The Legal Case for Ukraine’s Territorial Reintegration

The Legal Case for Ukraine’s Territorial Reintegration

By: Katie hetherington, sindija beta, and dr. paul r. williams

The overwhelming majority of the international community agrees on the illegality of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory and Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity. This is evidenced by the consistent diplomatic statements of major international actors and numerous U.N. General Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 68/262 of 2014, adopted in direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea; Resolution ES-11/1 of 2022, deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and decision to recognise the so-called independence of certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and Resolution ES-11/4 of 2022, reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and declaring the referendums in and subsequent Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia as illegal under international law. 

Ukraine’s claim includes the restoration of its borders as they stood immediately after the USSR’s dissolution, encompassing all territories currently occupied by Russia: Crimea, and parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russia continues to assert that its annexation and occupation of these territories is legitimate. International law provides a definitive response: Russia’s claims are illegitimate, and Ukraine’s sovereignty over its occupied territories remains unassailable. 

This blog outlines the legal foundation supporting Ukraine’s right to reintegrate these territories, structured around five key components: the principles of territorial integrity, use of force, and self-defense; uti possidetis juris; international agreements between Russia and Ukraine; self determination and remedial secession; and the principles of waiver, acquiescence, and extinctive prescription. Ultimately, this blog demonstrates that Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity and the restoration of its 1991 borders is supported by international law.

The Legal Basis for Ukraine’s Right to Territorial Integrity and Reintegration

Territorial Integrity, Use of Force, and Self-Defense

Russia consistently refutes the illegality of its invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. However, the international legal order within which Russia professes to operate clearly provides a basis for Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity and territorial reintegration. 

The prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. This principle has been upheld in numerous cases, including the ICJ's decisions in Corfu Channel and Nicaragua, and has been consistently supported by both the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly. General Assembly resolution 2625 reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force and restated the principle that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal. Further, General Assembly resolution 3314 on the definition of aggression reiterated that territorial acquisition through aggression shall not be recognized as lawful by the international community. 

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (“CSCE”), also affirms these fundamental legal principles and evidences Russia’s obligation to respect these legal norms. The Final Act, signed by the Soviet Union, codified respect for the territorial integrity of states as a cornerstone of European security and the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty of all signatory states. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new challenges in shifting European geopolitics, CSCE was institutionalized and evolved into what is currently known as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”), to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties. This membership commits both states to the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. 

In response to accusations that Russia has violated its obligation to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Russian authorities frequently assert that their use of force constitutes an act of self-defense intended to protect ethnically Russian communities in Ukraine. Much like the principle of territorial integrity, the right to self-defense is a well-established norm under international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. When invoked, it may justify a state’s use of armed force in response to an armed attack by another state. The exercise of self-defense may also be justified outside of an armed attack where self-defense is anticipatory, preemptive, or preventative. Yet Russia was not attacked by Ukraine, nor did it face any threat of force by Ukraine, in advance of its 2014 occupation of Crimea or its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory thus cannot be validated as an act of self-defense, and directly violates its commitments to the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and prohibition of the use of force.

Uti Possidetis Juris and the Validity of the 1991 Borders

Russia has repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine's claim to territorial integrity in accordance with its borders as they stood at the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  However, the legal basis for Ukraine’s claim to its 1991 borders can be found within the principle of uti possidetis juris.

This principle establishes that newly independent states inherit the administrative boundaries that existed at the time of independence, unless otherwise provided by agreement. The principle was initially applied in decolonization contexts to ascertain the boundaries of post-colonial states, such as in the ICJ’s 1986 judgment in Burkina Faso vs. Mali in which the Court relied on colonial boundaries at the time of independence to delineate the disputed border. 

However, the principle can now be said to serve as the rule for adjudicating border disputes for newly independent states. The Badinter Arbitration Committee, set up by the European Economic Community to provide arbitration and legal advice to the Conference on Yugoslavia during the break up of the former Yugoslavia, reaffirmed the principle of uti possidetis and clarified the scope of its application outside of post-colonial contexts. In its opinion in response to the question of whether the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, should be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law, the Commission determined that “except where otherwise agreed, former republican borders become international frontiers protected by international law.” This determination was based on two fundamental principles: territorial integrity and the principle of uti possidetis, and demonstrated the applicability of the latter principle in any context of state dissolution or boundary dispute. 

Ukraine’s administrative borders within the Soviet Union included the territory of Crimea and other currently occupied territories. Further, Ukraine’s claim to these borders, in line with the principle of uti possidetis, is not without recognition from Russia. On December 8, 1991, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Belovezha Accords, which declared that the Soviet Union dissolved and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (the “Commonwealth”). Soon after, on December 21, 1991, the Belovezha parties and eight other post-Soviet states signed the Alma-Ata Protocols, formally establishing the Commonwealth and committing the parties to respect one another's territorial integrity and “the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth.”

