January 2021

Monthly News Updates: Southern Cameroons – January 2021

By: Kristoffer Burck, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

THIS POST COLLECTS UPDATES FROM THE PAST MONTH CONCERNING RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN CAMEROONS. THE INFORMATION IS DRAWN FROM LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ONLINE SOURCES.

VIOLENCE IN ANGLOPHONE REGIONS

Separatist Violence | Five People Killed in Separatist IED Attack

An improvised explosive device (IED) killed five individuals on January 6 in the anglophone North West Region. The government blames armed separatist groups for planting the device as a deliberate attack on a government convoy. The blast killed four soldiers and one high ranking government communications official and injured three other government officials. [January 7th, 2021]

Separatist Violence | Six Individuals Killed in Separatist Attack on Checkpoint

Armed separatists attacked a military checkpoint at the border between the anglophone North West region and the francophone West region on the 8th of January. The attackers reportedly killed three military gendarmes, two civilians, and one police officer, while injuring at least four other individuals. [January 8th, 2021]

Clashes with Soldiers | Thirty Villagers Arrested and Some Reportedly Tortured

Following the attack on a military checkpoint by armed separatist groups on January 8, 2021, security forces reportedly responded by retaliating against the civilian population of a nearby village. Locals report that military personnel arrested around 30 villagers and took them to a military base, while other villagers fled their houses into the bushes. At the base, the arrested civilians were interrogated and some allegedly tortured by soldiers. [January 11th, 2021]

Clashes with Soldiers | Nine Civilians Killed by Soldiers in Mautu Massacre 

Nine people, including a six-year-old girl, have been killed on January 11th during a massacre in the anglophone South West region. Five others have reportedly been injured. The clashes forced a large number of local civilians to flee from their houses and hide in the nearby bushes. Local sources claim that soldiers indiscriminately killed villagers during an offensive against armed separatists. The Cameroonian Government released a statement acknowledging an encounter in Mautu but denying responsibility for the deaths of the nine civilians. The statement claims that soldiers responded to armed separatists in the villages and thereby killed “some terrorists”. The statement further mentions that armed separatists themselves, while fleeing from soldiers, opened fire on civilians and thus are responsible for the massacre. Local witnesses dispute this account and maintain that military personnel indiscriminately shot at villagers in order to punish them for hosting separatist fighters. The UN Office for Central Africa, the British High Commission in Yaoundé, and the French Embassy called for investigations into killings and prosecution of the perpetrators. [January 15th, 2021]

Clashes with Soldiers | Several Houses Burned by Soldiers in South West Region

Several civilian houses have allegedly been raided and burned by government soldiers in a village in the anglophone South West region on January 22. This marks another incident of attacks on civilian houses by government soldiers after government soldiers were accused of looting houses in a village in the North West region on January 12. [January 22nd, 2021]

Clashes with Soldiers | Four Schoolchildren Killed by Soldiers in North West Region

Soldiers reportedly killed four teenage schoolboys in the anglophone North West region on January 25 (BBC Africa Today reports here from min. 2:32 to min. 7:27). Government soldiers claim to have reacted to shots fired by separatist fighters. Several local voices, however, vehemently criticize the reckless response and lacking caution of the military personnel. [January 26nd 2021]

Reconstruction | National Reconstruction Team Evaluates Compensation Claims in North West Region

On January 23rd, following the Presidential Plan for Reconstruction and Development, a national reconstruction team started to evaluate compensation claims of citizens, who suffered material losses due to the ongoing anglophone crisis. Those who are eligible to claim compensation payments filed their claims with local authorities and are now screened by national officials. The majority of the compensation costs (up to 90%)  will be covered by the UN Development Program. [January 23rd, 2021]

