warfare tactics, and potential border destabilization have led them to reassess their defense strategies. While the Ottawa Convention sought to limit the use of landmines for humanitarian reasons, Poland and the Baltic states now view such measures as potential vulnerabilities in their border security. 

Landmines, though controversial, serve as a deterrent in strategic border areas, much as they do in the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The decision also signals a broader shift in European security policy, where deterrence is taking precedence over disarmament.

Arms Control Trends

This step back from the long-standing ban on antipersonnel landmines is just one piece in the broader puzzle of the erosion of arms control agreements. 

Since 2022 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia and all NATO allies have also withdrawn from or suspended their operations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was once seen as a cornerstone of European security. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 and aimed to prevent an arms race in Europe and ensure that NATO and Russia’s conventional weapons deployments were on par. This effectively signifies a new era in how Europe conceptualizes its security infrastructure.  

Likewise, in 2019, both Russia and the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty effectively leading to its collapse. The INF Treaty, once a pillar of nuclear stability in Europe, collapsed due to Russian violations and subsequent U.S. withdrawal.

In light of these developments, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) also faces an uncertain future. New START expires in 2026 and it is unclear how the current geopolitical circumstances will impact the feasibility of the Treaty’s renegotiation. 

The weakening of these agreements reflects a broader trend: nations are prioritizing their immediate security needs over long-term disarmament commitments. Now, with the potential beginning of the unraveling of the Ottawa Convention, another cornerstone of international security is under threat.

Conclusion

Russia’s war in Ukraine has proven that international agreements alone cannot guarantee peace. The possible withdrawal of Poland and the Baltic states from the Ottawa Convention is a direct response to this reality. While the humanitarian consequences of landmines are well-documented, the strategic necessity of deterrence cannot be ignored in the face of existential threats.

This move is just one development in a broader trend in arms control, where deterrence is regaining primacy over disarmament. As Russia continues to challenge the international order, more nations may follow suit, prioritizing military preparedness over treaty obligations. 

The Legal Basis for EU Security Guarantees for Ukraine

The Legal Basis for EU Security Guarantees for Ukraine

By: Sindija Beta and Katie Hetherington, PILPG, and Kerry Contini, Michal Zajda, Hanna Smyrnova, Ievgen Bidnyi, Nataliya Lipska, Marharyta Bahno, Ivan Tsios, Larysa Lysenko, Laura Zimmerman, Baker McKenzie

In the midst of ongoing developments in the negotiations to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the question of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine is a recurring sticking point. Discussions initially centered around NATO membership and the possibility of bilateral agreements with the US and others. In recent weeks, however, there has been increased focus on whether the existing EU security and defense infrastructure can provide the necessary security guarantees to Ukraine. 

Much of the discussions have focused on the EU’s capacity (military, financial, or otherwise) to provide such guarantees to Ukraine. There has been comparatively little attention paid to which EU legal mechanisms would form the legal framework for such guarantees. This blog post will identify, unpack, and assess the viability of the existing EU legal framework to support long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

What Are Security Guarantees? 

There is no uniform definition of the term “security guarantees”. In general, security guarantees are commonly recognized in international practice as commitments to safeguard and maintain the status and territorial integrity of a specific state or entity against security threats, foreign military interventions, or armed attacks.  Such guarantees can be given by one or more states or by international organizations.

Security guarantees are usually divided into two categories: positive (protective) and negative (restrictive) guarantees. 

Positive security guarantees constitute formal commitments to support a country or to take specific measures of assistance. An example of a positive security guarantee is the guarantees provided under NATO's Article 5, whereby an attack on one NATO member obligates every other NATO member to take action to protect the ally under attack.

Negative guarantees are formal undertakings to abstain from doing something. A negative guarantee may restrict the guarantor from taking certain actions. This type of guarantee can imply an obligation not to frustrate the agreement between the parties and a commitment by the guarantor to ensure compliance with its own obligations. An example of a negative security guarantee may include Russia’s promise not to threaten or use force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  Another example is the guarantee provided by the United States that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that are party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In the context of Ukraine, a positive guarantee could involve a commitment by other parties (e.g., the current NATO member states or the EU) to provide military, financial, or other support to ensure lasting peace. A negative guarantee could include, for example, Ukraine adopting a neutral status or abstaining from joining NATO, or Russia again agreeing not to threaten Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukraine's concerns have been that negative guarantees will not secure sustainable peace nor the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as they do not provide assurance that, despite Ukraine’s neutral status, there will be no military action undertaken against it by Russia. 

