Russia’s Constitutional Amendment from an International Law Perspective

BY: ISABELLE JEFFERIES, JUNIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PILPG-NL

In his annual address to the Russian assembly on January 15, 2020, Vladimir Putin proposed a number of amendments to the 1993 Russian constitution.  In March 2020, these amendments were formally approved by the State Duma and the Federation Council.  A nation-wide vote was held between June 25 and July 1, 2020, where 79 percent of voters were in favor of the proposed amendments.  Thus, on July 4, 2020, the amendments entered into force through Decree No.445 “on the Official Publication of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as Amended.”

Among the amendments, President Putin proposed to establish the priority of the Russian constitution over decisions of international courts.  This post will explore the background to the adoption of this amendment concerning international law, before considering the amendment itself and the reasons for which it is described as controversial. 

Background to the Constitutional Amendment: 2015 Russian Federal Law amending the Powers of the Russian Constitutional Court

In July 2015, members of the state Duma requested that the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) rule on the constitutionality of a number of laws.  Among these laws was the 1998 Russian Federal Law, concerning Russia’s ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).  The RCC refused to declare the 1998 Russian Federal Law as unconstitutional as Russia’s membership to a treaty does not equate to a renouncement of state sovereignty.  However, it declared that the ECHR and rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can only be implemented into Russian law if they conform with the Russian constitution.

At the time, analysts speculated that this ruling by the RCC was issued in response to Yukos v. Russia.  In this 2014 judgment, the ECtHR ordered Russia to pay 1.9 billion euros in compensation to shareholders of Yukos, a Russian oil company that had allegedly evaded billions of dollars in tax owed to the Russian state as a result of fraud.  

Moreover, in its judgment, the RCC authorized the federal legislator to create a legal mechanism that would allow the RCC to ensure the supremacy of Russian constitutional law in the execution of ECtHR judgments.  In December 2015, this legal mechanism entered into force through the 2015 Federal Constitutional Law amendment.  It authorized the RCC to declare as null and void any judgment by any human rights mechanism, such as the ECtHR or the UN Human Rights Committee, if they are inconsistent with the Russian constitution.

In April 2016, the RCC used this legal mechanism for the first time by conducting a constitutional review of the ECtHR’s ruling in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia.  In 2013, the ECtHR had held that article 32(3) of the Russian constitution, imposing a blanket ban on the right of convicted prisoners to vote, was incompatible with article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.  The RCC ruled that the ECtHR judgment could not be implemented in Russia as it was in conflict with the Russian constitution.  

In fact, at the time of Russia’s ratification of the ECHR, no doubts were raised as to the potential incompatibility between article 32 of the Russian constitution and article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.  However, article 125(2) of the Russian Constitution grants the RCC the power to verify the compatibility of international treaties, not yet in force, with the Constitution.  If the RCC finds that the international treaty is not compatible with the Constitution, the treaty cannot be signed and ratified by Russia.  Hence, the incompatibility found by the ECtHR in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia was caused by its novel interpretation of article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.  Russia had not consented to this interpretation at the time of its ratification of the ECHR.

Thus, Russia’s isolationist approach to international law is not new.  This is proven by the 2015 Federal Constitutional Law amendment mandating the RCC to declare as non-executable a decision by a human rights mechanism if it is incompatible with the Russian constitution.  However, the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution go further, as we will now consider. 

The 1993 Russian Constitution and the Amendments made in 2020 

Under the original article 79 of the Russian Constitution, Russia could only become a member of an international organization if this did not result in the limitation of the rights and freedoms of citizens as stipulated by the constitution and if this did not threaten the foundations of the constitutional order.  Following its amendment, article 79 also establishes that decisions of interstate mechanisms adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties shall not be enforceable in Russia if they are inconsistent with the constitution.  

Furthermore, under the original article 125(5), the RCC was mandated to interpret the Russian Constitution.  Under its amended version, the RCC now also has the authority to rule on, and to prohibit, the enforcement of a decision of an interstate mechanism concerning an international treaty that is contrary to the Russian Constitution.  