While the Alma-Ata Protocols did not explicitly define the specific borders of each member state, the recognition of specific borders among the Commonwealth member states—and importantly from Russia—was institutionalized later, notably with the adoption of the Commonwealth Charter on January 22, 1993. In the Charter Russia, acting consistently with the principle of uti possidetis, recognized Ukraine’s existing frontiers in line with the administrative boundaries of states within the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution.

International Agreements and Repeated Recognition

Subsequent international agreements provide additional support for Ukraine’s territorial claims. International agreements demonstrate Russia's consistent formal recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1991 borders, inclusive of Crimea and other occupied territories—although Russia has frequently disputed the delineation and demarcation of Ukraine’s borders and rescinded on its treaty obligations.

In 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances of Ukraine (the “Budapest Memorandum”). While not a legally binding treaty, the Budapest Memorandum contained important commitments to territorial integrity. In exchange for Ukraine’s relinquishing of its nuclear arsenal as it acceded to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Budapest Memorandum explicitly pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial boundaries in line with its “existing borders”. As a signatory to the agreement, Russia committed to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine. 

Three years later, in 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia (“Treaty on Friendship”). The Treaty on Friendship was a legally binding agreement subject to automatic renewal unless one party decided to terminate the agreement (it is worth noting that the treaty remained in effect until 2019 when, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and escalating conflict, then-Ukrainian President Poroshenko signed a decree opting not to extend the treaty, resulting in its expiry in March 2019). Under Article 2 of the treaty, both parties committed to “respect each other’s territorial integrity and confirm the inviolability of their common borders.” Furthermore, under Article 3 Russia agreed to “base relations with [Ukraine] on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, [and] the non-use of force or threat of force.” 

International agreements between Ukraine and Russia provide a clear and consistent record of Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its 1991 borders, and its annexation and occupation of Ukrainian territory demonstrably violate its commitments under several international treaties to which it is a signatory. 

Self-Determination and Remedial Secession

Despite Russia’s obligation to honor territorial integrity under multiple international agreements, Russia argues that Ukraine does not have any right to sovereignty over the territories it has occupied, and their right to self-determination must be recognized. It bases its claim on the purported results of the referenda held in Crimea in 2014 and Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson in 2022, as well as principles of self-determination and remedial secession. Nonetheless, as demonstrated below, Russia manipulates these legal principles to attempt to justify its illegal acts. 

The 2014 and 2022 Referenda

Russia asserts that the referenda of 2014 and 2022 were legitimate exercises of self-determination and remedial secession, but both referenda fail to meet the criteria for either principle and the application of these principles to Russia’s actions is legally invalid.

First, Russia’s application of self-determination and remedial secession is fundamentally flawed. The principle of self-determination is a key component of international law, granting peoples the right to determine their own political status and governance. However, the principle in the first instance is focused on the right to internal self-determination—the right of a people or group within a state to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development without seeking secession. This is opposed to external self-determination—the right of a people or group to freely determine their political status, including the possibility of secession. In fact, the existence of a contemporary right to external self-determination is widely disputed in the international discourse. 

Nevertheless, per the support of some commentators to the right to external self-determination, international law also establishes clear limits on when self-determination can justify altering the territorial boundaries of an existing state. These limits are essential for understanding Ukraine’s territorial claims and its legal right to reintegrate its occupied territories. In order for self-determination to justify secession, it must address extreme conditions such as systemic oppression or a denial of fundamental rights by the parent state. This is known as remedial secession, a legal concept that has not yet gained universal acceptance and allows secession only when a state is responsible for grave violations of the rights of a specific population. 

In the case of the 2014 and 2022 referenda, even if remedial secession was regarded as an established legal rule, there is no evidence that the populations of Crimea nor other occupied territories faced any such conditions before Russia’s intervention. The absence of these conditions negates Russia’s claim that the secession of these territories from Ukraine would be legally justified under the principle of remedial secession.

 A second factor is the context in which these referenda occurred. International law requires that any referendum on self-determination be conducted under free and fair conditions, free from external coercion or military occupation. The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, found the 2014 Crimean referendum to be unconstitutional under Ukrainian and Crimean law and conducted under conditions that violated international norms. Similarly, reports from the 2022 referenda found widespread evidence of coercion, military intimidation, and duress. In both instances, the referenda failed to meet this basic criteria, violating basic legal standards for free and fair elections. 

The illegitimacy of these referenda has been affirmed by the international community. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262 reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (including Crimea) and declared the Crimean referendum invalid. The referenda in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were similarly condemned by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution ES-11/4 as illegal attempts by Russia to modify Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders with no validity under international law.  The international community overwhelmingly affirms that Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity is unaltered by the sham referenda of 2014 and 2022, and rejects Russia’s attempts to legitimize its annexations.

