Op-Ed: Europe in Control

Europe in Control

By James Hooper, The Washington Times, February 11, 1999

At the peace talks in Rambouillet, France, more is at stake than Kosovo’s future. Important NATO equities are on the line as well. Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic and his erstwhile Russian protectors have been joined by France and some Clinton administration officials in a de facto effort to constrain the alliance’s effectiveness.

While NATO threats and inducements brought the Serbians and Kosovo Albanians to the negotiating table, no NATO representatives are present at Rambouillet. There are no plans for NATO officials to participate in the talks, although they may be allowed into Rambouillet to integrate the anticipated diplomatic agreement with the NATO ground force planned for Kosovo.

Sources close to the Rambouillet talks confirm that the Kosovo Albanian delegation is deeply concerned about NATO’s absence, and has raised the matter with senior conference officials. Their concern is understandable since the prospect of obtaining a NATO ground presence in Kosovo including American troops induced the Kosovo Albanians to attend the talks. Their trust in NATO is reflected in their implicit acceptance of a three-year interim self-government agreement rather than independence. The ethnic Albanians rightly believe that only NATO can shield them from Serbian attacks that have already displaced over 600,000 Kosovo Albanians, destroyed more than 500 villages and over 20,000 homes, and left their economy, medical and educational systems in shambles.

NATO was the proximate cause for Serbian participation as well. Having bluffed the alliance successfully last June and October to avert air strikes, Mr. Milosevic worried that this time NATO might mean business; he fears NATO power but questions its resolve. The unwillingness of the allies to insist upon his presence at the talks has already projected weak resolve, and he knows NATO is unlikely to bomb without first removing the 1,000 unarmed and unprotected Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors from Kosovo. Serbian diplomacy at Rambouillet will seek to ensure that a NATO ground force deployed to Kosovo will find its hands so tied that it will become Serbia’s partner in keeping the Kosovo Albanians under control.

Russia is poised to acquire new and undeserved laurels. Moscow’s international stature as a legitimate Balkans player is enhanced by its official presence at the negotiating table. NATO is already counting on a Russian contribution to the peacekeeping force before Washington has even signed on. This will increase Moscow’s leverage in forestalling tough NATO action. Senior American officials are already patting themselves on the back for bringing Russia into the process, in theory mitigating Moscow’s hostility to NATO. But Russia pays no price for its inclusion, and Serbia gains an ally at the talks and on the ground.

The French are hardly concealing their objective of using the peace talks to transact unfinished Gaullist business: elbowing the Americans aside and demonstrating that the Europeans can handle big league European security problems largely on their own. Were this 1991, that aim might appear plausible. But eight years of European failures to deal effectively with Balkan wars undermine such pretensions.

The missing element at Rambouillet is American leadership. The administration wants a troop mission in Kosovo that is small, cheap, risk-free and short. Washington has already been reduced to cheerleading European efforts to shoulder their responsibilities at Rambouillet. President Clinton was supposed to agree to an American troop contingent for Kosovo by Feb. 1, but recoiled from a firm decision at the meeting with his senior national security advisers three days later. Administration officials have attempted to mask his indecisiveness by claiming that congressional support had been less than expected. This, despite that fact that key senators from across the political spectrum have publicly urged forceful U.S. intervention against Serbia and the inclusion of U.S. troops in Kosovo.

President Clinton’s reaffirmation of support for the credible threat of force against Serbia is less than fully reassuring. All of Mr. Milosevic’s wars have been fought in the gap between the threat and use of Western force. Kosovo has been no exception.

The absence of presidential leadership has left the field open to others in the administration and Europe to rewrite the NATO playbook. They want an agreement, and a NATO-plus-Russia peacekeeping force in Kosovo that will nudge NATO towards a weakened but more inclusive pan-European security forum. This would serve the vision of those seeking to dilute American power and responsibility in Europe.

Who would have predicted that Serbia, a third-rate Balkan power, could have achieved in less than 10 years what the Soviets failed to accomplish in over four decades? Keep that in mind when you listen to the self-congratulatory speeches about NATO’s brave new future at its 50th anniversary Washington summit celebration in April.

James Hooper is executive director of the Balkan Action Council in Washington, DC.