Ultimately, the amendments to articles 79 and 125 raise to the constitutional level the content of the 2015 Federal Constitutional Law amendment concerning the RCC that was considered earlier.  Furthermore, it extends the 2015 Federal Constitutional Law amendment, targeting human rights mechanisms specifically, to all international legal mechanisms and courts, such as the International Court of Justice or international arbitral tribunals.  In November 2020, President Putin signed the Federal Constitutional Law amendment, which implements the aforementioned Constitutional amendments to the powers of the RCC and replaces the 2015 Federal Constitutional Law amendment. 

Why is this Constitutional Amendment perceived as Controversial? 

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) regulates the definition, drafting, amending, interpretation, and general operation of treaties concluded between states.  Russia has been a party to the VCLT since April 29, 1986, when it was still known as the Soviet Union.  

According to article 26 VCLT, a treaty is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith.  Furthermore, under article 27 VCLT, states cannot invoke domestic law to justify their failure to perform an international obligation they owe by virtue of a treaty, such as the implementation of a decision of an international court.  Hence, under international law, Russia cannot invoke its domestic law, even if it is constitutional law, to justify its non-performance of an obligation owed under international law. 

Although the Russian government has pledged to continue to comply with any international obligations it currently holds, its constitutional amendment enables the RCC to declare as non-executable any international decisions that contradict the Russian Constitution. 

Concluding thoughts

The 2020 amendment to the Russian constitution enabling the RCC to declare as non-executable any international decisions that contradict the Russian Constitution is not contrary to international law per se.  However, if the Russian government refuses to enforce a decision by an international mechanism on the basis of such a ruling by the RCC, this is contrary to the VCLT, and thus, to international law. 

This amendment is significant in light of the fact that Russia is currently facing international adjudication in various courts, namely the ECtHR, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Moreover, the damage sets a bad precedence for international cooperation generally, as other governments seeking to avoid international legal obligations could follow suit.

The Many ‘Firsts’ of the Frankfurt Genocide Trial

By: Paul Weber, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

Since April 2020, Taha Al-J., an Iraqi national, has been standing trial before the Higher Regional Court (HRC) of Frankfurt, Germany, for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, among other counts. The trial is significant given that it is the first time a court has been tasked to hold a member of the Islamic State (IS) responsible for committing genocide against members of the Yazidi religious minority in Iraq.  Moreover, the way in which the case found its way into the Frankfurt courtroom stands out for its particularly active reliance on universal jurisdiction for international crimes.  Furthermore, the accessory prosecution's, who represents the surviving victim in the criminal proceedings, recently requested the introduction of an additional charge of gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity against the defendant.  This blog post aims at further illuminating the different elements, which make this case a particularly exciting example of the domestic prosecution of international crimes. 

Facts of the Case

In 2015, Mr. Al-J. had bought a Yazidi mother and her young daughter as slaves.  The two women were captured by IS during its attack on Iraq’s Sindjar region – an attack that the court described as aimed at exterminating the Yazidis.  Al-J. allegedly forced his victims to do household chores, while depriving them of proper nutrition and physically punishing them.  In a particularly heinous “punishment”, the defendant tied the daughter to a window on a hot summer day, due to which she ultimately died of thirst.  One question for the court is thus whether the crimes committed against the two victims in this case may qualify as genocide.

Charges of Genocide

In his testimony, expert witness Guido Steinberg, a researcher on Islamic extremism, described the conduct in question in this case as far from an isolated incident.  According to Steinberg, IS regards the Yazidis as worshippers of the devil (source in German) who need to either be converted or exterminated.  In the eyes of the court, IS had systematically attempted to enslave and exterminate the Yazidi people during its organized attack on Iraq’s Sindjar region.  This could be a crucial observation if the court is to qualify the defendant’s conduct as genocide, as proving the required mental element of genocidal intent is particularly onerous.

Germany incorporated the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court into domestic law through its Code of Crimes Against International Law (CCAIL) of 2002.  In Paragraph 6, the CCAIL recognizes murder and other violent conduct against members of a national, religious, or ethnic group as constituting the offense of genocide, if it is committed with the intent to destroy this group in whole or in part.  Consequently, if the court finds that the murder of the child was a conscious part of a larger genocidal effort, it may convict the defendant as a genocidaire.  Thus, even a single murder may be sufficient to find that Al-J. committed genocide. 