REGIONAL VIOLENCE 

Nigeria/Cameroon | Boko Haram Attack Kills Twelve People in Cameroon

Members of Boko Haram killed twelve civilians, including eight children, in a suicide bombing in the Far North region of Cameroon. The attack on January 8th marks one of the deadliest attacks of Boko Haram in Cameroon so far. The terrorist group frequently crosses the border from Nigeria into Cameroon. [January 8th, 2021]

Central African Republic (CAR) | 5,000 Refugees from the CAR Flee to Cameroon

The UNHCR reports that nearly 5,000 refugees from the neighboring CAR fled to Cameroon. According to the UN agency, the refugees flee intensifying violence due to ongoing conflicts between the government of CAR and several armed rebel groups. The majority of the 60,000 refugees sought refuge in the bordering Democratic Republic of the Congo but some thousands also fled to Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Cameroon. [January 19th, 2021]

THREATS TO AFRICAN NATIONS SOCCER CHAMPIONSHIP IN CAMEROON

Soccer | African Nations Championship (CHAN) Kicks Off in Cameroon

January 16th marks the start of CHAN, the African soccer championships. Cameroon hosts 16 teams until February 7th. The government deployed the military to the anglophone town of Limbe after separatists threatened that the games scheduled there would not be secure. The tournament so far has not seen any violent interference by armed separatists despite these threats. [January 26th, 2021]

January 2021

Monthly News Updates: Human Rights Mechanisms - January 2021

By: Shaya Javadinia, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL 

The following post summarizes and highlights some of the updates on the work of regional and international human rights mechanisms around the world in the month of January.

EUROPE 

European Court of Human Rights | Georgia v. Russia

In Georgia v. Russia, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled upon the allegations made by Georgia against certain administrative practices of Russia in the context of the armed conflict between the two states in August 2008. The ECtHR found that Russia exercised “effective control” over the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia between August 12 and October 10, 2008. On this basis, the ECtHR held that the events occurring after the cessation of hostilities had fallen within the jurisdiction of Russia and found a number of violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.  [January 21, 2021]

European Court of Human Rights | Ukraine v. Russia

In Ukraine v. Russia, the ECtHR declared the case partly admissible.  In this Inter-State application, Ukraine brought a complaint before the ECtHR regarding Russia’s alleged pattern of human rights violations in Crimea. The ECtHR clarified that it was not concerned with deciding whether Crimea’s admission into Russia had been lawful under international law.  Instead, the ECtHR focused on deciding whether Russia had jurisdiction over Crimea from February 27, 2014. After deciding that Russia did in fact have jurisdiction over Crimea, the ECtHR declared admissible all but a few of the allegations of human rights violations brought by Ukraine against Russia. [January 14, 2021]

THE AMERICAS 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights | The Commission condemns the application of the death penalty to Lisa Montgomery in the United States of America

Lisa Montgomery, who was the beneficiary of a precautionary measure granted in December 2020 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), was executed on January 13, 2021, in the United States of America. The IACHR  stressed that the precautionary measures issued in favor of Lisa Montgomery aimed to preserve her rights until it could assess the merits of her case. The IACHR strongly condemned this application of the death penalty at the federal level by the United States.  [January 15, 2021] 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights | The Commission Condemns Violence Against the United States Capitol and Against Democratic Processes in the United States

On January 6, 2021, during the certifying of the votes on the United States presidential election held on November 3, 2020, hundreds of people forcefully entered the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. The IACHR strongly criticized these acts of violence and urged public officials “to cease speeches that encourage hatred or violence against officials and institutions that embody the rule of law.” Furthermore, the IACHR reiterated the importance of democratic institutions in ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law. The IACHR also highlighted that these acts of violence are the result of a “complex misinformation process” regarding the elections, and requested the individuals involved to base their complaints on facts and to follow and respect due procedure before the relevant institutions for their complaints. The IACHR urged the United States’ public officials to “condemn and not justify this type of violence.”  [January 8, 2021]

Inter-American Court of Human Rights | Website on the Joint Work of Three Regional Human Rights Courts

