The Murky Swamp—A Chance for Peace between Ukraine and Russia?

The Murky Swamp—A Chance for Peace between Ukraine and Russia?

 By: Professor David M. Crane and Sindija Beta

“Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding”

- Albert Einstein 

Introduction

The current war in Ukraine, ignited by Russia’s aggression in 2014 and reinforced by the full-scale invasion in February 2022, has caused immense suffering, reshaped global alliances, and destabilized international security.  Various peace proposals—ranging from Western-backed initiatives to Russian demands and efforts of possible mediators—have surfaced, each with its own challenges and merits.  Can diplomacy untangle this armed conflict, or will geopolitical realities prevent a lasting peace?

This blog post aims to contribute to the discussion about possible resolutions in Ukraine and examines the various (and shifting) positions of various nations, diplomats, and politicians without attempting to capture every proposal or analysis that has been published.

Current Positions for Peace

The United States' position on Ukraine has evolved over time, reflecting shifting political priorities.  During the earlier years of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the US was a staunch supporter of Ukraine contributing with substantial military aid and imposing sanctions on Russia.  With the inauguration of Donald Trump as the US President, US’s role has changed from being a contributor to Ukraine’s military effort of pushing Russia out of its territory to becoming a mediator navigating between both Ukraine and Russia with the goal of bringing the war to an end.

The Trump administration has particularly expressed a desire for pragmatic negotiation, leveraging Ukraine's military aid to pressure its leadership to agree to a swift pause in fighting.  The approach focuses on relying on the US's historic role in European security to create diplomatic pressure that would remove the burden of ensuring Ukraine’s security from the US.  In contrast, actors outside of the Trump administration’s circle engaged in policy-making have taken a firmer stance, emphasizing Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity and advocating for diplomatic efforts to unite international allies in opposition to Russian aggression.  Moreover, President Trump himself has also at times made statements threatening further sanctions against Russia if it continues its onslaught in Ukraine.

Russia’s proposals have centered on securing its territorial gains and limiting NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe.  Moscow has pushed for a ceasefire and negotiations, but only under conditions that Ukraine finds unacceptable.  These include recognizing Russian control over Crimea and other regions it has purportedly annexed in Ukraine’s Donbas region.  Additionally, Russia has demanded security guarantees that would halt NATO’s eastward expansion, framing the alliance’s growth as a direct threat to its national security.

Ukraine, while acknowledging that it will not be able to liberate its territory by military means, has remained unwavering in its insistence on maintaining legal sovereignty over all of its territory and refusing to cede the territory Russia has claimed but does not control.  Beyond territorial integrity, Ukraine is also demanding reparations for the damage caused by the war and accountability for Russian war crimes.  These firm conditions make peace negotiations extremely challenging, as both sides’ positions are in stark contrast with each other.

Searching for Peace Brokers for Ukraine

Peace in Ukraine has emerged as a near-global effort with multiple wide-ranging actors having stepped in to attempt to contribute to brokering peace in Ukraine.  These include Saudi Arabia, G-20 and BRICS nations, the United Nations, and European states.

Saudi Arabia’s willingness to provide good offices for Ukraine negotiations has emerged as a surprising but potentially impactful development.  While it has not thus far engaged in any active mediating role rather simply offering itself as a location for talks, it has the potential to also positively contribute to the resolution of the war.  By leveraging its diplomatic ties with both Ukraine and Russia, Saudi Arabia could help establish humanitarian corridors, secure temporary ceasefires for civilian evacuations, and address global energy security concerns tied to the conflict. 

Beyond Saudi Arabia, global players within the G-20 and BRICS nations, including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, could exert crucial diplomatic pressure to stabilize the situation in Ukraine.  These groups, comprised of major economies, may provide additional leverage and resources to support peace efforts.  At a minimum their public declarations of support for a ceasefire, stabilization, and facilitation of peace in the region are important.

China, maintaining its ties with both Russia and Ukraine, has promoted a balanced approach, advocating dialogue while expanding its own geopolitical influence.  India has largely remained neutral, urging peace while carefully navigating its relationships with both Moscow and the West.  Brazil and South Africa, as traditionally non-aligned states, have supported diplomatic negotiations while emphasizing the importance of sovereignty and humanitarian concerns. 

Meanwhile, the G-20 nations have a vested interest in economic stability and could use their collective influence to push for agreements that address global food security and energy market disruptions caused by the war.  Even if these nations do not directly intervene, their calls for stabilization and diplomatic resolutions carry significant weight.

The United Nations, furthermore, despite its bureaucratic limitations and geopolitical constraints, continues to play an essential role in addressing the humanitarian and diplomatic dimensions of the war.  Through agencies like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP), the UN has provided critical aid to affected populations, helping to alleviate the worst humanitarian crises stemming from the war.  Diplomatically, the UN General Assembly has consistently called for an end to hostilities and reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, yet the Security Council’s effectiveness is hamstrung by Russia’s permanent member status.  Russia’s status particularly limits the UN’s ability to engage in discussions surrounding a possible peacekeeping operation in Ukraine and the pursuit of accountability.