What are Ukraine’s Proposed Security Guarantees? 

Currently, Ukrainian officials have not presented an official list of proposed security guarantees. The primary focus at this point, per the official website of the President of Ukraine, is to prepare “framework documents to ensure a reliable peace and lasting security guarantees” during a complete 30-day ceasefire. The President of Ukraine has previously stated that the three key conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine are security guarantees, extension of the sanctions against Russia, and control over Russian frozen assets to support Ukrainian reconstruction. 

As declared by the Head of Office of the President of Ukraine, Andrii Yermak, any security agreement needs to be legally binding and contain specific terms. Security guarantees mentioned during various meetings and in public statements to date include the following: 

1. Enhancement of Ukrainian air defense and implementation of the agreements reached at the NATO Summit in Washington.

2. Creation of a network of security guarantors, i.e., countries that would undertake a legal obligation to assist Ukraine in case of future Russian aggression.

3. Ukraine’s NATO membership.  NATO has asserted that "Ukraine's future lies within NATO," yet Russia vehemently opposes Ukraine's potential NATO membership, effectively stalling any further discussions on the matter. 

4. Ukraine’s EU membership.  In the EU resolution published on March 12, 2025, the EU Parliament proposed to create a “coalition of the willing” that would assist Ukraine in achieving and enforcing a peace agreement and undertaking steps to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the EU. 

The remainder of this blog post discusses the security guarantees that may be available to Ukraine via the EU’s security toolbox.  

The EU’s Security Toolbox

While NATO membership remains Ukraine’s long-term goal, Ukraine has made significant strides toward EU integration, including obtaining EU candidate status in 2022.  With EU membership on the horizon, it is worth considering what defense and security commitments the EU itself can offer. 

Several questions arise.  What would be the legal basis for EU security guarantees?  Does the current EU security toolbox provide the sufficient legal foundation for such guarantees?  These questions can be answered by considering (1) the security guarantees that could be available to Ukraine once it becomes an EU member state, and (2) security guarantees that could be available to Ukraine now, without EU membership.

Security Guarantees Available Once Ukraine is an EU Member State 

If Ukraine were to join the EU, the most significant legal basis for providing security guarantees would be Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union.  Often referred to as the EU’s mutual defense clause, this article requires that member states provide “aid and assistance by all the means in their power” to any other member state that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. 

The language of Article 42(7) closely mirrors that of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and although the EU’s provision lacks NATO’s integrated military structure, it still constitutes a strong collective defense obligation.  That said, unlike Article 5, the operationalization of Article 42(7) depends on the political will and capabilities of individual member states.

Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union has been invoked once in history: following terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, France requested aid and assistance under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union from other EU member states.  As stressed by France’s former President François Hollande in a speech on November 16, 2015, “all the Member States shall have the obligation to provide aid and assistance because the enemy is not just France’s enemy, it is Europe’s enemy”.  In response to France’s request, EU members increased their focus on combating terrorism and provided various forms of assistance.  The United Kingdom and Germany assisted in the military actions in Iraq and Syria against the groups relating to the Islamic State, while other member states became involved in various international missions, including those in Africa and the Middle East. 

It should be noted, though, that the specific operation of Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union is unclear.  Demonstrably, France has proposed to clarify its functioning and assign an informational and coordinating role to a specific EU body.  No such proposals have yet been implemented, and therefore while it could form a legal basis for security guarantees for Ukraine, its practical utility is difficult to assess.

Additionally, the solidarity clause in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union could complement Article 42(7) by providing mechanisms for mutual support in the event of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster.  Although this clause is more limited in scope, particularly requiring that the act triggering the mechanism is classified as terrorism, it demonstrates the broader spirit of solidarity that underpins the EU’s legal architecture.