As part of their ongoing joint judicial dialogue, the IACHR, the ECtHR, and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights have launched a website on their joint work. [January 5, 2021]

UN MECHANISMS 

Human Rights Committee | Democratic Republic of the Congo violated the right to life of Pascal Kabungulu 

Pascal Kabungulu was a human rights defender who was killed in an extrajudicial killing in front of his family in 2005. His family has spent 15 years seeking justice before the judicial system of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Congolese authorities, however, refused to address the extrajudicial killing and to conduct a criminal trial for those responsible for the killing. In 2016, Mr. Kabungulu’s family brought the case before the Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights Committee found that, by refusing to conduct criminal investigations and proceedings into the violations, the DRC had violated Mr. Kabungulu's right to life, and his family’s right to an effective remedy. [January 13, 2021]

Human Rights Council (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions) | Call for Standards to Protect Aircraft over Conflict Zones

January 8 marked the first anniversary of the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 by an Iranian missile. Iran targeted this flight in the context of the heightened tensions between itself and the United States, killing 176 people on board. On this occasion, the UN experts called for urgent measures “to protect civilian aircraft flying in conflict zones or areas of high military tension.” The UN experts suggested that in such situations, regardless of whether the situation is classified as an armed conflict, states need to close the airspace under their jurisdiction. As such, establishing “clear, explicit, and unambiguous” international standards on when states need to close their airspace or restrict flights is of utmost importance for civilian air safety. The UN experts proposed for an independent entity to be responsible for creating air safety standards, as states and airlines tend to prioritize other motives over safety. According to Agnes Callamard, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, the current international system responsible for civilian air safety is not fit for purpose.  [January 7, 2021]

Justice Delayed, Justice Denied? Defendants’ and Victims’ Shared Interest in Seeing Justice Done Swiftly

By: Alexandrah Bakker, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

On December 3, 2020, after a five-year investigation and five different start dates, criminal proceedings against Alieu Kosiah opened before the Federal Criminal Court (FCC) in Bellinzona, Switzerland.  Kosiah faces charges relating to his responsibility as a commander of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) for mass killings committed in Lofa County between 1993 and 1995, during Liberia’s first civil war.  More specifically, he is charged with having ordered, committed, or participated in murder, desecration of a corpse, rape, cruel treatment, recruitment of a child soldier, pillage, and the forced transport of goods and ammunition.

Kosiah’s trial is remarkable in several ways.  Not only is it the first war crimes case to ever be tried by the FCC, but it is also the first trial before any jurisdiction of a direct perpetrator for war crimes committed during Liberia’s civil wars.  In 2018, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the conviction of Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven for complicity in war crimes by providing weapons, transportation, facilities, and armed personnel to the Liberian armed forces.  Another ULIMO commander, Kunti Kamara, is due to stand trial in France soon.  

However, due to a combination of unique challenges, Alieu Kosiah spent six years in detention before his trial could get underway.  At trial, Kosiah lamented the duration of his detention, saying, “I’ve been locked up for six years. I have emotions, I’m not an animal… I am the real victim.”  Meanwhile, Balkees Jarrah, Associate International Justice Director at Human Rights Watch, commented that this trial “is a powerful message to would-be perpetrators that justice may be slow but it never forgets.”  

This post explores the reasons for the delay in Kosiah’s trial, and the implications of delays for the various stakeholders in international criminal trials.

Justice Delayed

The case against Kosiah faced early delays during the investigative phase.  It has been reported that Michael Lauber, Switzerland’s former Attorney General, did not prioritize this case or cases like it due to their complexity and supposed unattractiveness to the Swiss public.  Alain Werner, founder and director of NGO Civitas Maxima and counsel for some of the plaintiffs, pointed out that there is little material evidence available in this case, meaning that it rests largely on witness testimony.  However, with the Swiss authorities unable to travel to Liberia, it took five years for the prosecution to hear only 25 witnesses and to prepare the indictment.