The European Question: Military and Political Courage

One of the key geopolitical questions emerging from the war is whether Europe has the military and political courage to act decisively without relying on U.S. leadership.  While European nations have collectively condemned Russia’s aggression, their ability to support Ukraine militarily, economically, and politically without weakening NATO or straining transatlantic relations remains in question.  If Europe were to take independent action, it would require unprecedented unity among EU nations, yet differences in national interests and strategic priorities make this a difficult prospect.  Politically, a stronger European stance could enhance the EU’s global role.  Militarily, Europe’s capabilities are uneven, with some nations capable of significant contributions while others struggle to maintain sufficient defense infrastructure.  An independent European initiative could also shift Russia’s strategic calculations, either deterring further aggression or escalating tensions, adding another layer of complexity to the search for peace.

One solution to stabilize the region, discussed in an earlier PILPG Lawyering Justice Blog, involves the deployment of a multinational force to oversee ceasefire agreements and prevent further escalation.  Such a force, possibly composed of EU, G-20, and BRICS member nations, could provide security assurances, facilitate humanitarian aid, and act as peacekeepers.  While several European countries and their Western allies have expressed a possible willingness to contribute forces to some kind of peacekeeping effort, the success of such an initiative depends on the willingness of both Ukraine and Russia to accept foreign monitoring. 

Parallel to the security efforts, the European Union has committed to a broader stabilization plan that includes economic reconstruction and political dialogue to integrate Ukraine more deeply into European structures.  Human rights and legal accountability remain central to these discussions, with the Council of Europe pursuing justice for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

NATO membership remains one of the most contentious issues in the ongoing conflict, with Ukraine’s aspirations to join the alliance serving as both a potential safeguard and a possible trigger for further Russian aggression.  While NATO membership would provide Ukraine with long-term security guarantees, it could also complicate peace negotiations by solidifying Moscow’s fears of Western encroachment.  Some proposals suggest a phased or conditional membership, tied to ceasefire agreements or broader diplomatic resolutions.  Regardless of the outcome, the question of NATO’s role in Ukraine’s future remains pivotal in shaping both the war and any eventual peace settlement.

Conclusion

Resolving the conflict in Ukraine requires navigating a web of competing interests, with global powers such as BRICS, the G-20, and the United Nations each playing a role in shaping potential outcomes.  Any viable path to peace will likely begin with ceasefire negotiations, possibly mediated by nonaligned actors like Saudi Arabia.  A neutral multinational force could help enforce ceasefire agreements and oversee humanitarian aid distribution, while diplomatic channels would have to remain open for bilateral and multilateral discussions that address security concerns, territorial disputes, and economic consequences.  Ultimately, Ukraine’s stability and impact in negotiations hinges on continued military and humanitarian support, ensuring that it can sustain itself while engaging in negotiations.  A long-term political framework should include provisions for reparations, accountability, and Ukraine’s gradual integration into European structures, all while managing Russia’s responses to such moves.

Europe, too, will have to reassess its role in regional security, balancing military support for Ukraine with its reliance on the United States.  The question remains whether European nations have the political and military resolve to act independently in shaping the region’s future, or if they will remain tethered to U.S. leadership.

Meanwhile, the international community should explore ways to empower the UN in both providing humanitarian aid and facilitating political dialogue to create a more cohesive international response to the crisis.

In navigating the murky waters of this war, flexibility and a genuine commitment to dialogue will be essential.  All parties will need to recognize the inextricable link between security, humanitarian needs, and geopolitical stability in Europe, transcending the immediate concerns of territorial disputes to foster a lasting peace. 

March, 2025

Peace in Ukraine: Perspectives from Academia and Think Tanks

Peace in Ukraine: Perspectives from Academia and Think Tanks

By: Katie Hetherington, Sindija Beta, and Paul R. Williams 

Introduction

The first quarter of 2025 has witnessed significant developments in Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, driven in part by the new Trump administration’s unprecedented approach to peace efforts. Galvanized by a shifting global order and as the war enters its fourth year, world leaders are urgently exploring avenues to end Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In parallel, prominent think tanks and experts are actively contributing to the discourse, offering their own proposals and frameworks for peace. While these ideas vary, a common thread emerges: any lasting resolution must address Ukraine’s security, sovereignty, and long-term stability. In this post, we explore some of the recurring themes in recent analyses—from robust security guarantees to the need for strong transatlantic leadership—while unpacking the difficult trade-offs negotiators must consider.

Robust Security Guarantees: The Cornerstone of a Lasting Peace

Across the board, analysts agree that a ceasefire or negotiated agreement without credible security assurances is untenable. Even if hostilities temporarily pause, Ukraine must be provided with binding guarantees that deter future aggression. This could take the form of an enhanced international peacekeeping framework (in several possible iterations), continued military aid, or legally binding security commitments from Western powers. The discussion around legally binding security commitments particularly centers on the possibility of future Ukrainian NATO membership and the viability of alternative security arrangements, such as bilateral security commitments offered by the U.S. to Israel.

There is consensus that, without such guarantees, any peace deal risks being nothing more than a pause in the fighting rather than a long-term solution to Russia’s aggression. The challenge, many analysts agree, is to ensure that these guarantees are robust enough without creating new vulnerabilities: while security guarantees must give Ukraine real, lasting assurance of its independence—so that it can govern freely and resist future aggression—they must not create complete dependence on external military forces or specific security arrangements and disregard the need to build and strengthen of Ukraine’s own security and defense capabilities. Furthermore, several commentators acknowledge the concern over possible fierce resistance from Russia should security guarantees involve NATO troops and fears over a possible NATO-Russia confrontation.