In the context of the case against Mr. Al-J., it is crucial for the prosecution to prove that Mr. Al-J. committed his crimes with the intent to contribute to the extermination of the Yazidis.  As Nathalie von Wistinghausen, who represents the mother in this case, remarked, this “special intent to commit genocide, as defined by the jurisprudence, has to meet a very high threshold and is, therefore, more difficult to prove.”  So far only the UN and a few other international organizations and states had found the IS persecution of the Yazidis to be a genocide.  If the prosecution succeeds, the Al-J. case will become the first time worldwide that a court recognizes the crimes against the Yazidis as genocide.  

Universal Jurisdiction 

Another reason why this case is noteworthy is the way in which it ended up in front of the HRC Frankfurt.  In recent years, the German legal system has seen numerous cases concerning international crimes committed by IS in Syria and Iraq.  Past cases, however, predominantly involved either German citizens who had fought for IS or foreigners that had sought refuge from the conflict in Germany.  

Although these crimes did not occur on German territory and often did not involve German citizens, German courts could claim universal jurisdiction over them. In the Al-J. case, by contrast, Germany did not merely claim jurisdiction over a suspect present on its territory, but actively sought universal jurisdiction.  In fact, in 2019, the case against his wife, a German citizen who also stands trial before a court in Munich, revealed the grave crimes that Mr. Al-J. had committed.  As a result, Germany subsequently issued an international arrest warrant for Mr. Al-J.  Greek authorities were able to apprehend him in Athens in 2019 and extradite him to Germany, where the Frankfurt HRC opened the proceedings against him.

Introducing gender-based persecution

The case has the potential for further ‘firsts’.  As recently as December 2020, the accessory prosecution, who represents the mother in this case, requested the reevaluation of the defendant’s charges for crimes against humanity to include paragraph 7 of the CCAIL, which criminalizes gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity.  The gendered nature in which IS organized the alleged genocide of the Yazidi becomes particularly apparent in its slave market.  Guido Steinberg also pointed to the fact that IS only enslaved Yazidi women, as he stated in his testimony.  Many observers, therefore, call on the court to recognize this defining characteristic of the crimes in question.  For Germany, it would be the first time gender-based prosecution is applied since its introduction through the CCAIL in 2002.  Such a step would make the case part of a larger development towards the legal recognition of gendered forms of violence, as for example the ICC’s current Al-Hassan case.  How the German court will apply the provision, should it decide to do so, could thus impact the overall jurisprudence on gender-based persecution world-wide as a leading example. 

The trial is ongoing, and it is impossible to predict its outcome.  No matter what the Frankfurt judges will decide, it promises to be a landmark judgment - on the crimes against the Yazidis, genocide, gender-based violence, and the way international justice is dealt in general.

Criminal accountability to end the use of child soldiers. A view of the Dominic Ongwen case

BY: Tamia Brito, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PILPG-NL

On the anniversary of the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers, the issue of child soldiers in armed conflict remains as relevant as ever. The conscription and enlistment of children continue to deny boys and girls a healthy development process. By stripping them of their childhood and pushing them to the harsh setting of armed conflict, children’s particular needs, vulnerability, and age-related necessities are ignored, making them the primary victims of war. International law has granted them special protection, setting a rich framework to prevent and end child recruitment in conflict. This framework includes the criminal prosecution of perpetrators in breach of the protective duty. 

This post addresses the issue of child soldiers by linking children’s rights with the accountability brought by criminal proceedings. It starts with a contextualization of the issue, followed by an overview of the international legal framework ensuring children’s protection. The post then looks at the case of Dominic Ongwen, a former child soldier who went on to become a commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and was recently convicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and war crimes.  

Child recruitment in conflict settings

“It is the singular characteristic of armed conflict in our time that children suffer most.”

Graça Machel

In critical times, protective measures are often disregarded. Conflict weakens institutions and undermines compliance with law and policy and, as a result, civilians struggle the most. In conflict, there is potential for abuses and violations, as monitoring and reporting the breaches becomes more difficult. 