Once the indictment was issued, the trial had to grapple with the delays accompanying the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic made it impossible for plaintiffs and witnesses to travel from Liberia to Switzerland in order to participate in the trial, and efforts to arrange for virtual attendance have also failed.  As a result, while the trial was initially scheduled to begin on April 14, 2020, it was ultimately postponed five times before finally beginning in December 2020.   Even then, the trial was split into two parts.  In December, the FCC dealt with preliminary questions and the defendant’s testimony.  The remainder of the trial is set to take place in February 2021.

Justice Denied?

A substantial amount of time has undoubtedly passed between Kosiah’s arrest in 2014 and the opening of his trial in 2020.  However, this is not unusual when compared to other trials involving international crimes.  At the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), suspects frequently remain in detention for many years, sometimes even for a decade or more – and unlike the FCC, these jurisdictions are meant to be specially designed and equipped to handle such cases.  Yet, in the case against Vojislav Šešelj, an ICTY Trial Chamber found that the accused’s eight-year detention, during which time no decision had been rendered, was not excessive given the complexity of the case.  The Trial Chamber notably emphasized the serious nature of the charges, the number of witnesses heard, and the number of exhibits tendered before the Chamber.

For trials taking place in Switzerland, a defendant’s right to be tried within a reasonable period of time is enshrined in Article 29(1) of the Swiss Constitution, Article 6§1 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  As in the case law of the ICTY, these provisions have been found to allow for longer trials when this is justified by the complexity of the case.  This was held, for instance, in Neumeister v. Austria by the European Court of Human Rights and in Rifaat Al-Assad by Switzerland’s FCC.  Unlike Alieu Kosiah’s case, however, the Rifaat Al-Assad case involved a complaint filed by victims regarding the duration of an investigation in which the suspect had not yet been arrested, and therefore the length of his detention was not at issue.

The Rifaat Al-Assad case does allude to the fact that an expeditious trial is not only in the best interests of the defendant.  Victims also have an interest in seeing justice done without undue delay, and lengthy trials for international crimes may cause victims to lose faith in the proceedings.  This is especially true in a trial such as Kosiah’s, which is taking place decades after the commission of the crimes and in a court many miles away from where the crimes were committed.

Conclusion

Civitas Maxima has announced that the second part of the Kosiah trial will take place between February 15 and March 5, 2021.  However, it is unclear whether solutions have been found to allow victims and witnesses to participate, be it from Bellinzona or from Monrovia.  As the first war crimes trial to come to fruition in Switzerland, this case may prompt reconsideration of the prosecutorial design.  It certainly points to a need to reinvigorate the all but abandoned war crimes unit.  Swiss authorities may also draw lessons from other states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who are looking for innovative ways to address the challenges of war crimes prosecution.  Alternatively, this case may indicate that a specialized tribunal for Liberia, as recommended by the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2009, may be more appropriate than a series of sporadic trials based on universal jurisdiction.  In any case, this trial is one to follow, for its contribution to justice for war crimes in both Switzerland and Liberia, and for the lessons it may teach us on how to conduct international criminal justice during a pandemic. 

Electing the Third Prosecutor for the ICC: What Lessons can be Drawn?

BY: ISABELLE JEFFERIES, JUNIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PILPG-NL

The International Criminal Court (the ICC, the Court) has encountered many challenges since its inception in 2002, from outspoken criticism of major states, to frustration among stakeholders regarding the quality of its investigations and prosecutions, which they argue are inefficient and ineffective.  

For the Court’s defenders, the election of its third Prosecutor presents an opportunity to strengthen the system created by the Rome Statute.  Yet, the task of nominating and electing a suitable candidate has proven complex.  This post provides an overview of the election process and assesses some of its criticisms.

