By: Henry Smith, Junior Research Associate at PILPG-NL
At the start of June, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) released a public statement announcing that it faced an unprecedented financial crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis in Lebanon, and would not be able to operate beyond July. As a result of the lack of funds, the Tribunal, which had already reduced its budget by 37 percent for 2021 in relation to previous years, is facing imminent closure. This blog will look at the possible consequences that the termination of the STL would have for its cases.
The financial crisis
Upon the establishment of the Tribunal, the United Nations (UN) Security Council determined that Lebanon would bear 49 percent of the STL’s costs, and the remaining 51 percent would be borne by voluntary contributions of third-party states. The Management Committee, composed of the ten largest contributors, would oversee and approve the annual budgets. Until now, 29 states have contributed in total with over a billion dollars.
Since late 2019, Lebanon has been facing a serious economic and financial crisis, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the explosion at the Port of Beirut in August 2020. As a consequence, it has been unable to provide its share of funds to the STL.
In 2021, the STL cut its budget by 35 percent in comparison to previous years, made significant cuts in staff, and received a subvention from the UN, which covered 75 percent of the Lebanese contribution. However, the STL still fell short of the necessary funds due to the lack of contributions from third-party states. Even members of the Management Committee failed to provide support, and commentators have suggested that this was due to the states’ frustration with the STL’s lack of effective results, having convicted a single suspect, who is still at large.
The cases
The UN established the STL in March 2009, at the request of Lebanon, to prosecute, under Lebanese criminal law, those responsible for the attack of February 14, 2005, that killed 22 people, including the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and injured 226 more. The STL charged four suspects, Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hassan Habib Merhi, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra, who were tried in absentia in the Ayyash et al. case. In 2020, the Tribunal issued its judgment on the case, acquitting three of the accused, but finding Mr. Ayyash guilty of all charges. The Tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment and issued an arrest warrant. However, Mr. Ayyash has still not been arrested, and the case is currently being appealed by the respondent and the Prosecutor. The Tribunal also has jurisdiction over other attacks that occurred in connection to the one that killed Hariri, and it had scheduled the beginning of the trial of its second case, the Ayyash Case, on July 16.
What the closure would mean for the cases
On June 1, the Registrar of the STL, Mr. David Tolbert, issued a notice to the Tribunal’s organs, informing them of the imminent exhaustion of funds, and of the activation of the plan to wind down its activities. This would include the suspension of all cases, the initiation of procedures for the protection of witnesses, and a process to secure records, evidence, and sensitive material. The following day, the Trial Chamber that was about to initiate the trial of the Ayyash Case announced the trial’s cancellation.
In previous closures of international adjudicative organs, such as International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and Yugoslavia (ICTY), the UN set up the International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). The IRMCT continued to hear appeals, track and prosecute remaining fugitives, and conduct retrials and reviews.
The problem for the STL is that such mechanisms also demand funding. Mr. Tolbert has said that he is drawing up plans along with the UN Secretary-General, but that these plans would not involve the same type of residual mechanism as the IRMCT, mainly due to the lack of financial resources. Alternatively, perhaps the STL's cases could be mandated to the IRMCT. However, the UN Security Council would have to restructure the Mechanism’s framework, currently divided into two branches, one for the ICTR and another for the ICTY. The UNSC would also need to redistribute funds, which could be disruptive for the IRMCT.
Another possibility would be to suspend the cases indefinitely in the hopes that they would be reopened in the future. Although this is technically possible, experts believe it is unrealistic. Therefore it is still quite hard to conclude exactly what will happen with the STL’s cases if the Tribunal effectively closes its doors.
Concluding remarks
While the STL makes plans to enter into a state of “dormancy,” determining what to do with its cases, and how to protect witnesses and archives, it is still seeking the funds it needs to conclude its pending cases. If it fails to do so before the end of July, it will be forced to shut down. It is still uncertain to conclude what will happen with its cases, but it is improbable that a residual mechanism like the one set up for the ICTR and ICTY will be established, due to the lack of financial resources.