This setting is particularly troubling for children. They have unique vulnerabilities and needs that make them easy targets for abuse. During the period of childhood, boys and girls are more susceptible in their physical, social, and mental development. They have limited means to protect themselves and their rights take into account their specificities and age-appropriate needs. Yet, when exposed to the impacts of war, children not only suffer from the same struggles as adults but also experience another level of deprotection due to their particular vulnerabilities. Today, one out of five children are affected by armed conflict. Thousands are being killed, subjected to sexual violence, and instrumentalized in conflict, which entails treating them as tools of a given party. Part of this instrumentalization is using children as soldiers, recruiting or enlisting them, and making them participate in conflict. 

The rich legal framework

Under international law, children enjoy special protection even in the direst of circumstances. This is regulated by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), General International Law (PIL), and International Criminal Law (ICL).

Through two Additional Protocols (I and II), IHL explicitly prohibits the instrumentalization of child soldiers in the form of recruitment, conscription, or enlisting in both international and non-international armed conflicts. Additionally, the IHL study on custom conducted by the International Federation for the Red Cross also concluded the prohibition as a duty of customary nature.

The IHRL framework protects children and prohibits the recruitment and instrumentalization of children through the International Convention on the Rights of the Child,  the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, the Paris Principles, the Safe Schools Declaration, and the Vancouver Principles. The main instrument on this issue, however, is the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Now ratified by 170 state parties, the Optional Protocol marks a paradigmatic development to the issue of child soldiers. The day it entered into force in 2002, February 12th is now the day known as the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers.

Efforts on PIL got traction in 1996 when, under the request of the UN General Assembly, an independent expert report uncovered that children are the primary victims of conflict. In 1999, the UN Security Council released its first resolution on the issue, placing the issue within its mandate of international peace and security. It also highlighted the gravest violations affecting children, like child recruitment. By 2001, the Council determined that the recruitment of child soldiers would not be tolerated and started requesting the UN Secretary-General to list armed conflict parties that would instrumentalize children.

The ICL framework uses the above-mentioned protective framework to focus on individuals and secure accountability. The establishment of the ICC, adoption of the Rome Statute, and institution of criminal proceedings under ICL norms, embody the international community’s commitment to protect children. The Rome Statute, for instance, specifically precludes atrocity crimes targeting children. That is the case for the conscription or enlisting of children into armed forces or groups, a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts. It also incorporates particular measures to protect children when they participate as victims or witnesses during proceedings, and it explicitly requires ICC staff to be adequately trained on children’s issues. It also gives the Prosecutor the duty to take similar measures in the course of the investigations. The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence also include provisions designed to protect children throughout investigations and proceedings. 

A unique case

In the case of Dominic Ongwen, the ICC deals with a particular defendant. Ongwen is a former Commander in the Sinia Brigade of the LRA, active since the 1980s in Northern Uganda and South Sudan. He was abducted by the LRA as a child when he was approximately 11-13 years old. He spent the entire period between his abduction and the beginning of the period relevant for the ICC’s charges (July 2002) in the LRA, being trained and rising in the ranks. When he was approximately 24-27 years old, he participated in the attacks on former Internally Displaced People’s camps, which constituted the basis for his indictment. Ongwen was accused of 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the war crimes of conscripting and using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities. In other words, he was charged with the crime of which he was a victim. 

In its judgment, the ICC acknowledged Ongwen’s background as a former child soldier, but it also highlighted Ongwen’s direct and indirect participation in the conscription and use of children in conflict. The Court determined there was an agreement to conduct these actions among LRA brigade leaders and concluded that Ongwen provided both, an “essential contribution” to the crimes and the intent for children to be abducted. Thus, the defense’s arguments on grounds to exclude criminal responsibility (due to mental incapacity and duress) were dismissed. Ongwen was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 61 out of the 70 crimes he was charged with, including the conscription and use of children under the age of 15 years and their use in armed hostilities (Counts 69-70).

Ongwen’s case can be viewed as unique as it constitutes a reminder that failing to end impunity for atrocity crimes affecting children can create a vicious cycle of violence. Thus, in addition to complying with states’ commitment to uphold children’s rights, criminal proceedings have the potential to end the violation of children’s rights as well as prevent future breaches. 