The Central Role of the Court’s Prosecutor

The Prosecutor heads the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), one of four organs of the ICC.  Under article 42(1) of the Rome Statute, the OTP is responsible for identifying, examining, investigating, and prosecuting crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.  Under article 15(1) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu, or in other words, on his or her own initiative.  As well as having broad powers, the Prosecutor is elected for a term of nine years.  

The Prosecutor is a central actor in the system created by the Rome Statute and has a crucial role in improving the ICC’s work.  In fact, the Prosecutor determines the strategies and priorities of the examinations, investigations, and prosecutions conducted by the OTP.  Therefore, it has the means to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Court’s performance. 

Selecting the Court’s Third Prosecutor and the Importance of Consensus 

The Assembly of States Parties (ASP), composed of representatives of states that ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute, is the Court’s legislator.  It convenes on a yearly basis to discuss and take decisions on important issues relating to the Court’s functioning.  Notably, it is responsible for electing the Prosecutor.  In doing so, members of the ASP are to make every effort to elect a candidate by consensus.  The ASP was successful in selecting the Court’s first and second Prosecutor by consensus, in 2003 and 2011 respectively.  In the absence of consensus, the procedure set out in Article 42(2) of the Rome Statute is followed: the voting is done by secret ballot, and the candidate who receives a majority of votes wins the election.  Yet, for the Prosecutor to succeed in improving the functioning of the Court, by conducting efficient and effective examinations, investigations, and prosecutions, fragmented support is not enough.  It is essential that he or she has the approval of all members of the ASP, so the OTP can exercise its mandate freely.  In fact, a Prosecutor that is supported by all state parties will be more resilient to efforts to derail its mandate.

The next Prosecutor was supposed to have been elected during the nineteenth ASP session, which took place in December 2020.  Two bodies were established in April 2019 to facilitate the election process, and to ensure that the most suitable candidate was selected in a structured and transparent manner: the Committee on the Election of the Prosecutor (Committee), and the Panel of Experts (Experts).  Broadly speaking, their mandate, carried out from July 2019 to June 2020, was to assess applications, establish and interview a longlist of candidates, and provide a shortlist of candidates to state parties, from which they would choose a consensus candidate.  Their aim was to guarantee an election based on merit, and free from the political interference of states.  However, in spite of these efforts made towards the facilitation of the election process, states were unable to agree on any of the candidates provided in the Committee’s shortlist. 

Creating the Shortlist of Candidates: Innovative Process

The vacancy for the position of Prosecutor was published in August 2019.  Applicants applied to the Committee directly, and their identity was kept confidential until later in the process, thus preventing undue interference from states.  The Committee received 144 applications, but only 84 were submitted with all the information requested.

In February 2020, members of the Committee met to review the applications, having regard to the criteria set out in the Rome Statute and the vacancy announcement.  Article 42(3) of the Rome Statute requires that the Prosecutor possess the following attributes: (a) a high moral character, (b) high competence and extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases, and (c) excellent knowledge or fluency in English and/or French.  The vacancy set out an extensive range of further requirements such as strategic awareness, leadership skills, and financial competencies.  The role of the Experts was to assist the Committee in its mandate and represents a novelty from the election of previous prosecutors.  

The Committee agreed on a longlist of 16 candidates who moved on to the next stage of the process: competency-based interviews.  Along with the interviews, the Committee carried out a vetting process of the candidates, which also constitutes a real innovation compared to previous elections.  Candidates were subject to reference checks, criminal record checks, as well as social media checks.  The Independent Expert Review, commissioned at the 18th session of the ASP, made some Findings concerning the working culture of the ICC.  In particular, it determined that the OTP suffers from distrust and a culture of fear, with many reported accounts of workplace bullying (Findings 62-71).  As a result, the vetting process was aimed at corroborating the high moral character of candidates, and ensuring that they would not allow or contribute to such workplace harassment during their mandate.  