Lastly, the EU has set up the PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) framework, which is designed to deepen military cooperation between participating EU member states, promote collective defense capabilities, and foster greater strategic autonomy for the EU.  Established under Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 46(2) of the Treaty on European Union, and Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation in accordance with EU Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, it enables participating countries to engage in joint defense projects and initiatives aimed at enhancing military readiness, interoperability, and defense integration. 

Security Guarantees Available Without EU Membership

For as long as Ukraine remains outside the EU, the legal bases for EU security guarantees shift from treaty-based obligations to those found in the EU’s broader security and defense policy toolkit.  Chief among these is the Common Security and Defence Policy, which enables the EU to develop and deploy civilian and military crisis management missions around the world. 

Through the Common Security and Defence Policy, Ukraine has already engaged with various EU initiatives, including cooperation with the European Defence Agency and the use of the European Peace Facility to finance military assistance.  The European Peace Facility, in particular, has played a crucial role in enabling the EU to provide substantial support to Ukraine since the onset of the Russian invasion.  One of the most significant steps taken by the EU was the launch of the Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) in 2022.  The mission’s primary goal was to strengthen the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces, ensuring they are well-equipped to defend the civilian population and counter the ongoing aggression.  These initiatives could continue to provide the basis for ongoing and deepened security cooperation. 

Beyond these instruments, Ukraine could also benefit indirectly from arrangements such as the Berlin Plus agreement, which allows the EU to draw on NATO assets and capabilities for its own peacekeeping missions.  While this framework is not a security guarantee mechanism in the strict sense, it provides a platform for coordination and resource-sharing between the EU and NATO, as demonstrated in past operations in the Western Balkans.  In the Ukrainian context, similar arrangements could help amplify the reach and effectiveness of EU-led security commitments by utilizing NATO resources.

Conclusion

Taken together, these legal mechanisms demonstrate that the EU already has a range of tools at its disposal to provide meaningful security guarantees to Ukraine, both now and in a future scenario in which Ukraine becomes a member state. While the practical implementation of these mechanisms will depend on political will, resource availability, and broader geopolitical dynamics, the legal foundations for action are stronger than often assumed.  Understanding and leveraging these existing frameworks is a crucial step toward crafting a credible and durable security architecture for Ukraine and, by extension, for the broader European neighborhood.

Outlasting the Aggressor: Lessons from West Germany’s Cold War Experience

 By: Darrell Guthrie

Introduction

The Russian aggression against Ukraine is now more than three years old. A new US administration is implementing a radical approach to securing a ceasefire and appears poised to limit direct military assistance to Ukraine. Consequently, Europe now recognizes that it must approach this war in a decidedly different manner than might have been presumed only a few months ago. The past may offer hints to a path forward for Ukraine to survive and ultimately prevail against Russia.

While the imminent threat of war hung over Europe during the Cold War, West Germany lived under the constant threat of Soviet aggression. Yet, through economic revival, strategic military growth and partnerships, and careful political maneuvering, West Germany not only outlasted its aggressor but laid the groundwork for long-term stability and prosperity. 

West Germany's experience during the Cold War offers valuable insights for Ukraine in its pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity amid external threats. This blog explores some of the lessons that may be drawn from West Germany across economic and military themes. 

Economic Revival 

In the aftermath of WW2, Europe’s economy was devastated. While the likes of the UK and France made a slow but steady return to normality, West Germany’s economic recovery was more challenging. Bombing had destroyed swathes of urban infrastructure, food and industrial production was dramatically depleted, and millions of refugees from East Germany had sought sanctuary in the West.

Recovery efforts began in earnest in 1948, led by West Germany’s military government. Currency reform and the introduction of the Deutsche Mark encouraged production while price controls were lifted and taxes reduced, thus helping to restore economic stability and build a foundation for rapid industrial growth.

At the same time, the Marshall Plan (officially, the European Recovery Plan) was enacted in 1948: a U.S.-led initiative that provided economic aid to Western European nations to rebuild their economies and ultimately intended to counter the spread of communism. Providing over $13bn in grants and loans, 11% of which went to West Germany, the Plan played a key role in reviving Western economies and stabilizing political contexts. Although the Marshall Plan’s direct financial contribution to West Germany was relatively modest, its psychological impact was significant: it catalyzed domestic action to rebuild and revitalize. While future aid to Ukraine is more likely to come from its European allies than in the form of a US-led funding package, the Marshall Plan model provides a useful demonstration of the transformative potential of robust foreign aid. 