Conclusion

The ICC set an example for accountability in the Ongwen case. The verdict stands by the rich protective framework to prevent and end child recruitment while recognizing the extent of victimization of children affected by atrocity crimes. Guaranteeing children a safe developing process, especially in conflict, is a complex process involving law, policy, and accountability. Failing to put together all elements can draw children back into the dire circumstances of armed conflict, thus protracting violence and creating future breaches and victims. That was the case for Dominic Ongwen. Yet, through this judgment, the international community can find the mission of protecting children from forced recruitment revitalized, as Ongwen’s conviction draws a line in the potentially vicious cycle of exposing more children to the horrid circumstances of combat and conflict. With challenges still ahead, this mission is as valid today as it was in 2002 when the International Day against the Use of Child Soldiers was first commemorated. 

How to Handle Complicated Guests – The Legality of the King of Thailand´s Long Term Vacation in Germany

By: Kristoffer Burck, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

Foreign heads of state or monarchs on vacation abroad are always of great interest to the press. Donald Trump golfing in Scotland, Lady Diana shopping in Paris, or the Dutch royal family enjoying Greek beaches during a pandemic are often the focus of meticulous stories in yellow press tabloids. Yet these visits seldom result in intricate questions of international law, let alone serious diplomatic crises. The King of Thailand, Maha Vajiralongkorn´s long term stays in Southern Germany are different. While reports initially focused on his lavish lifestyle and the choice to spend months of quarantine 8,000 kilometers away from his kingdom, the focus subsequently shifted to questions of legality. Activists and German parliamentarians demanded that the German government declare if they deemed King Vajiralongkorn ruling his people from abroad compatible with international law. In response, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas declared before the Parliament that “politics concerning Thailand should not be conducted from German soil”. Even though King Vajiralongkorn returned to Thailand last October, his habits of traveling back and forth make it worth examining the legality of making sovereign decisions while on his visits. Is the statement by Maas based on international norms, preventing the King from ruling Thailand, while enjoying a beautiful view of the Bavarian Alps? If so, would there be any way for Germany to enforce these rules?

The Principle of Sovereignty 

The fundamental principle of sovereignty, contained in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter and recognized in international jurisprudence (for example in the Lotus Case), generally prohibits foreign heads of state from performing sovereign acts on another state's territory without consent by the territorial state. Commonly, states allow the stationing of foreign military on its soil or the organization of elections for the diaspora. A host state may even allow foreign governments to operate entirely from its soil.  The United Kingdom, for example, hosted several exile governments on its territory during World War II. This is not the case here: Foreign Minister Maas made it clear that Germany does not consent to the King ruling Thailand from his hotel room in Bavaria. 

The Exception for Domestic Issues and Its Limits

Yet, international law has recognized an exception for heads of state from the requirement of explicit consent during trips abroad, even private. This applies to acts over their domestic constituents as long as the acts do not concern the host state. This exception allows heads of states and other high ranking officials to efficiently continue domestic government affairs abroad. The academic service of the German Federal Parliament (for an English report on the analysis see here) concludes that under customary international law and German constitutional law the exception for domestic issues is limited by the ordre public. This assessment was also adopted by the Federal Foreign Office (for an English press ticker of the statements see here). Any acts which would infringe on international human rights standards, international law, or the German constitutional order would thus be prohibited. For instance, a head of state ordering an execution from German soil would be in breach of Article 102 of the Constitution, thereby detrimental to the ordre public and thus illegal. The Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia, in a case involving the US drone base in Ramstein, has further found an active obligation of the German state to make sure that no breaches of international law are conducted from its soil. Since the same standard would apply to acts of King Vajiralongkorn, German authorities would be forced to react, should the King choose to enact laws contrary to international human rights standards from German soil. 

What are the “Real World” Consequences?

There are strong indications that King Vajiralongkorn did conduct certain acts of government from his hotel room in Bavaria, for example signing official letters and decrees. However, due to the wide range of immunities the King enjoys as a head of state (as acknowledged for example by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case), German authorities have little to no means to further investigate whether some of these acts might violate the ordre public. Consequently, while allegations loom that the King ordered the execution of a convicted criminal from Germany, there is a lack of verified evidence for this accusation. German authorities have little legal leeway in the case of King Vajiralongkorn; as long as there is no clear evidence of breaches of the ordre public, he will be able to spend the better part of his time in Bavaria and even conduct some limited government affairs from there.