Claims of Waiver, Acquiescence, and Extinctive Prescription

In light of Russia's prolonged occupation, international legal principles like waiver, acquiescence, and extinctive prescription arise: can Ukraine’s sovereignty be lost simply due to inaction or the passage of time? International law again definitively confirms that this is not the case, especially when the occupation is unlawful.

The concept of waiver in international law requires an explicit and intentional renunciation of rights over territory. Ukraine has made no such renunciation. On the contrary, Ukraine has consistently and unequivocally objected to Russia’s occupation, affirming its sovereign claim over all occupied territories. Similarly, the principle of acquiescence—implying a state’s tacit consent to a violation—cannot apply when a state persistently contests the unlawful actions of another, as Ukraine has done.

The doctrine of extinctive prescription, which suggests that prolonged failure to assert territorial rights might lead to their loss, is also inapplicable here. Under international law, prescription cannot legitimize territorial claims arising from aggression, coercion, or unlawful occupation. Russia's actions—constituting aggression and unlawful occupation—cannot create a valid legal title to Ukrainian territory, regardless of how long the occupation endures.

Ukraine's ongoing rejection of Russia’s claims, alongside the consistent reaffirmation of its 1991 borders by both Ukraine and the international community, reinforces its sovereign rights. These actions preclude any legal arguments based on waiver, acquiescence, or extinctive prescription, further bolstering Ukraine’s right to reintegrate its occupied territories and restore its internationally recognized borders.

Conclusion

The legal case for Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity according to its 1991 borders and the reintegration of its occupied territory is both robust and unassailable. International law affirms that Russia’s occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories are without legal validity. From the prohibition of territorial acquisition through force to the principles of self-determination and the reaffirmation of Ukraine's borders in international agreements, Ukraine’s sovereignty remains firmly intact. The doctrine of territorial integrity, which upholds the inviolability of state borders, has been consistently reinforced by the international community, leaving no room for Russia’s claims to legitimacy. Ukraine’s steadfast rejection of Russia’s unlawful actions, coupled with its ongoing assertion of its 1991 borders, precludes any legal arguments for waiver, acquiescence, or prescription. Ukraine is fully entitled to reintegrate its occupied territories and restore its internationally recognized borders.

As the international community continues to stand firm in rejecting Russia’s illegal actions, the case for Ukraine’s territorial reintegration grows stronger. Supporting Ukraine’s right to reintegrate its occupied territories is not only a defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty but also a broader affirmation of the principles that protect all states from unlawful territorial aggression. 

Seeking a Path to Durable Peace: How a Multinational Force for the Donbas Region Could Forge Stability in Ukraine

Seeking a Path to Durable Peace: How a Multinational Force for the Donbas Region Could Forge Stability in Ukraine

By: Professor David M. Crane

The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine poses significant challenges to stability in Europe and beyond. With the full-scale war entering its fourth year, finding a path to durable peace has proven nearly impossible. Government officials and foreign policy experts have laid out numerous ideas and proposals for peace, including the option of establishing a demilitarized zone, stationing European peacekeepers in Ukraine, or freezing the war on current battlefield lines. Despite the numerous ideas put forward, none have emerged as a clear solution.

This blog post explores a ceasefire model based on the successful Multinational Force and Observers (“MFO”) established for the Sinai Peninsula, examining how such a framework could be adapted for the Donbas region of Ukraine. The MFO, agreed upon in the 1981 Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, functioned as a peacekeeping force to observe and verify compliance with the provisions of the peace treaty. By drawing inspiration from this model, a Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region (“MFO-DR”) could offer a potential avenue for fostering security, dialogue, and cooperation among the affected parties in Ukraine.

While not proposing it as a definitive solution to the conflict, the MFO-DR model represents a framework through which neutral international forces could help ensure compliance with any ceasefire and facilitate further dialogue. The MFO-DR model is intended to only apply to the Donbas region as Crimea would likely require an alternative arrangement. Likewise, this model is not intended to replace security guarantees for Ukraine as a whole. This approach aims to contribute to the broader conversation on peacekeeping strategies without positioning itself as the sole path to resolution.

The Concept of the Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region (MFO-DR)

The MFO-DR would divide the conflict zone into three distinct zones, each serving a specific purpose in maintaining peace and ensuring compliance with any ceasefire agreement. This division would allow for better monitoring, reduce the chances of escalation, and enable trust-building measures between Ukraine and Russia.

Zone A would cover an area directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border, where Russia would maintain control and stability. Military presence in this zone would be limited, with only non-offensive personnel, such as border police, allowed. Surveillance equipment could be employed to monitor activities in the region.