A shortlist of four candidates, deemed to be the most highly qualified, was created by the Committee after the interviews and the vetting.  The identities of those shortlisted are as follows: Morris A. Anyah from Nigeria, Fergal Gaynor from Ireland, Susan Okalany from Uganda, and Richard Roy from Canada.  Their identities were revealed to the ASP in June 2020, along with a report containing an assessment of each candidate, highlighting their respective strengths and weaknesses.  The mandate of the Committee and the Experts came to an end, and the ASP’s consultation process, where public hearings are held in order to identify the consensus candidate, began.

Response to the Shortlisted Candidates

Despite the extensive process undertaken to create the shortlist, Kenya rejected the candidates contained therein on the basis that they lacked the requisite managerial experience in large international institutions and state diplomacy experience.  Kenya also claimed that the shortlist appeared “skewed” in favor of a particular candidate.  In fact, there is a custom of regional rotation for the Prosecutor, so as Mrs. Bensouda is currently from the Gambia, Mr. Anyah from Nigeria, and Mrs. Okalany from Uganda cannot be elected.  Moreover, the Rome Statute precludes, under Article 42(2), the Prosecutor from being of the same nationality as the Deputy Prosecutor.  On this basis, Mr. Roy cannot be elected as the current Deputy Prosecutor, James Steward, is also Canadian.  Therefore, this leaves one candidate: Mr. Gaynor from Ireland.

Upon hearing the response of certain states, several civil society organizations were quick to discourage states from nominating new candidates, calling on them to stand by the process they had established and to select one of the shortlisted candidates.  Their concern was that allowing new nominees at the eleventh hour would enable them to escape the level of due diligence and scrutiny applied to those shortlisted by the Committee.  However, although states are discouraged from doing so, they can nominate new candidates.  

With no prospect of consensus in sight, the nomination period was extended in September, and again in October, providing additional time for the conclusion of the consultation period.  Ultimately, in November 2020, the consultation process was opened up to the candidates who had made the Committee’s longlist, and who were still interested in being considered for the position.  Five additional candidates were thus added to the consultation process, namely Carlos Castresana Fernandez from Spain, Karim A. A. Khan from the United Kingdom, Francesco Lo Voi from Italy, Robert Petit from Canada, and Brigitte Raynaud from France.  The nomination period was extended once more until December 13, 2020, then again until December 18, 2020.  However, during the 19th session of the ASP, there was still no discernable consensus candidate, so the consultation period was once again extended until January 18, 2021.  In fact, the assembly decided to defer the election until early 2021.

Assessment and Implication: Concluding Thoughts

Although the election process for the Court’s Prosecutor improved from previous elections, in particular by creating the Panel of Experts to assist the Committee and by including a vetting process of candidates, critics still view the process as flawed.  Ultimately, the process did not produce a consensus candidate, which puts its effectiveness into question.  

A solution to the present issue may be to limit the Committee’s role in the selection process by maintaining a longlist of candidates rather than creating a shortlist.  

Previously, the Committee narrowed down 86 candidates to 16 candidates in the shortlist. Limiting the Committee’s role in the selection process might prevent the uncertainties and the extensions that have marked this election, by allowing States to retain more control over the selection of a suitable candidate. Furthermore, it could be useful for the Committee to be mandated to carry out a full vetting process of candidates, in order to ensure the improvement of the working environment of the OTP.

December 2020

Monthly News Updates: Southern Cameroons – December 2020

By: Kristoffer Burck, Junior Research Associate, PILPG-NL

THIS POST COLLECTS UPDATES FROM THE PAST MONTH CONCERNING RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN CAMEROONS. THE INFORMATION IS DRAWN FROM LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ONLINE SOURCES.