The Territorial Question

The issue of territorial integrity remains one of the most contentious aspects of any potential peace agreement for Ukraine, and as such, is at the forefront of most analysts’ minds. Many argue that any lasting peace must involve the full restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. They contend that allowing Russia to retain control over occupied territories would not only legitimize aggression and undermine international law but also set a dangerous precedent for future conflicts. From this standpoint, any peace deal that involves territorial concessions would weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty and embolden authoritarian regimes to pursue territorial expansion through force.

However, other commentators suggest that a negotiated settlement may require difficult compromises, including territorial concessions. Some institutions have explored scenarios in which Ukraine might agree to freeze the conflict along current frontlines in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid. From a more realist perspective, some experts argue that, given the military realities on the ground, continuing a prolonged war may be more damaging than a carefully negotiated ceasefire and follow-on peace agreement that involves territorial compromises. While this view remains controversial, particularly if it requires de jure territorial concessions, it highlights the broader debate between those who believe a full Ukrainian victory is essential for lasting peace and those who prioritize an end to hostilities, even if it means accepting tough compromises.

The Transatlantic Question: Can Europe Secure Peace Without U.S. Support?

The current geopolitical climate has also sparked intense debate about the roles of Europe and the United States in ensuring Ukraine’s security. With uncertain and precarious U.S. commitment under the Trump administration, the majority of analysts note the need for an increased European leadership role. At the same time, most recognize the formidable challenges Europe faces in replacing the full spectrum of U.S. support. Analysts highlight that Europe’s capacity to plug the gap left by the U.S., especially in critical areas like air defense, long-range missile technology, and satellite communications, is—at least at present—limited. 

Analysts increasingly consider the possibility and form of a European-led military response—such as deploying an independent peacekeeping or reassurance force—but generally acknowledge that such a response carries significant political risks. It requires a high degree of cohesion and willingness among European nations—which, it should be noted, European leaders have increasingly demonstrated in recent weeks. It also risks antagonizing Russia further: Russian leadership has made it clear that any presence of NATO or European troops in Ukraine is unacceptable and may be viewed as an escalation. This underscores a dual challenge: Europe must rapidly enhance its military capacity without provoking further aggression, all while operating in a geopolitical environment where the traditional U.S. security umbrella is in question.

The current debate among analysts reflects a broader reckoning with the future of transatlantic security architecture. Many experts agree that even as Europe works to bolster its own defense capabilities, a strong U.S. commitment remains indispensable for ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and deterring further aggression. Without this partnership, the risk is that Ukraine’s security could be compromised, leaving the region vulnerable to renewed conflict.

The Role of Economic Leverage

Economic sanctions have been a central tool in the West’s response to Russia’s aggression, and they continue to be critical. However, economic leverage in a peace proposal for Ukraine is evolving well beyond traditional sanctions, as demonstrated by the Trump administration’s prioritization of economic incentives and trade deals as tools for peace. 

The role of Russia’s frozen central bank assets in a peace agreement continues to occupy the minds of commentators. Many have long proposed that a portion of the estimated $300 billion worth of frozen Russian assets could be redirected and used as a bargaining chip: if Russia agrees to concrete peace measures (such as a verified withdrawal of forces or the acceptance of binding security guarantees for Ukraine), then some of these assets could be released as a form of economic relief.  Proposals also include the use of these assets, at least partially, to support Ukraine’s defense and post-war reconstruction efforts, providing Ukraine with much-needed resources to rebuild its infrastructure and bolster its sovereignty. 

The Trump administration’s proposed U.S.-Ukraine rare earth minerals deal has also elicited diverse opinions from analysts. Some contend that the creation of firm economic ties between the U.S. and Ukraine could create a vested American interest in Ukraine’s security and stability, potentially acting as something of a security guarantee—an assumption that has been indicated by the U.S. administration. However, many commentators are skeptical about the tangible security benefits for Ukraine, cautioning that the deal may primarily serve U.S. economic interests and commoditize Ukraine’s sovereignty without offering it substantial returns or formal security assurances.  Additionally, concerns have been raised about the feasibility of extracting these resources, given that significant mineral deposits are located in regions currently under Russian control, necessitating considerable investment and stability to fully exploit these assets. As a means of facilitating lasting peace, the efficacy of the minerals deal and the wider transactional approach it represents remain a subject of active debate among experts.

Justice versus Peace?

The question of justice and the indictments issued for high-ranking Russian officials is another key theme that has sparked extensive discussion among commentators. Many human rights advocates emphasize that justice must not be sidelined in the pursuit of peace. They argue that prosecuting those responsible for crimes such as the forcible transfer of children and civilians, attacks on civilian infrastructure, massacres, and systematic torture is vital to upholding international law and preventing future violations. Without accountability, they contend, any peace settlement would be fragile, signaling that perpetrators can act with impunity and leaving victims without redress. Some point to the environment of impunity in Russia, as a result of the lack of accountability for Soviet-era crimes such as the Holodomor and other human rights violations committed under oppressive Soviet rule, as root causes of the atrocities occurring in Ukraine today.