A combination of foreign aid and robust economic reforms thus enabled West Germany to revive its shattered economy in a transformation that came to be known as the Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle. This economic stability fostered social unity and political legitimacy, reducing internal vulnerabilities. The German example may offer valuable lessons for buttressing economic resilience as a tool for stabilization in the face of an aggressor.

Ukraine has already implemented wide economic reforms heavily driven by its EU integration process, for which the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and within that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, sets the framework. Continued focus on the likes of currency stabilization and inflation reduction and further EU alignment can help to create a fertile environment for investment and domestic growth. International aid from European allies can be used beyond emergency relief, as a strategic tool for economic transformation, channeled into structural reforms and critical rebuilding and infrastructure projects. Such international support can also signal robust backing for Ukrainian growth, helping to boost organic domestic efforts to revitalize the Ukrainian economy. Ever-deeper integration with Europe and other international partners can further foster robust trade networks and help to enhance resilience against economic shocks. 

Ultimately, while Russia’s aggression continues, it may be argued that a modern, resilient, interconnected, and prospering Ukrainian economy will make it much harder for Russia to leverage economic and trade disruption as a tool of aggression, or to play upon economic challenges domestically as a tool for sowing discontent. A resilient and thriving Ukrainian economy limits the ability of an aggressor to exploit economic manipulation for political leverage both domestically and internationally. 

Strategic Military Partnerships

Further lessons for Ukraine may be learned from the West German experience of collective defense. West Germany joined NATO in 1955, leading to the establishment of the Bundeswehr, or the Federal Defense Force. Whilst not initially capable of deterring a Soviet attack on its own, the Bundeswehr quickly grew into one of NATO’s most modern and well-equipped forces, and its NATO integration meant that West Germany’s military strength was amplified through collective defense. The alliance provided a credible deterrent against Soviet aggression during the Cold War by pooling resources, intelligence, and strategic planning among member nations. This collective security arrangement provided a formidable deterrent against Soviet expansion and assured West Germany that any aggression would trigger a coordinated response from the entire alliance.

Although Ukraine’s NATO accession is, at present, unlikely, Ukraine is closely focused on deeper security relationships with strategic partners, and with good reason: collective defense arrangements can bring enhanced intelligence and military capabilities as well as crucial deterrence mechanisms to mitigate the likelihood or impact of external aggression. 

West Germany was able to grow a defense industry that was compatible with Western standards and tapped into domestic ingenuity and innovative thinking. It further focused on state of the art and hardened defense infrastructure (such as ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities), improving the ability of West German and its partners to respond to Soviet aggression. Separate from the question of Ukraine’s NATO accession, more generally Ukraine could adopt Germany’s approach to strategic military partnerships, which could provide a robust security framework for Ukraine: one that enables targeted Ukrainian requests for military assistance while building both internal and external defense capabilities to better protect key population centers and critical infrastructure from Russian attacks.

Further, the economic revival that underpinned West Germany’s military modernization illustrates the deep interconnectivity between economic stability and military capability. A robust Ukrainian economy can provide the necessary resources for defense spending, technological innovation, and sustainable military growth. For Ukraine, reinforcing its economy through reforms and international support will bolster its capacity to invest in a modern, resilient military that can effectively deter or counter aggression in the long-term.

Conclusion

Ukraine can learn from West Germany's experience during the Cold War. The chief difference is that Ukraine is engaged in an active conflict that is consuming critical resources—especially the valiant effort of its people—and which requires vast amounts of aid. However, the blueprint for West Germany’s economic, political, and military organization, which enabled it to survive until the day that it unified with East Germany, may provide a framework for Ukraine’s own long-term and rightful sovereignty. 

The Murky Swamp—A Chance for Peace between Ukraine and Russia?

The Murky Swamp—A Chance for Peace between Ukraine and Russia?

