The Minsk Protocols: Flawed by Design
Authors: Sindija Beta, Katie Hetherington, and Paul R. Williams
The election of Donald Trump as the next President of the United States has reignited discussions about a potential peace agreement in Ukraine. Advisors close to the President-elect have floated the idea of revisiting the Minsk Protocols of 2014 and 2015—agreements initially crafted to address Russian aggression in Ukraine but fraught with significant design flaws.
At first glance, revisiting the Minsk Protocols might seem like a logical starting point. However, their design was fundamentally flawed, with three critical weaknesses undermining their effectiveness.
First, Russia acted in bad faith by asserting that it was not a party to the armed conflict, despite maintaining a military presence on Ukrainian territory. This claim allowed Russia to avoid any obligations under the protocols, undermining their credibility and enforceability.
Second, the “special status” provision in the Minsk Protocols created a pathway for eroding Ukrainian political unity. It fostered governance fragmentation and institutionalized a permanent Russian influence over Ukraine’s internal affairs.
Third, the sequencing of the Minsk Protocols required Ukraine to hold elections in Donetsk and Luhansk before regaining control over its territory. This made it impossible to ensure that the elections would be free, fair, and transparent.
This blog will explore these design flaws in greater detail and explain why reviving the Minsk Protocols in future peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is unlikely to result in a durable peace.
What are the Minsk Protocols?
In response to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine, the Minsk Protocols were negotiated under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with France and Germany mediating the talks. These agreements, known as Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015), sought to establish ceasefires and provide a roadmap for resolving the conflict. However, both agreements ultimately failed, largely due to their inherent weaknesses.
Minsk I outlined commitments in three key areas: cessation of hostilities, conflict resolution, and enhanced security measures. It called for a bilateral ceasefire, OSCE monitoring, and the exchange of detainees. Additionally, the agreement provided for "special status" autonomy for parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, encouraged a national dialogue, and required “early local elections” to be held under Ukrainian law.
Following the collapse of Minsk I, Minsk II attempted to address some of these shortcomings by specifying obligations more clearly. It introduced provisions for a demilitarized zone monitored by the OSCE, constitutional reforms, local elections, and the restoration of full control over Ukraine’s borders by its government.
The “special status” provision in Minsk II included an annex detailing the powers to be granted to Donetsk and Luhansk under the decentralization process. These included the ability to appoint judicial officials, form cross-border cooperation initiatives with Russia, create militia units, enjoy immunity from interference by Ukraine’s central government, and decide language rights in the regions.
It Is Not The Same Context 10 Years On
While the Minsk Protocols address some of the same issues that continue to persist during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, their provisions were shaped by a very different geopolitical context. The war has evolved, rendering the assumptions underlying these agreements increasingly irrelevant.
Namely, when, after the protests that erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan Square and the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine, it did not do so as overtly and blatantly as in 2022. The aggression started with “The Little Green Men”, Russian military personnel acting without identification marks taking control of the Crimean peninsula. Over the course of the next 8 years, Russia continued to assert that the war in Ukraine was a civil war between “separatists” in Luhansk and Donetsk and the Ukrainian military.
In this context, the Minsk Protocols included provisions stating that Ukraine would eventually regain control over all its territory. For example, Minsk I specified that “unlawful military formations, military hardware, militants, and mercenaries” would be removed from Ukraine. Minsk II reinforced this, promising Ukraine full control over its borders.
Fast forward to 2025–Russia has launched a full-scale invasion, sending hundreds of thousands of its soldiers into Ukraine and claiming to have annexed the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. On October 4, 2022, the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council approved the Federal Constitutional Laws on the accession of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Russian Federation, thereby putting the Russian Constitution in direct conflict with the Ukrainian Constitution.
This drastic shift in Russia’s strategy and its illegal actions under international law have escalated the conflict far beyond the assumptions of 2014-2015. The Minsk Protocols, based on outdated frameworks, are no longer applicable to the realities of 2024. They fail to address the current scale of aggression, Russia’s abandonment of diplomatic subtleties, and overlapping constitutional claims over territory.
Granting Special Status: Entrenched Instability and Dysfunction
In addition to being unsuitable for the 2025 context, the Minsk Protocols were already flawed in their 2014-2015 design. Specifically, the “special status” provision for Donetsk and Luhansk was not about genuine decentralization of power but a mechanism to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.
Decentralization can be a valid governance model, but the Minsk Protocols went far beyond empowering local governance. They effectively created states within Ukraine that would operate as Russian proxies, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and unity.
By granting Donetsk and Luhansk control over policing, language policies, and cross-border cooperation with Russia, the protocols institutionalized dysfunction. This level of autonomy would paralyze Ukraine’s central government on critical issues, including foreign policy and security. For example, attempts by Kyiv to deepen ties with NATO or the European Union could be obstructed by these regions’ refusal to comply with national policies.
These provisions were not aimed at fostering self-governance but at giving Moscow leverage to control Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. Russia’s broader strategic goal has always been to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence and prevent its integration into Western institutions. Embedding such provisions into Ukraine’s political framework would ensure perpetual instability and make NATO or EU membership impossible.
The Sequencing That Was Never Realistic
The sequencing of obligations in Minsk I and Minsk II was among their most critical flaws. Both agreements required Ukraine to hold local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and implement constitutional reforms before regaining control of its borders and ensuring security.
First, holding elections in regions controlled by Russian-backed forces made it impossible to guarantee free, fair, and transparent elections. Without territorial control or security guarantees, these elections would legitimize governments loyal to Moscow.
Second, this sequencing allowed Russia to maintain leverage over Ukraine throughout the process. By requiring elections before border control, the protocols gave Russia an opportunity to entrench its influence in the region. Moscow could strengthen its position on the ground during the pre-election period, ensuring that political developments aligned with its interests. This would make it even harder for Ukraine to reassert sovereignty, as Russia could manipulate the political environment to maintain control under the guise of peace.
Conclusion
The design and sequencing of the Minsk Protocols were flawed from the outset, and their application today would only entrench Russian influence in Ukraine. Any effort to revive these agreements would perpetuate instability and undermine Ukraine's sovereignty. A viable peace proposal must affirm Ukraine’s independence, safeguard its political unity, and support its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine’s future lies in strengthening its sovereignty, not in appeasing Russia through a flawed peace process.