Zone B, the largest and most critical area, would be managed by the neutral Multinational Force. Composed of selected countries willing to contribute to peacekeeping efforts, the Multinational Force would serve as a buffer between the warring parties. This area would be where most of the monitoring, inspections, and negotiations would take place. The force would be equipped with basic defensive tools for self-protection but would refrain from deploying any offensive weapons.

Lastly, Zone C would be the Ukrainian-controlled area, where Ukrainian governance and security forces would operate. This zone would also prohibit heavy military equipment and offensive weapons, with the presence of Ukrainian border police limited to non-aggressive personnel. Surveillance would be used here as well to ensure compliance and prevent any violations of the ceasefire.

The command structure of the MFO-DR would be headed by a neutral general officer, someone with vast experience in international peacekeeping and diplomacy. The Director General, an equally impartial individual, would oversee the strategic and diplomatic aspects of the mission, working to maintain relationships between all stakeholders and keep the peace process moving forward.

The Importance of Neutrality in the MFO-DR

One of the key aspects of the MFO-DR would have to be its neutrality. Drawing from the success of the MFO in the Sinai, which had troops from various states with no affiliation to either party in the conflict, the MFO-DR would similarly need to maintain strict impartiality. This would allow the multinational force to be seen as a legitimate and trusted entity by both Ukraine and Russia, increasing the likelihood of cooperation.

States involved in the MFO-DR would not be part of NATO, ensuring that the initiative is not perceived as an extension of Western influence. The inclusion of states from diverse regions of the world, such as China, India, Kenya, Jordan, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia, could help mitigate concerns from all parties about bias or interference in the war. These states have historically held neutral stances in international conflicts, and their involvement could signal an effort to balance international interests while respecting the sovereignty of both Russia and Ukraine.

By remaining neutral and independent, the MFO-DR could play a vital role in easing tensions and encouraging dialogue between the two sides. The participation of neutral nations from a variety of geopolitical backgrounds would enhance the legitimacy of the peace process, giving it a broader, more inclusive global appeal. This diversity also brings a wealth of experience in conflict resolution and peacekeeping, making the MFO-DR a potentially effective instrument for long-term stability.

Operational Guidelines and Confidence-Building Measures

For the MFO-DR to function effectively, several operational guidelines would be required. Observers and peacekeepers within the force would need unrestricted access to all zones, allowing them to conduct regular inspections and engage with local populations to assess the situation on the ground. In addition, there would need to be a robust reporting mechanism to quickly address any incidents or breaches of peace, ensuring that any violations of ceasefire agreements are communicated and dealt with swiftly.

Perhaps one of the most crucial elements of the MFO-DR would have to be its role in building trust. Regular consultations between Russian, Ukrainian, and Multinational Force representatives could help maintain open lines of communication and address concerns as they arise. Additionally, cross-border cultural and economic initiatives could be implemented to foster collaboration among communities divided by the conflict.

Training programs for military and security forces from participating nations could further reinforce cooperative security principles and build trust. These programs could focus on cooperation, non-escalation tactics, and human rights, reinforcing a commitment to peaceful resolution rather than military confrontation.

Geopolitical and Diplomatic Considerations for the MFO-DR

As for any peace proposal for the Russian war in Ukraine, the evolving geopolitical landscape could present both challenges and opportunities for the MFO-DR. While NATO and the European Union would not formally participate, their influence as established power structures in Eastern Europe remains significant. For this model to work, Russia, Ukraine, and the international community, including NATO and the EU, would have to agree on the framework and support its implementation.

Furthermore, the MFO-DR may find itself navigating the complex tension between national sovereignty and collective international action. The MFO-DR, by involving nations outside traditional Western alliances, may reflect a new paradigm of cooperation. Nations like India and Brazil, with their histories of non-alignment, could facilitate dialogue between Russia and Ukraine and open doors for constructive engagement in negotiations.

The United Nations could serve as a critical facilitator for bringing together the core nations in establishing the MFO-DR. Leveraging its expertise in peacekeeping and conflict resolution, the UN could provide technical assistance and guidance to the MFO-DR, ensuring adherence to international norms and practices.

A potential General Assembly resolution supporting the MFO-DR could provide the initiative with the necessary legitimacy, especially if the UN Security Council remains paralyzed by political divisions. This would parallel the MFO in the Sinai Peninsula, which operated without direct UN involvement but received public support from the international community, including the UN.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Multinational Force and Observers for the Donbas Region could be another model to consider for peace in Ukraine. By involving nations from outside traditional Western alliances, the MFO-DR can provide a balanced, multi-polar approach to peacekeeping that avoids the pitfalls of geopolitical bias. The establishment of this framework would aim to reduce hostilities, encourage dialogue, and ultimately create a path towards long-term peace and stability in Ukraine.