 By: Professor David M. Crane and Sindija Beta

“Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding”

- Albert Einstein 

Introduction

The current war in Ukraine, ignited by Russia’s aggression in 2014 and reinforced by the full-scale invasion in February 2022, has caused immense suffering, reshaped global alliances, and destabilized international security.  Various peace proposals—ranging from Western-backed initiatives to Russian demands and efforts of possible mediators—have surfaced, each with its own challenges and merits.  Can diplomacy untangle this armed conflict, or will geopolitical realities prevent a lasting peace?

This blog post aims to contribute to the discussion about possible resolutions in Ukraine and examines the various (and shifting) positions of various nations, diplomats, and politicians without attempting to capture every proposal or analysis that has been published.

Current Positions for Peace

The United States' position on Ukraine has evolved over time, reflecting shifting political priorities.  During the earlier years of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the US was a staunch supporter of Ukraine contributing with substantial military aid and imposing sanctions on Russia.  With the inauguration of Donald Trump as the US President, US’s role has changed from being a contributor to Ukraine’s military effort of pushing Russia out of its territory to becoming a mediator navigating between both Ukraine and Russia with the goal of bringing the war to an end.

The Trump administration has particularly expressed a desire for pragmatic negotiation, leveraging Ukraine's military aid to pressure its leadership to agree to a swift pause in fighting.  The approach focuses on relying on the US's historic role in European security to create diplomatic pressure that would remove the burden of ensuring Ukraine’s security from the US.  In contrast, actors outside of the Trump administration’s circle engaged in policy-making have taken a firmer stance, emphasizing Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity and advocating for diplomatic efforts to unite international allies in opposition to Russian aggression.  Moreover, President Trump himself has also at times made statements threatening further sanctions against Russia if it continues its onslaught in Ukraine.

Russia’s proposals have centered on securing its territorial gains and limiting NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe.  Moscow has pushed for a ceasefire and negotiations, but only under conditions that Ukraine finds unacceptable.  These include recognizing Russian control over Crimea and other regions it has purportedly annexed in Ukraine’s Donbas region.  Additionally, Russia has demanded security guarantees that would halt NATO’s eastward expansion, framing the alliance’s growth as a direct threat to its national security.

Ukraine, while acknowledging that it will not be able to liberate its territory by military means, has remained unwavering in its insistence on maintaining legal sovereignty over all of its territory and refusing to cede the territory Russia has claimed but does not control.  Beyond territorial integrity, Ukraine is also demanding reparations for the damage caused by the war and accountability for Russian war crimes.  These firm conditions make peace negotiations extremely challenging, as both sides’ positions are in stark contrast with each other.

Searching for Peace Brokers for Ukraine

Peace in Ukraine has emerged as a near-global effort with multiple wide-ranging actors having stepped in to attempt to contribute to brokering peace in Ukraine.  These include Saudi Arabia, G-20 and BRICS nations, the United Nations, and European states.

Saudi Arabia’s willingness to provide good offices for Ukraine negotiations has emerged as a surprising but potentially impactful development.  While it has not thus far engaged in any active mediating role rather simply offering itself as a location for talks, it has the potential to also positively contribute to the resolution of the war.  By leveraging its diplomatic ties with both Ukraine and Russia, Saudi Arabia could help establish humanitarian corridors, secure temporary ceasefires for civilian evacuations, and address global energy security concerns tied to the conflict. 

Beyond Saudi Arabia, global players within the G-20 and BRICS nations, including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, could exert crucial diplomatic pressure to stabilize the situation in Ukraine.  These groups, comprised of major economies, may provide additional leverage and resources to support peace efforts.  At a minimum their public declarations of support for a ceasefire, stabilization, and facilitation of peace in the region are important.

China, maintaining its ties with both Russia and Ukraine, has promoted a balanced approach, advocating dialogue while expanding its own geopolitical influence.  India has largely remained neutral, urging peace while carefully navigating its relationships with both Moscow and the West.  Brazil and South Africa, as traditionally non-aligned states, have supported diplomatic negotiations while emphasizing the importance of sovereignty and humanitarian concerns. 

Meanwhile, the G-20 nations have a vested interest in economic stability and could use their collective influence to push for agreements that address global food security and energy market disruptions caused by the war.  Even if these nations do not directly intervene, their calls for stabilization and diplomatic resolutions carry significant weight.