Demands from a German member of parliament for the opposition party “Die Linke”, Sevim Dagdelen, to declare the Thai King a persona non grata, are unlikely to manifest. Declaring someone a persona non grata would mean that the person must leave the country after a short deadline and is not allowed to re-enter as long as the declaration stands. The declaration does not require illegal conduct but is solely dependent on the discretion of the host state. Article 9(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which can be applied to heads of state analogously, enshrines this principle in treaty law.  Since such a declaration bears significant diplomatic and political consequences, most governments use them with restraint. Consequently, the Federal Foreign Office already indicated that it will not make any moves against King Vajiralongkorn without evidence for illegal acts. 

Conclusion

While the requests from German opposition parties and the Foreign Minister may have contributed to the decision to return to Thailand, the main reason for the King to do so was most likely the large scale protests at home denouncing his absence. 

This case may give an indication to other states, dealing with complicated guests. There are almost no legal tools to the government, short of declaring them a persona non grata. Most governments will refuse to take this step and international law therefore leaves host states with little possibilities. Only civil society efforts “back home” will have the necessary impact on future “vacation plans”. 

January 2021

Monthly News Updates: Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes - January 2021

By: Alexandrah Bakker, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

The following post highlights developments from around the world in the prosecution of international crimes before domestic jurisdictions. This month, states have not only continued to arrest and try defendants but have also taken steps to repair the harms caused by international crimes.

EUROPE

Bosnia and Herzegovina | Former Bosnian general sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for war crimes 

A Sarajevo court sentenced Sakib Mahmuljin, a former general in the Bosnian army, to ten years’ imprisonment for failing to prevent the killing and torture of 50 ethnic Serb prisoners.   Foreign fighters, known as “El Mujahid,” who fell under Mahmuljin’s command, were the ones who killed the prisoners. [January 22, 2021] 

Bosnia and Herzegovina | Bosnian Constitutional Court rejects appeal against war crimes conviction

Tarik Sisic, a former Bosnian soldier sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for war crimes, had appealed his conviction, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial.  The Bosnian Constitutional Court found that the conviction did not violate Sisic’s rights. [January 14, 2021] 

Finland | Finnish National Bureau of Investigation concludes investigation into suspect for crimes committed during Liberian civil war 

The Finnish National Bureau of Investigation concluded its investigation into a Sierra Leone national for crimes committed during the Liberian civil war.  The authorities classified the crimes as murder, aggravated warfare crimes, and aggravated human rights violations against civilians in a state of emergency.  The trial is set to open before the Pirkanmaa District Court on February 1, 2021. [January 13, 2021] 

France | French authorities open an investigation into crimes against humanity against suspect from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

French prosecutors opened an investigation into Roger Lumbala, who is accused of complicity in the crimes against humanity committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002 and 2003.  Lumbala is the first suspect to be arrested following the publication of a Mapping Report in 2010 identifying serious human rights violations committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1993 and 2003. [January 8, 2021] 

AFRICA

South Sudan | South Sudanese court convicts soldiers of wartime rape for the first time

A South Sudanese court convicted 26 soldiers of crimes including wartime rape, a first for South Sudan.  An army representative apologized and affirmed the army’s intention to arrest future perpetrators. [January 15, 2021]

AUSTRALIA

Australia | Australia launches criminal investigation into possible war crimes

The Office of the Special Investigator, established to conduct criminal investigations into the incidents of war crimes identified in the Brereton report released in November 2020, began its operations on January 4, 2021.  The Office will examine the evidence unearthed in the previous administrative inquiries and will decide whether to refer cases to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. [January 4, 2021]

ASIA

South Korea | South Korean court orders Japan to pay compensation to so-called “comfort women” 

The Seoul Central District Court ordered Japan to pay 12 women $91,000 each as compensation for the harm they suffered while being kept as sex slaves by Japanese armed forces during World War II. [January 8, 2021]