Crimea and Donbas Are Ukrainian: A Historical and Cultural Perspective

Crimea and Donbas Are Ukrainian: A Historical and Cultural Perspective

Authors: Kateryna Kyrychenko and Dr. Paul R. Williams

The territories of Crimea and Donbas, currently under Russian occupation, have become central to the global discourse on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite their distinct characteristics, Crimea and Donbas are inseparable parts of Ukraine, with centuries of shared cultural, historical, and political ties that firmly anchor them within the Ukrainian state. Both regions are also universally recognized as Ukrainian under international law. The 1991 Ukrainian Independence referendum and UN Resolution 68/262 on Ukraine's territorial integrity affirmed their status within Ukraine’s borders. Yet, the ongoing tensions over the status of these territories stem from the regions' complex histories. Understanding their shared histories offers a deeper perspective on Ukraine’s modern struggles to protect its territorial integrity.

Historical Perspective on Crimea

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 reignited an age-old debate about the peninsula’s rightful place. The diverse ethnic and cultural background of Crimea, including its Tatar heritage, shaped its complex relationship with both Russia and Ukraine. 

From ancient times, the Crimean peninsula was home to various indigenous peoples, including the Cimmerians, Scythians, Greeks, Armenians, and Crimean Tatars, who have long-standing ties to Ukraine. The development of the region was largely influenced by ancient Ukrainian and Greek settlements. In the 15-18th centuries, the Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, controlled the region. While having significant economic and political links with Ukraine, the Crimean Khanate was characterized by an aggressive policy and remained the primary rival of the Russian Empire for dominance in the Northern Black Sea region until its downfall. In 1783, the peninsula was annexed by the Russian Empire and became part of various Russian governorates for over two centuries. From the 1920s onward, Crimea formally became a part of the Soviet Union.

Prior to the 1783 annexation, Crimea was a truly culturally diverse region. However, following its incorporation into the Russian Empire, the region started experiencing a systematic process of russification aimed at diminishing local culture, which included the renaming of cities and the settlement of Russian-speaking populations. The aggressive assimilation policy peaked in 1944, when the Soviet Union organized mass forced deportations of the Crimean Tatars, along with other indigenous groups, accusing them of collaboration with the enemy during World War II. The deportations resulted in a profound demographic shift, undermining the multicultural fabric of the region and facilitating the dominance of Russian settlers.

In 1954, the Soviet Union transferred control of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine, which was described as a gesture of goodwill between the two populations. The decree with which this transfer was executed itself characterized the move as advisable due to the “territorial inclination of the Crimean Oblast' toward the Ukrainian SSR, the commonality of the economy, and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean Oblast' and the Ukrainian SSR”. This decision was in fact a pragmatic move by the Soviet Union to address the peninsula’s post-war economic decline and logistical challenges, as Ukraine’s geographic proximity and resources made it better suited to manage Crimea’s recovery and development.  

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by Ukraine’s declaration of independence, which was supported by a majority of the population in Crimea, further solidified the understanding that Crimea was part of Ukraine—despite later Russian claims and the illegal annexation of the peninsula in 2014.

Undoubtedly, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians are tied with enduring connections rooted in mutual respect and shared struggles. During the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917, Ukrainians recognized Crimean Tatars as the primary agents of self-determination in the region, fostering cooperation. Crimean Tatars, in turn, aligned with the Ukrainian People’s Republic, united by aspirations to resist imperial domination. This history of collaboration contrasts sharply with Russian imperial and Soviet policies of repression and cultural erasure, which undermined Crimean Tatar autonomy and left a legacy of mistrust. 

Acknowledging the Crimean Tatars’ unique role and historical grievances is crucial in the context of any future peace agreement that might end the current war. Ensuring their political and cultural autonomy within Ukrainian Crimea would restore justice and reinforce Ukraine’s commitment to human rights and inclusive governance.

Donbas: Ukraine’s Melting Pot

While Crimea’s historical ties to Ukraine are often discussed through cultural and administrative lenses, Donbas region is more deeply intertwined with the country’s industrial legacy and its long-standing resistance against Russian imperialism. 

Donbas region (an abbreviation of "Donetsk Coal Basin") is a major industrial and coal-mining hub, located in the eastern part of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). The region was heavily influenced by Russian and Soviet policies from the late 19th century onward. It became a melting pot of various ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, Russians, and others, due to its booming industry and labor demands. However, the region’s industrialization was not purely economic; it was deeply shaped by Russia’s russification policies. The expansion of Russian-speaking communities in Donbas, initiated by tsarist Russia and intensifying during Soviet times, fundamentally altered the region’s cultural landscape. From the late 19th century, Russian-speaking workers were brought to the area to work in coal mines and factories, gradually diluting the Ukrainian presence. By the mid-20th century, Russian became the dominant language of communication in both public and private spheres.