However, some analysts caution that making full accountability a prerequisite for peace could complicate negotiations, or render a settlement unattainable. They argue that pushing for justice may delay peace talks, as Putin would have little incentive to engage in negotiations if it risks exposing key Russian leadership figures to international prosecution.

Conclusion

In today’s rapidly evolving international landscape, commentators’ proposals for ending Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine evolve alongside global political dynamics. Yet, it remains that a durable settlement must not only end the immediate violence but also protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic future. Analysts largely agree that achieving this will require a carefully balanced strategy that integrates military strength, robust security guarantees, gradual diplomatic progress, and a firm commitment to some degree of international accountability. At its heart, the challenge lies in crafting a peace process that is not just a temporary ceasefire but one that builds the foundation for a stable, secure, and sovereign Ukraine—ensuring long-term peace and stability for the country and the region.

In Pursuit of a Ceasefire in Ukraine: Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo

In Pursuit of a Ceasefire in Ukraine: Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo

By: Frederick Lorenz

Fast-moving international developments in February 2025 may soon create a real opportunity for ceasefire negotiations in the ongoing Ukraine war. After years of brutal conflict and significant changes in geopolitical trends, Ukraine and Russia are at a point where they may have no other choice but to agree that the war cannot go on. However, reaching an agreement will be only the first step. The real challenge lies in implementing a ceasefire that is both durable and enforceable. Key issues will include the separation of forces and defining the precise geographical boundaries of demilitarized zones, and establishing an effective international monitoring framework.

Historical examples of international peacekeeping efforts offer valuable insights for shaping such an agreement. The NATO-led missions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the aftermath of the Balkan conflicts provide instructive models, particularly in the crucial first ninety days of ceasefire enforcement. In both cases, military stabilization was assigned to a NATO force while a separate but connected civil administration worked to maintain governance and reconstruction. 

By examining these past missions, policymakers can draw important lessons on force deployment, security arrangements, and international oversight mechanisms that could help stabilize Ukraine in the early stages of a ceasefire. While no single model is directly applicable to the complex and evolving situation in Ukraine, adapting elements from previous peacekeeping efforts could provide a viable framework for ensuring a cessation of hostilities and laying the groundwork for a more lasting resolution.

Establishing a Cease Fire Boundary Line and Zone of Separation in Ukraine

The situation in Ukraine is complex and unprecedented. Negotiations over the potential ceasefire line will be a formidable task as they may have a long-term impact on Ukraine’s outlook. In the short term, establishing effective mechanisms for separating opposing forces within a demilitarized zone can help prevent clashes and build stability. 

The boundary readjustment and transition process followed in Bosnia could provide some lessons for Ukraine. Following the negotiation of the Dayton Accords in 1995, the General Framework for Peace (the General Framework) was signed later that same year, which established an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (Boundary Line) in Bosnia separating the conflicting parties and preventing further clashes. While the General Framework established a provisional Boundary Line, the parties themselves committed to establishing a joint commission with an equal number of representatives from both sides to develop a precise description of the Boundary Line. Disputed portions of the Boundary Line were further decided by arbitration.

Further, the General Framework declared a zone of separation spanning 2 kilometers on both sides of the Boundary Line making a zone 4 kilometers in total. The Boundary Line was established mostly along the military frontlines as they were at the time of the Dayton negotiations, with some major adjustments, most notably in the western part of the country, and in-and-around Sarajevo. The full separation of forces with a 4-kilometer distance between each other was fully completed ninety days after NATO forces operating as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) tasked with implementing the Dayton Accords had taken over the authority from the UN forces previously responsible for enforcing peace in Bosnia. 

In addition to a boundary readjustment, military forces and civilians in Bosnia were relocated according to the schedule contained in the General Framework. In fact, despite efforts to persuade them to stay, most Serbs (about 30,000) hastily moved to the Serb zone designated in the General Framework.

Following the example in Bosnia, a similar boundary line commission could be established in Ukraine to minimize subsequent clashes between Ukrainian and Russian forces caused by disputes over the precise definitions of the delineation line. 

International Monitoring in Ukraine

The ceasefire and the established delineation line will also require a robust monitoring mechanism. While Bosnia’s IFOR and Kosovo’s KFOR forces had extensive mandates that included enforcement by NATO forces which are unlikely to happen in Ukraine’s case, certain aspects applicable to Ukraine can still be extracted. 

For instance, the Bosnia context has shown that a centralized military control structure will be essential for Ukraine. Specifically, coordination in Bosnia was handicapped because the General Framework did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political, and humanitarian aspects of the NATO mission. 

Additionally, a detailed report of the command and control arrangements in Bosnia found that the role of judge advocate officers was crucial and an important source of advice to commanders as they “played a key role in establishing [rules of engagement] for each force.” For instance, judge advocate officers would brief the IFOR Commander on rules of engagement and the Military Annex of the General Framework, including military activities such as defensive bunkers that would be permitted or prohibited in the zone of separation. 

Moreover, new technologies are rapidly emerging that can help manage or enforce peace and inhibit the deterioration of crises into war. Data collected through sensor and surveillance systems can help increase the confidence of the parties to an agreement and provide operational intelligence for preventing violence. Autonomous unarmed drones could play a role in monitoring lines of contact and ceasefire violations to reduce the risk to peacekeepers on the ground.