VIOLENCE IN ANGLOPHONE REGIONS

Abductions | Separatists Abduct Four Local Chiefs

Two different armed separatist groups kidnapped four local chiefs on December 12 and December 13, 2020. One local ruler was abducted on the 12th December in the anglophone North West region and the three others were kidnapped on the 13th December in the anglophone South West region. [December 13th, 2020]

Abductions  | Separatists Release Three Chiefs, One Dies in Captivity

On December 16, 2020, armed separatists in the North West region released one local chief from captivity, who was abducted on December 13. Two other local chiefs from the South West region, who were kidnapped on December 13, were also released the next day. The fourth kidnapped local chief died in the custody of armed separatists. The kidnappers claim that he died due to a preexisting medical condition. [December 16th, 2020]

Clashes with Soldiers | Repeated Killings of Civilians by Military Forces

Throughout December, several sources reported arbitrary killings of civilians by soldiers in the anglophone North West and South West regions. These instances included deadly beatings of an individual on December 13th, the arrest and killing of two civilian brothers on the same day, the abduction of three and ensuing shooting of one individual on December 20th, and the killing of five villagers during a military operation against separatists on December 23rd. While the military justified some of their acts alleging that the victims had affiliations with armed separatist groups, local sources maintained that the victims had no such connections in all cases. [December 23rd, 2020]

Clashes with Soldiers | Soldiers Accused of Burning Several Civilian Houses

Besides the above-mentioned killing of five civilians, Cameroonian soldiers are accused of burning down 20 - 25 civilian houses during a military operation. The operation failed to reach its objective of capturing a separatist commander and instead resulted in the arrest of several civilians and the displacement of hundreds of villagers from their homes. [December 23rd, 2020]

Clashes with Soldiers | Three Members of Security Forces Stand Trial for Ngarbuh Massacre

The trial of three members of the security forces, two soldiers, and one gendarme, for their involvement in the Ngarbuh massacre in February 2020, began on December 17, 2020. According to Human Rights Watch, security forces killed 21 civilians, including 13 children, and subsequently looted and burned their houses. At first, the government denied any wrongdoing but later agreed to set up a commission of inquiry. This commission concluded that five of the killed individuals were armed fighters and 13 civilians were accidentally killed in the crossfire. Human Rights Watch criticized these findings of the commission, on which the trial is based, as only “going after low-ranking soldiers” and excluding those higher up in the chain of command. [December 14th, 2020]

REGIONAL ELECTIONS 

Election Results| Ruling Party Wins Regional Elections in a Landslide

The ruling CPDM party of President Biya won nine out of ten regions in regional elections, held on December 6, 2020. Out of the 14 participating parties, only four managed to secure any seats in the regional councils. The two main opposition parties boycotted the elections out of concerns of fraud, reports of corruption, and what they called an unfair system. Only local chiefs and traditional rulers were allowed to vote. The regional elections this year were held for the first time after they were promised in 1996 as an effort to address regional grievances. [December 10th, 2020]

Election Interference | Separatists Impose Lockdown during Regional Elections

Armed anglophone separatists aimed to disrupt the regional election process in the two anglophone regions. They declared a four-day lockdown spanning over the election weekend and demanding that electors do not attend polling places. There were sparse instances of isolated violence at some polling places, including the killing of one traditional ruler, while the situation remained relatively calm throughout the country. [December 6th, 2020]

Election Interference | Government Offers “Financial Gesture” to Traditional Rulers

The central government offered “financial support” to traditional chiefs, who are the sole electors, only a few days before the regional elections. The support notably is offered from government funds while they show strong affiliation with the ruling party of President Biya, the CPDM. Opposition figures described the offer as a bribe and political manipulation. [December 2nd, 2020]

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMEROON

Opposition | Opposition Leader Fee to Leave His Own House Again

Police officers, who kept Maurice Kamto, the leader of the main opposition party, under de facto house arrest for months left their post on December 8, 2020. This ends the de facto detention of Kamto. The government has not issued any statements related to the initial practice of keeping Kamto in de facto captivity, any possible legal charges against the leader, or why the house arrest ended. [December 9th, 2020]