Nonetheless, the Donbas region has always been an integral part of Ukrainian lands. Before industrialization, Donbas had a rich history tied to Ukraine. In the 17th century, the region was home to the Ukrainian Cossacks, who played a pivotal role in shaping Ukrainian identity and protecting Ukrainian lands from external threats. Archaeological evidence also shows that Donbas was historically linked to the Wild Fields, a frontier zone sparsely inhabited by various Ukrainian-speaking communities. The foundation of towns such as Bakhmut and Sloviansk in the 16th and 17th centuries as salt-mining centers further tied Donbas to early Ukrainian economic development.

The region’s inclusion in the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union did not sever its ties with Ukraine. During the Ukrainian War of Independence (1917–1921), Donbas was a site of resistance against Russian imperial forces, demonstrating its strong connection to the Ukrainian national struggle. Later, the Soviet industrialization program brought more Russian speakers into the region, further complicating its identity. Nonetheless, Donbas remained a critical component of the Ukrainian SSR’s economy, society, and culture.

 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Donbas became a part of the newly independent Ukraine. Despite significant pro-Russian sentiment in the region among some parts of the population, rooted in decades of russification, the 1991 referendum showed overwhelming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, even among the Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Conclusion

Despite their distinct histories, both Crimea and Donbas share a common Ukrainian experience through culture, language, and shared national consciousness. The histories of Crimea and Donbas are inextricably linked to Ukraine’s national identity. The regions’ crucial roles in Ukraine’s independence movement reveal that they have always been part of Ukraine’s historical, social, and cultural fabric. Though Russia has attempted to assert its claims over these territories, the historical narratives of Crimea and Donbas demonstrate that their connection to Ukraine is deep and unbroken.

The ongoing Russian aggression and occupation of Crimea and Donbas, fueled by the Federation's imperial ambitions, highlight the larger struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty and the right of its people to determine their own future. The histories of these two regions remind us that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not just a matter of contemporary politics but is also rooted in centuries of shared culture, economic ties, and a collective desire for independence. Understanding this history is essential for acknowledging the legitimate claim of Ukraine to both Crimea and Donbas and reaffirming its rightful place on the world stage as a sovereign nation.

The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design

The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design

Authors: Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams

The election of Donald Trump as the next President of the United States has reignited discussions about a potential peace agreement in Ukraine. Advisors close to the President-elect have floated the idea of revisiting the Minsk Protocols of 2014 and 2015—agreements initially crafted to address Russian aggression in Ukraine but fraught with significant design flaws.

At first glance, revisiting the Minsk Protocols might seem like a logical starting point. However, their design was fundamentally flawed, with three critical weaknesses undermining their effectiveness.

First, Russia acted in bad faith by asserting that it was not a party to the armed conflict, despite maintaining a military presence on Ukrainian territory. This claim allowed Russia to avoid any obligations under the protocols, undermining their credibility and enforceability.

Second, the “special status” provision in the Minsk Protocols created a pathway for eroding Ukrainian political unity. It fostered governance fragmentation and institutionalized a permanent Russian influence over Ukraine’s internal affairs.

Third, the sequencing of the Minsk Protocols required Ukraine to hold elections in Donetsk and Luhansk before regaining control over its territory. This made it impossible to ensure that the elections would be free, fair, and transparent.

This blog will explore these design flaws in greater detail and explain why reviving the Minsk Protocols in future peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely to result in a durable peace.

What are the Minsk Protocols?

In response to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine, the Minsk Protocols were negotiated under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with France and Germany mediating the talks. These agreements, known as Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015), sought to establish ceasefires and provide a roadmap for resolving the conflict. However, both agreements ultimately failed, largely due to their inherent weaknesses.

Minsk I outlined commitments in three key areas: cessation of hostilities, conflict resolution, and enhanced security measures. It called for a bilateral ceasefire, OSCE monitoring, and the exchange of detainees. Additionally, the agreement provided for "special status" autonomy for parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, encouraged a national dialogue, and required “early local elections” to be held under Ukrainian law.

Following the collapse of Minsk I, Minsk II attempted to address some of these shortcomings by specifying obligations more clearly. It introduced provisions for a demilitarized zone monitored by the OSCE, constitutional reforms, local elections, and the restoration of full control over Ukraine’s borders by its government.

The “special status” provision in Minsk II included an annex detailing the powers to be granted to Donetsk and Luhansk under the decentralization process. These included the ability to appoint judicial officials, form cross-border cooperation initiatives with Russia, create militia units, enjoy immunity from interference by Ukraine’s central government, and decide language rights in the regions.