Since technology collects a tremendous amount of information, Artificial Intelligence (AI) could help monitoring missions review the images of potential violations and the interface with satellite imagery. AI can provide advantages but also risks from intentional disinformation from parties to the conflict. But even with useful information, there needs to be effective mechanisms for command, control, and enforcement of provisions in the ceasefire agreement.

In this regard and given President Trump's calls for European commitment, Europe will likely have to bear the main burden of providing security and ensuring compliance with a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. Nonetheless, as highlighted in a recent paper by the German Institution for Security Affairs (SWP): “A mission entirely without U.S. support is inconceivable because of the mix of capabilities required for such an endeavor.” 

As regards the size of the possible European force in Ukraine, President Zelenskyy has stated that 200,000 peacekeepers would be needed. For comparison, the KFOR mission in Kosovo began in 1999 with 48,000 soldiers, which covers almost 11,000 square km. Ukraine is almost 55 times larger. Realistically, without the US, even the 200,000 peacekeeper number is unlikely to be feasible. Nevertheless, with the proper technological support, a much smaller force might be able to effectively cover a Ukraine demilitarized zone.

Eli Tenenbaum, director of the Security Studies Center at the French Institute of International Relations, offers details on how such a smaller force could look like. He proposes deploying “three to five brigades with a total of about 40,000 troops with robust air defense capabilities, positioning these forces 20-50 kilometers from the frontline, east of the Dnipro River.” 

Additionally, it will take some time to identify, assemble, and properly deploy to the region. In Bosnia, a large part of IFOR was already in the country as part of the UNPROFOR, and in Kosovo, the NATO forces were in the region and could deploy along previously established ground routes. In Ukraine, the differences are vast, both in terms of the size of the armed conflict zone and the distances to move and properly deploy. Although the US will likely not have “boots on the ground,” it may very well be able to supply intelligence, logistic support, and strategic airlift for the multinational force.

Negotiating a ceasefire

Undeniably, before thinking about implementing a ceasefire in Ukraine, the parties will need to agree to this ceasefire. 

The Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) provides valuable resources to support negotiations, including a Ceasefire Drafters Handbook. Several core elements are listed from a comparative analysis of ceasefires: (1) a cessation of hostilities, (2) the separation of forces, and (3) the verification, supervision, and monitoring of the agreement.

Past agreements and efforts to establish peace between Ukraine and Russia further provide important insights and words of warning for current attempts to develop an effective ceasefire or peace agreement. Another PILPG document outlines the substance and several key failings of recent past agreements, including the

Budapest Memorandum, Minsk I and II. This information should be crucial for those attempting to negotiate a durable cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the initial process could start and conclude rather quickly, and the written agreement could be only a few pages long. The Gaza agreement was only 1,400 words. The agreement consists of three related and interconnected stages, each with a forty-three-day schedule, and a description of the conditions (including the release of detainees) to be met by each side.

The initial ceasefire arrangement in Ukraine might similarly consist of three stages of about 45 days each. Phase 1 could commence after an agreement for cessation of hostilities, and during that time, the preliminary boundary lines would be established, and remote monitoring would begin. Phase 2 could provide a deadline for the withdrawal of the military forces of Russia and Ukraine from the newly established zone of separation. Phase 3 could provide for the deployment of the multinational force and the commencement of monitoring and other activities described in the ceasefire agreement. 

For a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, the first or second phase will likely require a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Russia in the Kursk Region, with a corresponding Russian yielding of claims to certain areas that it has previously “annexed” but does not physically control. This may have to wait until a more permanent peace agreement is signed. A boundary commission, like the one used in Bosnia, may be essential in the short term. The difficult part of the ceasefire negotiation will be the establishment of an organizational framework that includes military, civilian, and humanitarian tasks, as well as a reconstruction plan. While not discussed in this blog, long-term security guarantees will be another highly challenging negotiation conundrum. 

Conclusion

A ceasefire agreement in Ukraine will require careful negotiation and the development of an innovative political-military framework for peace. The structure of the framework and its implementation will likely be the responsibility of the major European powers. Although there is no single model that is directly applicable, negotiators can draw on successful aspects of previous models, including NATO IFOR, and UNMIK KFOR, among others. Designation of boundaries, separation of forces, verification, and monitoring of zones will be critical in the short term. New technologies may provide options that were not

available in previous conflict areas. Ukraine is unique and challenging with multiple factors that might prevent permanent peace. However, a well-drafted ceasefire agreement can play a critical role in establishing a durable cessation of war.

Europe Must Act Now to Secure Ukraine’s (And Its) Future

Europe Must Act Now to Secure Ukraine’s (And Its) Future

By: Julian Braithwaite, Professor Michael Kelly, Katie Hetherington

As the United States bypasses both Ukraine and Europe to negotiate directly with Russia on an end to its war of aggression in Ukraine, Europe faces a stark reality: a settlement could be imposed that weakens Ukraine and undermines European security. While U.S. policy is still in flux, Europe cannot afford to be a passive observer. Instead, it must adopt a similarly transactional approach, creating irreversible commitments to Ukraine’s future that make it harder for Washington and Moscow to strike a deal that leaves Kyiv vulnerable. To shape the course of negotiations, Europe must establish facts on the ground that bind its security to Ukraine’s survival. 