The United Nations, furthermore, despite its bureaucratic limitations and geopolitical constraints, continues to play an essential role in addressing the humanitarian and diplomatic dimensions of the war.  Through agencies like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP), the UN has provided critical aid to affected populations, helping to alleviate the worst humanitarian crises stemming from the war.  Diplomatically, the UN General Assembly has consistently called for an end to hostilities and reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, yet the Security Council’s effectiveness is hamstrung by Russia’s permanent member status.  Russia’s status particularly limits the UN’s ability to engage in discussions surrounding a possible peacekeeping operation in Ukraine and the pursuit of accountability.

The European Question: Military and Political Courage

One of the key geopolitical questions emerging from the war is whether Europe has the military and political courage to act decisively without relying on U.S. leadership.  While European nations have collectively condemned Russia’s aggression, their ability to support Ukraine militarily, economically, and politically without weakening NATO or straining transatlantic relations remains in question.  If Europe were to take independent action, it would require unprecedented unity among EU nations, yet differences in national interests and strategic priorities make this a difficult prospect.  Politically, a stronger European stance could enhance the EU’s global role.  Militarily, Europe’s capabilities are uneven, with some nations capable of significant contributions while others struggle to maintain sufficient defense infrastructure.  An independent European initiative could also shift Russia’s strategic calculations, either deterring further aggression or escalating tensions, adding another layer of complexity to the search for peace.

One solution to stabilize the region, discussed in an earlier PILPG Lawyering Justice Blog, involves the deployment of a multinational force to oversee ceasefire agreements and prevent further escalation.  Such a force, possibly composed of EU, G-20, and BRICS member nations, could provide security assurances, facilitate humanitarian aid, and act as peacekeepers.  While several European countries and their Western allies have expressed a possible willingness to contribute forces to some kind of peacekeeping effort, the success of such an initiative depends on the willingness of both Ukraine and Russia to accept foreign monitoring. 

Parallel to the security efforts, the European Union has committed to a broader stabilization plan that includes economic reconstruction and political dialogue to integrate Ukraine more deeply into European structures.  Human rights and legal accountability remain central to these discussions, with the Council of Europe pursuing justice for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

NATO membership remains one of the most contentious issues in the ongoing conflict, with Ukraine’s aspirations to join the alliance serving as both a potential safeguard and a possible trigger for further Russian aggression.  While NATO membership would provide Ukraine with long-term security guarantees, it could also complicate peace negotiations by solidifying Moscow’s fears of Western encroachment.  Some proposals suggest a phased or conditional membership, tied to ceasefire agreements or broader diplomatic resolutions.  Regardless of the outcome, the question of NATO’s role in Ukraine’s future remains pivotal in shaping both the war and any eventual peace settlement.

Conclusion

Resolving the conflict in Ukraine requires navigating a web of competing interests, with global powers such as BRICS, the G-20, and the United Nations each playing a role in shaping potential outcomes.  Any viable path to peace will likely begin with ceasefire negotiations, possibly mediated by nonaligned actors like Saudi Arabia.  A neutral multinational force could help enforce ceasefire agreements and oversee humanitarian aid distribution, while diplomatic channels would have to remain open for bilateral and multilateral discussions that address security concerns, territorial disputes, and economic consequences.  Ultimately, Ukraine’s stability and impact in negotiations hinges on continued military and humanitarian support, ensuring that it can sustain itself while engaging in negotiations.  A long-term political framework should include provisions for reparations, accountability, and Ukraine’s gradual integration into European structures, all while managing Russia’s responses to such moves.

Europe, too, will have to reassess its role in regional security, balancing military support for Ukraine with its reliance on the United States.  The question remains whether European nations have the political and military resolve to act independently in shaping the region’s future, or if they will remain tethered to U.S. leadership.

Meanwhile, the international community should explore ways to empower the UN in both providing humanitarian aid and facilitating political dialogue to create a more cohesive international response to the crisis.

In navigating the murky waters of this war, flexibility and a genuine commitment to dialogue will be essential.  All parties will need to recognize the inextricable link between security, humanitarian needs, and geopolitical stability in Europe, transcending the immediate concerns of territorial disputes to foster a lasting peace. 

March, 2025