It Is Not The Same Context 10 Years On

While the Minsk Protocols address some of the same issues that continue to persist during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, their provisions were shaped by a very different geopolitical context. The war has evolved, rendering the assumptions underlying these agreements increasingly irrelevant.

Namely, when, after the protests that erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan Square and the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine, it did not do so as overtly and blatantly as in 2022. The aggression started with “The Little Green Men”, Russian military personnel acting without identification marks taking control of the Crimean peninsula.  Over the course of the next 8 years, Russia continued to assert that the war in Ukraine was a civil war between “separatists” in Luhansk and Donetsk and the Ukrainian military. 

In this context, the Minsk Protocols included provisions stating that Ukraine would eventually regain control over all its territory. For example, Minsk I specified that “unlawful military formations, military hardware, militants, and mercenaries” would be removed from Ukraine. Minsk II reinforced this, promising Ukraine full control over its borders.

Fast forward to 2025–Russia has launched a full-scale invasion, sending hundreds of thousands of its soldiers into Ukraine and claiming to have annexed the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. On October 4, 2022, the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council approved the Federal Constitutional Laws on the accession of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Russian Federation, thereby putting the Russian Constitution in direct conflict with the Ukrainian Constitution. 

This drastic shift in Russia’s strategy and its illegal actions under international law have escalated the conflict far beyond the assumptions of 2014-2015. The Minsk Protocols, based on outdated frameworks, are no longer applicable to the realities of 2025. They fail to address the current scale of aggression, Russia’s abandonment of diplomatic subtleties, and overlapping constitutional claims over territory.

Granting Special Status: Entrenched Instability and Dysfunction

In addition to being unsuitable for the 2025 context, the Minsk Protocols were already flawed in their 2014-2015 design. Specifically, the “special status” provision for Donetsk and Luhansk was not about genuine decentralization of power but a mechanism to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.

Decentralization can be a valid governance model, but the Minsk Protocols went far beyond empowering local governance. They effectively created states within Ukraine that would operate as Russian proxies, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and unity.

By granting Donetsk and Luhansk control over policing, language policies, and cross-border cooperation with Russia, the protocols institutionalized dysfunction. This level of autonomy would paralyze Ukraine’s central government on critical issues, including foreign policy and security. For example, attempts by Kyiv to deepen ties with NATO or the European Union could be obstructed by these regions’ refusal to comply with national policies.

These provisions were not aimed at fostering self-governance but at giving Moscow leverage to control Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. Russia’s broader strategic goal has always been to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence and prevent its integration into Western institutions. Embedding such provisions into Ukraine’s political framework would ensure perpetual instability and make NATO or EU membership impossible.

The Sequencing That Was Never Realistic

The sequencing of obligations in Minsk I and Minsk II was among their most critical flaws. Both agreements required Ukraine to hold local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and implement constitutional reforms before regaining control of its borders and ensuring security.

First, holding elections in regions controlled by Russian-backed forces made it impossible to guarantee free, fair, and transparent elections. Without territorial control or security guarantees, these elections would legitimize governments loyal to Moscow.

Second, this sequencing allowed Russia to maintain leverage over Ukraine throughout the process. By requiring elections before border control, the protocols gave Russia an opportunity to entrench its influence in the region. Moscow could strengthen its position on the ground during the pre-election period, ensuring that political developments aligned with its interests. This would make it even harder for Ukraine to reassert sovereignty, as Russia could manipulate the political environment to maintain control under the guise of peace.

Conclusion

The design and sequencing of the Minsk Protocols were flawed from the outset, and their application today would only entrench Russian influence in Ukraine. Any effort to revive these agreements would perpetuate instability and undermine Ukraine's sovereignty. A viable peace proposal must affirm Ukraine’s independence, safeguard its political unity, and support its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine’s future lies in strengthening its sovereignty, not in appeasing Russia through a flawed peace process.

The Istanbul Communique: A Blueprint for Ukraine's Capitulation

The Istanbul Communique: A Blueprint for Ukraine's Capitulation

Authors: Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams

The Istanbul Communique, an early and ambitious attempt to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia, has often been portrayed as a promising step toward ending a devastating conflict. Drafted in Istanbul, Turkey, during March and April 2022, the treaty aimed to halt hostilities soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, a closer analysis reveals that the agreement would have been disastrous for Ukraine. It left the country vulnerable to future Russian aggression and offered no foundation for lasting peace. The Communique’s key provisions on neutrality, military constraints, and security guarantees amounted to little more than a blueprint for Ukraine’s capitulation.

Neutrality: A Dangerous Gamble

A cornerstone of the Istanbul Communique was the establishment of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state. This neutrality, enshrined in the constitution, would have barred Ukraine from joining military alliances, hosting foreign bases or weapons, or engaging in activities that might compromise its neutral status. At face value, neutrality might seem like a pathway to de-escalation, but in reality, it would have stripped Ukraine of the very means it needed to defend itself against further aggression.