A European Stabilization Force

First, European governments should agree with Kyiv to deploy European forces as part of a stabilization force. This presence would give Europe a direct stake in Ukraine’s security and ensure that any future agreement considers European interests. European troops should be clustered around Ukraine’s 10 largest cities still under Ukrainian control (from Kyiv to Odesa), thereby preventing Russia from attacking them with drones or rockets for fear of hitting NATO troops stationed there, albeit not under the NATO flag.

Fast-Tracking EU Accession

Second, Ukraine’s integration into the European Union must be fast-tracked, providing Kyiv with tangible economic and security benefits that Russia cannot undo. Although Ukraine has some way to go in further aligning with EU requirements regarding the rule of law and democratic institutions and rooting out corruption, the Zelenskyy government has made tremendous strides – certainly similar to those made by Romania and Bulgaria on their accession. By accelerating Ukraine’s EU accession and implementing concrete measures such as increased market access, investment guarantees, and security cooperation, Europe would signal its unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Leveraging Frozen Assets

Third, Europe must leverage Russia’s frozen assets. This is one thing Europe controls directly. Most of the Russian Central Bank’s $300 billion is located in Europe, the interest of which is being routed to rebuild Ukraine. The release of these assets should be made conditional on a settlement that guarantees Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security. If an unjust peace is imposed, Europe should repurpose these assets to strengthen its own defense, support Ukraine’s long-term resilience, and pay for European stabilization forces located in Ukraine.

A Unified European Defense Posture

Finally, while the withdrawal of U.S. security commitments to Europe is not yet certain, Europe must prepare for a unified European defense posture without U.S. backing. First, European defense industries must scale up long-term arms production for Ukraine. This ensures sustained military support that is independent of U.S. political cycles and strengthens Europe’s strategic autonomy. Germany’s new Chancellor has committed to do so, following similar French and British commitments. Second, Europe’s two nuclear powers—the U.K. and France—can use their nuclear weapons as a deterrent of their own, underpinning European security independent of U.S. security guarantees. Saber-rattling is in no way endorsed, but Moscow should be reminded that Paris and London’s nuclear weapons are not under American control. 

Exerting Pressure on Russia and United States

Beyond bolstering Ukraine, Europe can exert pressure on both Russia and the United States to ensure a fair settlement. What might this look like? On the Russian front, loopholes in energy sanctions must be closed to prevent the backdoor export of oil and gas via third countries such as India—which mixes discounted Russian oil with Saudi oil so that it is no longer Russian and then upsells the derived petroleum products back to the U.S. and others. 

On the U.S. front, Europe must remember that it has leverage as well. If Washington pressures Ukraine into an unfair deal, European nations should shift defense procurement away from American suppliers, reducing reliance on the U.S. defense industry. And much like the U.S., Europe can also use trade policy as a bargaining chip, by linking cooperation on China and digital regulation to American support for Ukraine’s full sovereignty. The deal President Trump struck with President Zelenskyy to secure Ukraine’s valuable minerals vaguely implies American protection for Ukraine, but this will only last during the mining process. Once the minerals are extracted, the Trump-run United States will no longer have any interest in protecting Ukraine, and any protection there was will most certainly be withdrawn.

Decisive European Action

Europe does not need U.S. permission to act. Indeed, if Europe acts now with both vision and conviction, they can influence the endgame for the war in Ukraine. By creating leverage, establishing clear commitments, and taking decisive action, European leaders can ensure that any negotiated settlement—whether led by Washington or not—secures Ukraine’s future and safeguards European security for the long term. The time to act is now.

The Legal Case for Ukraine’s Territorial Reintegration

The Legal Case for Ukraine’s Territorial Reintegration

By: Katie hetherington, sindija beta, and dr. paul r. williams

The overwhelming majority of the international community agrees on the illegality of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory and Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity. This is evidenced by the consistent diplomatic statements of major international actors and numerous U.N. General Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 68/262 of 2014, adopted in direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea; Resolution ES-11/1 of 2022, deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and decision to recognise the so-called independence of certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and Resolution ES-11/4 of 2022, reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and declaring the referendums in and subsequent Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia as illegal under international law. 

Ukraine’s claim includes the restoration of its borders as they stood immediately after the USSR’s dissolution, encompassing all territories currently occupied by Russia: Crimea, and parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russia continues to assert that its annexation and occupation of these territories is legitimate. International law provides a definitive response: Russia’s claims are illegitimate, and Ukraine’s sovereignty over its occupied territories remains unassailable. 

This blog outlines the legal foundation supporting Ukraine’s right to reintegrate these territories, structured around five key components: the principles of territorial integrity, use of force, and self-defense; uti possidetis juris; international agreements between Russia and Ukraine; self determination and remedial secession; and the principles of waiver, acquiescence, and extinctive prescription. Ultimately, this blog demonstrates that Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity and the restoration of its 1991 borders is supported by international law.

The Legal Basis for Ukraine’s Right to Territorial Integrity and Reintegration

Territorial Integrity, Use of Force, and Self-Defense

Russia consistently refutes the illegality of its invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. However, the international legal order within which Russia professes to operate clearly provides a basis for Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity and territorial reintegration. 

The prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. This principle has been upheld in numerous cases, including the ICJ's decisions in Corfu Channel and Nicaragua, and has been consistently supported by both the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly. General Assembly resolution 2625 reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force and restated the principle that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal. Further, General Assembly resolution 3314 on the definition of aggression reiterated that territorial acquisition through aggression shall not be recognized as lawful by the international community. 

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (“CSCE”), also affirms these fundamental legal principles and evidences Russia’s obligation to respect these legal norms. The Final Act, signed by the Soviet Union, codified respect for the territorial integrity of states as a cornerstone of European security and the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty of all signatory states. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new challenges in shifting European geopolitics, CSCE was institutionalized and evolved into what is currently known as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”), to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties. This membership commits both states to the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. 

In response to accusations that Russia has violated its obligation to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Russian authorities frequently assert that their use of force constitutes an act of self-defense intended to protect ethnically Russian communities in Ukraine. Much like the principle of territorial integrity, the right to self-defense is a well-established norm under international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. When invoked, it may justify a state’s use of armed force in response to an armed attack by another state. The exercise of self-defense may also be justified outside of an armed attack where self-defense is anticipatory, preemptive, or preventative. Yet Russia was not attacked by Ukraine, nor did it face any threat of force by Ukraine, in advance of its 2014 occupation of Crimea or its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory thus cannot be validated as an act of self-defense, and directly violates its commitments to the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and prohibition of the use of force.

Uti Possidetis Juris and the Validity of the 1991 Borders

Russia has repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine's claim to territorial integrity in accordance with its borders as they stood at the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  However, the legal basis for Ukraine’s claim to its 1991 borders can be found within the principle of uti possidetis juris.

This principle establishes that newly independent states inherit the administrative boundaries that existed at the time of independence, unless otherwise provided by agreement. The principle was initially applied in decolonization contexts to ascertain the boundaries of post-colonial states, such as in the ICJ’s 1986 judgment in Burkina Faso vs. Mali in which the Court relied on colonial boundaries at the time of independence to delineate the disputed border. 

However, the principle can now be said to serve as the rule for adjudicating border disputes for newly independent states. The Badinter Arbitration Committee, set up by the European Economic Community to provide arbitration and legal advice to the Conference on Yugoslavia during the break up of the former Yugoslavia, reaffirmed the principle of uti possidetis and clarified the scope of its application outside of post-colonial contexts. In its opinion in response to the question of whether the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, should be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law, the Commission determined that “except where otherwise agreed, former republican borders become international frontiers protected by international law.” This determination was based on two fundamental principles: territorial integrity and the principle of uti possidetis, and demonstrated the applicability of the latter principle in any context of state dissolution or boundary dispute. 

Ukraine’s administrative borders within the Soviet Union included the territory of Crimea and other currently occupied territories. Further, Ukraine’s claim to these borders, in line with the principle of uti possidetis, is not without recognition from Russia. On December 8, 1991, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Belovezha Accords, which declared that the Soviet Union dissolved and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (the “Commonwealth”). Soon after, on December 21, 1991, the Belovezha parties and eight other post-Soviet states signed the Alma-Ata Protocols, formally establishing the Commonwealth and committing the parties to respect one another's territorial integrity and “the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth.”

While the Alma-Ata Protocols did not explicitly define the specific borders of each member state, the recognition of specific borders among the Commonwealth member states—and importantly from Russia—was institutionalized later, notably with the adoption of the Commonwealth Charter on January 22, 1993. In the Charter Russia, acting consistently with the principle of uti possidetis, recognized Ukraine’s existing frontiers in line with the administrative boundaries of states within the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution.

International Agreements and Repeated Recognition

Subsequent international agreements provide additional support for Ukraine’s territorial claims. International agreements demonstrate Russia's consistent formal recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1991 borders, inclusive of Crimea and other occupied territories—although Russia has frequently disputed the delineation and demarcation of Ukraine’s borders and rescinded on its treaty obligations.

In 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances of Ukraine (the “Budapest Memorandum”). While not a legally binding treaty, the Budapest Memorandum contained important commitments to territorial integrity. In exchange for Ukraine’s relinquishing of its nuclear arsenal as it acceded to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Budapest Memorandum explicitly pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial boundaries in line with its “existing borders”. As a signatory to the agreement, Russia committed to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine. 

Three years later, in 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia (“Treaty on Friendship”). The Treaty on Friendship was a legally binding agreement subject to automatic renewal unless one party decided to terminate the agreement (it is worth noting that the treaty remained in effect until 2019 when, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and escalating conflict, then-Ukrainian President Poroshenko signed a decree opting not to extend the treaty, resulting in its expiry in March 2019). Under Article 2 of the treaty, both parties committed to “respect each other’s territorial integrity and confirm the inviolability of their common borders.” Furthermore, under Article 3 Russia agreed to “base relations with [Ukraine] on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, [and] the non-use of force or threat of force.” 

International agreements between Ukraine and Russia provide a clear and consistent record of Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its 1991 borders, and its annexation and occupation of Ukrainian territory demonstrably violate its commitments under several international treaties to which it is a signatory. 