Neutrality is an untenable proposition for a nation sharing a border with an aggressive and expansionist power like Russia. This provision would have stripped Ukraine of its ability to seek military assistance from international partners, severely limiting its defense options in the event of another invasion. In a world where territorial integrity is constantly at risk, neutrality would have only invited further Russian encroachment, leaving Ukraine without the support of allies for protection.

Given Russia's demonstrated disregard for international norms and its pattern of invading neighboring countries, a policy of neutrality would have left Ukraine exposed to continuous threats. It would have denied Ukraine the ability to bolster its defenses or seek support from NATO or other military alliances. Far from fostering peace, the notion of neutrality undermined Ukraine's security and signaled that aggression could be rewarded through diplomatic concessions. Rather than safeguarding Ukraine’s sovereignty, this provision would have left the country vulnerable to future exploitation by its far larger neighbor.

Security Guarantees: Promises Without Guarantees

The Communique’s proposed security framework revolved around guarantees from a group of Guarantor States, including the United Kingdom, China, the United States, France, and Russia. Additional guarantors were suggested, such as Belarus (proposed by Russia) and Turkey (proposed by Ukraine). At its core, the framework aimed to provide a safety net should Ukraine face renewed aggression, yet these guarantees were riddled with flaws.

The draft treaty required the Guarantor States to engage in consultations if Ukraine were attacked. While military assistance was a possible outcome, it was neither automatic nor guaranteed. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, which obligates member states to collective defense, the Istanbul Communique provided no binding mechanisms to ensure a swift and unified response. This reliance on consultations left Ukraine’s security dependent on the alignment of interests among the Guarantor States.

The draft treaty also failed to resolve whether unanimous consensus among all Guarantor States, including Russia, would be required to activate any assistance. If adopted in a final peace agreement, this provision would replicate the dysfunctional decision-making model of the United Nations Security Council’s veto system. It is unthinkable to design security guarantees that give veto power to the very aggressor responsible for initiating the war.

Military Constraints: Ukraine on a Silver Platter

Russia’s demand that Ukraine drastically reduce its military would have amounted to a catastrophic surrender of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Without solid, unconditional security guarantees, these constraints would have left Ukraine defenseless against future Russian aggression, effectively handing the country over to an emboldened Russia.

Stripping Ukraine of its military capabilities in a region marked by fragile security and constant threats to territorial integrity would have invited further invasions. Ukraine’s recent resilience against Russian aggression has demonstrated that a strong, modernized military is indispensable for its survival.

Unresolved Issues: Just Peace?

Beyond its provisions on neutrality, military reductions, and security guarantees, the Istanbul Communique left numerous critical issues unresolved. Chief among these was the lack of a clear mechanism for the return of prisoners of war and civilians, including children. While the treaty called for their return, it provided no specific details on how this would be accomplished—an alarming omission given the global outcry over the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children. This failure would only prolong the suffering of families, perpetuate grave human rights violations, and undermine any hopes for a genuine and just peace.

Moreover, Russia’s demands—such as lifting sanctions, terminating legal cases against Russia, and recognizing Russian as an official language in Ukraine—constituted a blatant infringement on Ukraine’s sovereignty. Accepting these terms would have been tantamount to capitulation, undermining Ukraine’s independence and its international legal rights.

Few Wins for Ukraine

It is worth noting that the treaty did contain a few positive aspects. One notable success was the acceptance of Ukraine’s EU membership. Additionally, Russia did not object to Ukraine’s participation in peacekeeping missions under international frameworks such as the UN, OSCE, or EU. This provision preserved Ukraine’s connection to European institutions and represented a small but meaningful concession from Russia.

The Communique also proposed a procedure for a ceasefire and a monitored troop withdrawal. Russia agreed to withdraw its forces to their permanent deployment positions, with implementation supervised by a joint commission comprising Russian, Ukrainian, and potentially UN representatives. Although the exact timeline for withdrawal was left to future consultations, the inclusion of this framework suggested a step toward de-escalating the conflict and pursuing a peaceful resolution.

Conclusion

The Istanbul Communique was a dangerously flawed attempt to force Ukraine into submission. By stripping the country of its ability to defend itself and offering no solid protection against future Russian aggression, the treaty would have exposed Ukraine to further exploitation and vulnerability. Even the few concessions, such as the prospect of EU membership, barely masked the overwhelming flaws of the agreement. Ukraine deserves a peace that guarantees its future—not a treaty that sets the stage for further subjugation. The Istanbul Communique was a dangerous fantasy, and Ukraine must continue to fight for peace that truly ensures its survival and sovereignty.