Self-Determination and Remedial Secession

Despite Russia’s obligation to honor territorial integrity under multiple international agreements, Russia argues that Ukraine does not have any right to sovereignty over the territories it has occupied, and their right to self-determination must be recognized. It bases its claim on the purported results of the referenda held in Crimea in 2014 and Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson in 2022, as well as principles of self-determination and remedial secession. Nonetheless, as demonstrated below, Russia manipulates these legal principles to attempt to justify its illegal acts. 

The 2014 and 2022 Referenda

Russia asserts that the referenda of 2014 and 2022 were legitimate exercises of self-determination and remedial secession, but both referenda fail to meet the criteria for either principle and the application of these principles to Russia’s actions is legally invalid.

First, Russia’s application of self-determination and remedial secession is fundamentally flawed. The principle of self-determination is a key component of international law, granting peoples the right to determine their own political status and governance. However, the principle in the first instance is focused on the right to internal self-determination—the right of a people or group within a state to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development without seeking secession. This is opposed to external self-determination—the right of a people or group to freely determine their political status, including the possibility of secession. In fact, the existence of a contemporary right to external self-determination is widely disputed in the international discourse. 

Nevertheless, per the support of some commentators to the right to external self-determination, international law also establishes clear limits on when self-determination can justify altering the territorial boundaries of an existing state. These limits are essential for understanding Ukraine’s territorial claims and its legal right to reintegrate its occupied territories. In order for self-determination to justify secession, it must address extreme conditions such as systemic oppression or a denial of fundamental rights by the parent state. This is known as remedial secession, a legal concept that has not yet gained universal acceptance and allows secession only when a state is responsible for grave violations of the rights of a specific population. 

In the case of the 2014 and 2022 referenda, even if remedial secession was regarded as an established legal rule, there is no evidence that the populations of Crimea nor other occupied territories faced any such conditions before Russia’s intervention. The absence of these conditions negates Russia’s claim that the secession of these territories from Ukraine would be legally justified under the principle of remedial secession.

 A second factor is the context in which these referenda occurred. International law requires that any referendum on self-determination be conducted under free and fair conditions, free from external coercion or military occupation. The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, found the 2014 Crimean referendum to be unconstitutional under Ukrainian and Crimean law and conducted under conditions that violated international norms. Similarly, reports from the 2022 referenda found widespread evidence of coercion, military intimidation, and duress. In both instances, the referenda failed to meet this basic criteria, violating basic legal standards for free and fair elections. 

The illegitimacy of these referenda has been affirmed by the international community. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262 reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (including Crimea) and declared the Crimean referendum invalid. The referenda in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were similarly condemned by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution ES-11/4 as illegal attempts by Russia to modify Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders with no validity under international law.  The international community overwhelmingly affirms that Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity is unaltered by the sham referenda of 2014 and 2022, and rejects Russia’s attempts to legitimize its annexations.

Claims of Waiver, Acquiescence, and Extinctive Prescription

In light of Russia's prolonged occupation, international legal principles like waiver, acquiescence, and extinctive prescription arise: can Ukraine’s sovereignty be lost simply due to inaction or the passage of time? International law again definitively confirms that this is not the case, especially when the occupation is unlawful.

The concept of waiver in international law requires an explicit and intentional renunciation of rights over territory. Ukraine has made no such renunciation. On the contrary, Ukraine has consistently and unequivocally objected to Russia’s occupation, affirming its sovereign claim over all occupied territories. Similarly, the principle of acquiescence—implying a state’s tacit consent to a violation—cannot apply when a state persistently contests the unlawful actions of another, as Ukraine has done.

The doctrine of extinctive prescription, which suggests that prolonged failure to assert territorial rights might lead to their loss, is also inapplicable here. Under international law, prescription cannot legitimize territorial claims arising from aggression, coercion, or unlawful occupation. Russia's actions—constituting aggression and unlawful occupation—cannot create a valid legal title to Ukrainian territory, regardless of how long the occupation endures.

Ukraine's ongoing rejection of Russia’s claims, alongside the consistent reaffirmation of its 1991 borders by both Ukraine and the international community, reinforces its sovereign rights. These actions preclude any legal arguments based on waiver, acquiescence, or extinctive prescription, further bolstering Ukraine’s right to reintegrate its occupied territories and restore its internationally recognized borders.

Conclusion

The legal case for Ukraine’s claim to territorial integrity according to its 1991 borders and the reintegration of its occupied territory is both robust and unassailable. International law affirms that Russia’s occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories are without legal validity. From the prohibition of territorial acquisition through force to the principles of self-determination and the reaffirmation of Ukraine's borders in international agreements, Ukraine’s sovereignty remains firmly intact. The doctrine of territorial integrity, which upholds the inviolability of state borders, has been consistently reinforced by the international community, leaving no room for Russia’s claims to legitimacy. Ukraine’s steadfast rejection of Russia’s unlawful actions, coupled with its ongoing assertion of its 1991 borders, precludes any legal arguments for waiver, acquiescence, or prescription. Ukraine is fully entitled to reintegrate its occupied territories and restore its internationally recognized borders.

As the international community continues to stand firm in rejecting Russia’s illegal actions, the case for Ukraine’s territorial reintegration grows stronger. Supporting Ukraine’s right to reintegrate its occupied territories is not only a defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty but also a broader affirmation of the principles that protect all states from unlawful territorial aggression.